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This dissertation examines the repatriation of Nigerian mental patients during Nigeria’s 
colonial period. In so doing, it explores how racist and paternalistic definitions of the 
“African mind” developed in the colonial context implicitly influenced psychiatric and 
governmental officials’ opinions about whether or not Nigerian mental patients should be 
repatriated when they became mentally ill abroad. When analyzing files of repatriation 
cases, a distinct pattern emerges: psychiatric and governmental authorities nearly always 
justified the repatriation of Nigerian mental patients from what they considered “modern” 
countries with white majority populations such as the United Kingdom or the United 
States. Nigerian mental patients in these countries were almost always repatriated. The 
same types of authorities, however, never argued for the repatriation of Nigerians from 
what they regarded as “primitive” African colonies. Mental patients within Africa, 
including Muslim pilgrims on the journey to Mecca, were almost never repatriated to 
Nigeria. The examination of such a wide range of mentally-ill Nigerian migrants from 
across the globe allows for a new perspective on the power of colonial psychiatry to 
 viii 
emerge. Whereas scholarly works on mental illness in colonial Africa thus far have 
focused overwhelmingly on the effect that definitions of the “African mind” had on 
Africans within the colonial setting, specifically the colonial mental asylum, this 
dissertation analyzes how these same definitions affected the terms under which Nigerian 
migrants lived beyond the asylum setting and throughout the world. The result was a 
global construction of mental illness that followed colonial subjects wherever they went. 
This dissertation therefore integrates the fields of African history and global history by 
focusing on a subject group that was transnational in nature. In so doing, it illustrates the 
broad parameters within which the psychiatric knowledge and state power influenced 
each other at an international level and expands the discourse of African resistance to 
racialized psychiatry to the global arena in ways that previous works have not discussed.
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Adekunle John Hughes arrived in the United Kingdom in 1953. He had left his native 
Nigeria, for reasons unknown, having stowed away on a British vessel, presumably in 
hopes of making a better life abroad. In 1953, the UK was still the colonial master of 
Nigeria, and was seen as a land of wealth and opportunity to many colonial subjects 
throughout the world. In the UK, colonial subjects believed they would find high-paying 
jobs, get top-notch educations, maybe even build families. It is not clear from existing 
records what skills Hughes had, or what he intended to do once he arrived in Britain, but 
it is clear that, whatever his expectations, forging a new life in the UK proved very 
difficult. Not long after Hughes arrived in the UK he applied for repatriation back to 
Nigeria, presumably as a distressed British subject. Before his repatriation could be 
accomplished, however, Hughes was admitted to Long Grove Hospital, Epsom, in 1954, 
having suffered a mental breakdown. His repatriation was temporarily postponed as a 
result, but on November 18, 1954, despite his unstable condition, Hughes sailed for home 
aboard the “Apapa.” Sometime before November 26 he jumped overboard and was lost at 
sea.1  
Hughes’ story is more than a dramatic anecdote. While an exceptionally tragic 
figure, Hughes was just one of many Nigerians who experienced episodes of mental 
instability or collapse while living abroad during Nigeria’s colonial period, which lasted 
from roughly 1900 to 1960. I have compiled nearly one hundred case files of mentally-ill 
Nigerian migrants whose repatriations to Nigeria were initiated, if not necessarily carried 
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out, by host governments during this timeframe. These nearly one hundred migrants were 
a diverse group: some were relatively wealthy Nigerians seeking educational 
opportunities abroad; others were quite poor, often looking for employment opportunities 
that they hoped would be more readily available outside of Nigeria. Many of the latter 
group had financed their travel as ship workers, soldiers, and stowaways. Most were men, 
but a couple were women. They were of all different age groups from young adult to 
quite elderly. They traveled to many different corners of the globe: they went to the UK 
or to other countries in Europe; they went to neighboring African countries and colonies. 
They traveled west, crossing the Atlantic and settling in the US or Canada; and they 
traveled east, crossing the Sahara on the holy pilgrimage to Mecca, often settling in the 
Sudan for long periods of time because they could not afford to continue their journeys. 
Despite the widely divergent backgrounds of the migrants in these case files, they all had 
one thing in common: while abroad they all suffered a supposed mental breakdown 
severe enough that the host government desired their repatriation back to Nigeria. 
This dissertation is concerned primarily with what happened to these unfortunate 
Nigerian migrants after the point at which they were declared to be “mentally-ill” in a 
foreign country. Essentially, three distinct outcomes were possible. Mentally-ill migrants 
could be repatriated to Nigeria and released to the care of family and friends; they could 
be repatriated to Nigeria to languish without adequate treatment in dilapidated colonial 
mental asylums; or they could remain public charges in the mental institutions of their 
host countries. All three of these outcomes occurred to varying extents.  
                                                                                                                                                 
1
 Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor-General, Nigeria, 26 November 1954 NAI CSO 
03028/S.1088/31. 
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But why did the outcomes vary? As it turns out, at no point during Nigeria’s 
colonial period were “rules” for the repatriation of mentally-ill persons established, and 
repatriation cases continued to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis throughout this 
period. There were many factors that could potentially affect the ultimate decision. Was 
the patient in the host country legally? Until 1963, British subjects had the unlimited right 
to reside in any British-controlled territory, including the UK itself. However, beyond the 
realms of the British Empire, legal restrictions on immigration were often much more 
strict, especially in the United States where legal immigration of Africans was highly 
limited after the passing of the xenophobic Immigration Act of 1929. Also at issue was 
the cost of repatriating mental patients to Nigeria. Who should pay for such an 
undertaking? The government doing the repatriating? The government of which the 
patient was an actual subject? The patient’s family/community of origin? Negotiations 
over cost and who should pay were sometimes quite protracted and in several cases did 
affect the outcome of repatriation cases. Governments also had to assess whether 
repatriation could be completed successfully at all. The mental asylums in colonial 
Nigeria were chronically overcrowded and lacked even basic therapeutic opportunities 
due primarily to the parsimonious nature of the colonial government. The colonial 
government of Nigeria was sometimes able to forestall repatriations by declaring there 
was no room in Nigerian mental asylums. Often the intended goal was to repatriate the 
patient and release him or her to the care of relations. However, if relatives could not be 
found or refused to accept responsibility for their ailing kinsman, then repatriation 
became less plausible of an alternative.  
 4 
Although these factors were all influential to varying degrees depending on 
specific cases, one of the most important factors determining how a repatriation case 
would proceed was the issue of the patient’s best interests and how they were defined in 
the psychiatric context of the day. Should the patient be repatriated, sent home to familiar 
surroundings in Nigeria where they would lack access to “modern” mental health services 
but would have the support of friends and family; or should they remain where their 
affliction was recognized, relying on the psychiatric services (or lack thereof) of a host 
country, for better or worse? This dissertation argues that the answers to these questions 
varied between individual cases, based most commonly on the geographical location of 
the mental patient in question. 
Despite the multitudinous factors impinging upon repatriation cases and lack of a 
clear policy for assessing these factors, the decision-making processes for the repatriation 
of mentally-ill Nigerians proved to be anything but random. Upon close examination, a 
conspicuous pattern emerges, a pattern that was followed with little variation throughout 
Nigeria’s colonial history. With remarkable consistency, those Nigerians that were 
declared to be suffering from a mental illness while in Europe, Canada, or the US were 
almost always repatriated quickly and with little dispute between governments. The most 
common explanation justifying repatriation in these cases was that it would be in the 
patient’s “best interests” to be removed from an unfamiliar environment and returned to 
his homeland, regardless of whether he or she would be returned to family members or 
placed in an asylum upon returning to Nigeria. This process varies drastically from that 
of Nigerians who came to be recognized as mentally ill while resident in countries or 
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colonies within Africa. In such cases, the patient was almost never repatriated at all, and 
concerns for the patient’s “best interests” were never the justification for the actions 
taken. On the contrary, logistical issues such as the cost of repatriation and the need to 
reduce overcrowding in colonial asylums were the primary stated motivations for 
pursuing repatriations.  
The pattern just described was never outlined as official policy, but was followed 
with great consistency. Of the 54 Nigerian mental patients whose repatriations were 
requested from Western countries such as the UK, Canada, US or countries in mainland 
Europe, at least 47 were ultimately repatriated. Of the 29 cases of Nigerian mental 
patients whose repatriations were requested from within Africa, only nine were ever 
carried out and almost all of these were accomplished at the request of relations of the 
patient, not at the behest of the governments involved. There are a small number of cases 
in which the ultimate outcome of the repatriation process remains unclear, and in a 
couple of the cases repatriation did not occur because the patient unfortunately died 
before arrangements could be finalized, but the overall pattern is remarkably consistent. 
Why should I make such a fuss over a process that affected so relatively few 
people in such an unusual set of circumstances? It may appear at first glance that the 
focus of this study is esoteric, and, as such, unlikely to contribute much to historians’ 
understanding of anything. This is more than the history of a seemingly inconsequential 
official correspondence, however. Likewise it is more than the narrative of a few 
“subaltern” lives whose stories would go otherwise untold. The examination of the 
official correspondence concerning these marginalized individuals reveals how the 
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complex intersections between theories concerning the nature of race, ethnicity, culture 
and human psychology were influencing government actions and affecting individuals’ 
lives in the first half of the twentieth century. These theories, which made up the core of a 
sub-discipline within psychiatry known in the early twentieth century as “ethno-
psychiatry” (I prefer to call it “colonial psychiatry” since there was very little “ethnic” 
about it), were largely constructed within the context of a global imperial project that 
defined Europeans as inherently superior to non-Europeans in intellect and mental 
cognition. In African colonies, colonial psychiatry effectively defined the essential 
mentality of colonial subjects, affecting to a certain degree the way that colonial 
governments addressed and controlled their subject populations, particularly their 
mentally-ill populations. However, as the cases of repatriation examined in this 
dissertation illustrate, colonial psychiatry also had a global reach, defining colonial 
subjects and determining how they would be treated across the world. In this way 
colonial psychiatry led not only to a “colonial” construction of mental illness that defined 
and controlled Africans in a colonial context, but also to a global construction of mental 
illness that affected Africans wherever they traveled. In forging these linkages between 
psychiatric knowledge and the exercise of imperial power, this dissertation breaks new 
analytical ground within the existing historiography of psychiatry and mental illness in 
colonial Africa while simultaneously expanding the scope of that historiography to a 
global level. It thereby brings the study of African history into conversation with methods 
in the emerging field of global history, and vice versa. 
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COLONIAL PSYCHIATRY, CULTURE, AND MIGRATION  
Determining the impact of colonial psychiatry on global migration control policies 
requires posing a couple of key questions: Why did such a systematic process of 
migration control come into being and how was it justifiable to treat mentally-ill persons 
differently based primarily upon where in the world they were first deemed to be insane? 
Perhaps more importantly, how did this system of migration control emerge and remain 
so consistent without the backing of a declared policy or legal procedure for such cases? 
The answer to these questions, I argue, lies in the development of colonial psychiatry in 
African colonies during the first half of the twentieth century.  
 Colonial psychiatry in Africa developed within the context of a European colonial 
ideology that justified white rule on the basis of racial superiority. European colonization 
of Africa was rationalized, to a large extent, on the belief that European civilization was 
qualitatively more sophisticated, rational, humane and introspective than those of non-
Europeans, particularly Africans. One of the most popular explanations for the 
superiority of European civilizations was that Europeans were simply intellectually and 
cognitively superior to Africans, a stereotype dating back into the days of the Atlantic 
slave trade that justified the sub-human treatment of Africans on the basis that Africans 
were somehow sub-human and, as such, meant to serve whites. The idea of African 
inferiority pervaded most aspects of colonial rule in African territories, and the 
development and function of colonial psychiatry was no exception. Colonial 
psychiatrists, by and large, took the inferiority of African subjects for granted. The main 
concern of colonial psychiatrists was trying to prove why Africans were mentally inferior 
to Europeans. This led to numerous studies by European psychiatrists, anthropologists, 
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and colonial officials across the continent designed to determine the nature of the 
“African mind”, what caused its underdevelopment compared to European minds, and 
what caused it to become mentally ill.2 Ultimately, the consensus in colonial psychiatric 
communities became that African mental inferiority was not mainly the result of biology, 
but of environmental factors, most importantly African culture, which did not prepare 
their young people to reach the levels of intellectual achievement and deep thought that 
European culture did.  
Because colonial psychiatrists were influenced by the prevalently-held racist 
ideology that justified the colonization of “inferior” Africans by “superior” Europeans, 
they tended to disdain Africans’ own culturally-specific understandings of mental illness. 
Colonial psychiatrists believed that Europeans, with their superior intellects, could 
understand Africans far better than they could understand themselves. Pre-existing 
knowledge that Africans had about their own cultures and definitions of mental illness 
within those cultures was only useful to European colonial psychiatrists once they had 
analyzed it for themselves and uncovered its true value. However, since Europeans 
looked at Africans through racially-tinted lenses, they tended to see Africans similarly 
across the continent, as universally “inferior” to Europeans in the same ways. The quest 
for the nature of the “African mind” and how “African culture” affected it therefore 
became a universalizing process by which Europeans saw all Africans as essentially the 
same, at least in relation to Europeans, and all African cultures as essentially the same, 
                                                 
2
 This was a project undertaken not only in the African setting, but with a mind to uncovering the nature of 
the “primitive” human mind in general. Major works on the subject of “primitivism” include Sigmund 
Freud, Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics 
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again, in relation to European. Cultural differences between groups within Africa and 
Europe were less significant to colonial psychiatrists than differences across race. 
“African culture” therefore came to be universally defined as the totality of 
characteristics that made Africans inferior to Europeans. 
 Colonial psychiatrists further believed that the “African mind” was at its 
healthiest when functioning in “primitive” circumstances of the universal “African 
culture”. The greatest threat to the “African mind,” according to colonial psychiatrists, 
was contact with more sophisticated, individualistic, manic and often stressful culture of 
Europeans. African culture had simply not prepared Africans to understand European 
culture or to cope effectively with the changes and stresses of the “civilization” that it 
brought.  
 The concept that too much contact with Europeans was actually dangerous for 
Africans complemented the administrative philosophy of the British colonial government 
in Nigeria quite well. The philosophy of indirect rule, which the British applied in all of 
their African colonies, had actually been articulated first and most famously by Frederick 
Lugard in northern Nigeria. At its basic level, the concept behind indirect rule was to 
leave indigenous African societies untouched to the greatest extent possible, altering 
indigenous political, economic and cultural institutions only when necessary: i.e. in the 
interests of administrative expediency or to quash the most noxious practices such as 
domestic slavery. Indirect rule was partly designed out of a belief that indigenous cultures 
should be preserved as much as possible, incorporating the best parts of British culture 
                                                                                                                                                 
first published 1913, trans. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1989); and Lucien 
Levy-Bruhl, Primitive Mentality , trans. Lilian A. Clare (New York: Macmillan, 1923).  
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with the best parts of indigenous culture over a very long time. Indirect rule was also an 
economic necessity: it provided a philosophical justification for the unwillingness of 
colonial governments to provide the capital necessary for the wholesale “modernization” 
of African infrastructure and public services.   
 Indirect rule applied to psychiatric services just as it did to other public services. 
Colonial asylums were built to house only the most dangerous, violent and criminal 
“lunatics,” to use the parlance of the times. Requests for expansion and improvement of 
facilities were regularly denied. The result was that colonial asylums quickly became 
chronically overcrowded, dilapidated, and offered little to no therapeutic value to those 
detained within them. The failure to expand colonial asylums in Nigeria, while a 
recognized embarrassment to the government, was often justified on the philosophical 
underpinnings of indirect rule not to overrun indigenous societies with European 
institutions. Colonial administration and colonial psychiatry were therefore ready 
bedfellows. The racist underpinnings justifying colonial rule influenced how colonial 
psychiatry as a discipline developed, the questions it asked and the answers it sought. 
Similarly, colonial psychiatry justified colonial administrations by supporting the belief 
that European influence should be gradual for the best interests of the subject 
populations.   
 The need to limit African contact with European culture also proved important in 
matters of migration. The fear was that migration to places with high levels of European 
influence would contribute to “detribalization”, the alienation of Africans from their 
communities of origin and their replacement with European-inspired ideas that they could 
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not handle. European educations only exacerbated this phenomenon, providing unfettered 
access to European ideas and the prospect of employment in “modern” industries, 
possibly even travel abroad. Those who went abroad, particularly to Europe or the US, 
found themselves surrounded by the culture that colonial psychiatrists believed to be the 
greatest threat to African mental health. The pattern of repatriation cases laid out in this 
dissertation clearly evinces the threat that psychiatrists believed European surroundings 
posed to African mental health. These psychiatrists often argued, as they did in the case 
of Adekunle John Hughes mentioned above, that improvement of the patient’s mental 
disorder was contingent on removing him or her from a “modern” and “white” 
environment back to more familiar surroundings.  Those who traveled abroad to non-
European places, however, were not seen to be threatened by their new cultural 
surroundings. No mention of a patient’s interests is ever made in such cases, and, more 
often than not, repatriation was not effected at all. 
Although never explicitly stated, it is clear that racialized perceptions of mental 
health played a role in how repatriation cases were negotiated and how they were 
resolved. Cases that originated within African colonies did not require resolution, since 
conditions were seen as much the same everywhere and there was very little chance that 
repatriation would improve the mental health of a patient. However, in cases from outside 
of Africa, the cause of mental illness was often seen as a direct result of the foreign 
conditions of chaos and modernity that the patient encountered – therefore repatriation, 
even if it was to a place with poorer medical and mental health facilities, was considered 
useful. Although the primary goal of governments in all cases was the avoidance of 
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responsibility for someone likely to become a public charge or public nuisance, the 
ultimate outcome relied heavily on racialized conceptions of the “African mind.” In 
simple terms, the “African mind” belonged in Africa. As long as the African mental 
patient was in Africa, he was in his element and little could be done to improve his 
mental health by repatriating him. However, if the African was outside of Africa, the best 
thing for him was to return him to Africa. In this way, the knowledge of the “African 
mind” developed by colonial psychiatrists defined the needs and capabilities of Africans, 
in this case Nigerians, throughout the world. 
The recognition that socio-cultural factors play a part in the formation and 
diagnosis of mental illnesses in individuals does not imply that these illnesses are not real 
and that people do not actually suffer from them. There is no doubt that migrants’ 
experiences were physically and mentally taxing. Migrants tried to make their way in 
new societies and cultures, far from home, lacking the stability and comfort of the 
familiar. Their trips could be dangerous and could end in disaster. Homeless and 
penurious Africans crowded the cities of Britain. Racism and violence in Europe and the 
United States threatened lives and livelihoods of those who dared to have the wrong skin 
color. Pilgrims faced the prospect of hunger, thirst, disease, enslavement and death on 
their long overland journey across the Sahel to the Red Sea. Under such conditions and 
with so much at stake, it is remarkable how many migrants were able to persevere and 
build new lives in far away places or complete their missions and return to Nigeria as 
better, stronger people. It is not surprising that many were not able to cope with their 
migratory trials and developed a mental illness in the process. At the same time, however, 
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the way that these migrants were treated was inextricably linked to the psychiatric 
community’s power to define “African” culture homogenously and in contradistinction 
from “European” culture, to suggest that proximity to “European” culture was 
detrimental to the functioning of the African mind, and to disseminate this knowledge on 
a global level.  This dissertation therefore contributes substantially to the historical 
understanding of how colonial psychiatry affected people’s lives not only within the 
colonial context, but throughout the world through a global construction of mental illness. 
PSYCHIATRY, POWER, AND COLONIALISM 
It is clear from the above that psychiatric understandings of cultural difference and what 
constitutes “normality” and “abnormality” within specific cultures have been shaped by 
psychiatrists’ own cultural and historical contexts. The obvious difference between the 
racialized definition of culture employed by colonial psychiatrists and the much more 
variegated understandings of culture utilized by psychiatrists in the twenty-first century is 
a clear indication that such definitions can change significantly with the times. Even 
today, psychiatrists do not fully understand the complex relationships between biological 
and environmental processes that create the individual human mind. Regardless of 
whether biologically or environmentally founded, chronic or transitory, real or imagined, 
mental illnesses are always manifested, diagnosed, and treated within specific socio-
cultural contexts. Whatever their cause and manifestations, they are explained in terms of 
“abnormality”, an individual’s deviation from behavioral norms. Definitions of what 
constitutes “normal” behavior are not universal – they are cultural constructs that often 
vary between social groupings and change over time. This recognition within psychiatric 
 14 
circles has sparked ongoing debates over how the human mind should be scientifically 
understood.3 How much of the functioning of the human brain is universal, applicable to 
all humans? How much is specific to the individual experience, and what kind of 
experience matters most? How much does a person’s cultural background affect their 
definitions of “normality” and, by extension, the ways that they will express their 
“abnormality” in the form of a mental illness? Can these “abnormalities” be universally 
understood, or will they be difficult, if not impossible, to diagnose and treat effectively 
from a different normality paradigm?   
The exact, specific, undeniably true answers to these complicated questions may 
never be known. But it is important to note that definitions of culture and categorizations 
of mental illness are extremely important to the psychiatric treatment of mental illness, 
and that these definitions change over time. Nevertheless, a majority of psychiatric 
experts both today and in the time period under investigation in this dissertation – 
roughly the first half of the twentieth century- would recognize that mental illness is not 
universal in humans. It appears in a variety of forms both within and across cultures. 
Even in the forms that do appear universally prevalent, such as schizophrenia, they seem 
to occur at different rates and to manifest themselves in different ways across cultures.4 
This increasingly clear differentiation of incidence, symptoms, and treatment regimes 
between individuals within and across cultural groupings is a strong indication that a host 
of biological and environmental factors play a role in the development and progression of 
                                                 
3
 For more on the relationship between psychology and culture see, for example, Francis L.K. Hsu, ed., 
Psychological Anthropology (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1972). 
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mental illnesses. Biological predisposition, intensely personal experience, and socio-
cultural background are all elements that work together in extraordinarily complex ways 
to shape the operation of the human mind. But recognizing that culture is a factor 
influencing mental processes is also dependent on recognizing that culture is itself a 
variable in any equation. Defining what is meant by “culture” and where lines between 
cultures should be drawn is a sociological process in itself. The defining characteristics 
that constitute a distinct “culture” are determined differently depending on who is doing 
the defining, and many groups have changed how they define their own cultures and 
those of others significantly over time.   
The purpose here is not to detail how or why definitions of culture change, but to 
note that this process does occur and that the ability to define the “normal” characteristics 
of a specific culture and, by contrast, what constitutes “abnormality” within that culture 
or across cultures carries with it a great deal of power: the passive power to label 
individuals or groups as inferior and therefore less worthy of respect and equal treatment 
and the active power of marginalizing those individuals and groups in the supposed 
interests of law, order, and preservation of the “normal.” The role of psychiatrists in 
shaping this power dynamic has been a major theme with historians stemming from 
Foucault. In his seminal work, Madness and Civilization, Foucault argued that the 
modern science of psychology was used as a tool by European governments as a form of 
social control, a way to rid the streets of elements that posed a threat to the established 
social order. According to Foucault, the “Great Confinement” of the “insane” in the 
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seventeenth through nineteenth centuries was the result of a dialectic that placed 
“madness” as the polar opposite of “reason” in ways that had never before been 
articulated in European society.5 Foucault’s arguments have been the subject of intense 
debate amongst historians of psychiatry in Britain (and Europe in general). Some “anti-
psychiatrists”, including several historians, have taken Foucault’s argument to the 
extreme, arguing that psychiatry is little more than a process of social control, and that 
mental illnesses only exist in the sense that individuals who do not follow established 
social norms are “labeled” as mentally ill by majority populations that are not willing to 
abide deviation from the norm.6  Others have argued that Foucault and his followers have 
overstated the extent to which mental illnesses are exaggerated phenomena – for example 
pointing out that the “Great Confinement” was isolated to a very few places and should 
not be taken as a universal characterization of the relationship between psychiatry and 
state power.7 It is hard to argue, however, that psychiatrists’ ability to define mental 
abnormality in concrete and scientific terms and to isolate individuals from society based 
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on these diagnoses is not a powerful responsibility that could be and, in cases, has been 
marshaled by the state in one form or another. 
The link between psychiatric practice and state power is more apparent in colonial 
Africa, and Nigeria is no exception. European colonial psychiatrists often had very 
different views of causes and treatments for mental illness than did the indigenous 
societies in which they worked. The impact that colonial psychiatrists had, therefore, 
came through the extension of colonial rule, through the coercion of indigenous persons 
into European-styled psychiatric institutions. Colonial governments’ interests in the 
psychiatric health of their subjects were relatively clear: the role of mental asylums was 
to remove mentally “abnormal” people from the streets so that they would not be a threat 
to law and order. In colonial Africa, Foucault’s link between psychiatric institutions and 
social control could not be more apt. However, because colonial governments were 
concerned only with those people who posed a significant threat to law and order, 
asylums typically only housed severe cases of mental illness, those that were too violent 
or severely affected to be controlled in their home environments by family and friends. 
Therefore, nothing along the lines of a “Great Confinement” of the insane occurred 
anywhere in colonial Africa. However, the power of colonial psychiatry was very heavily 
linked to that of the state in African colonies, including Nigeria.  
This relationship between colonial power and the psychiatric definition and 
control of colonial subjects has been the main preoccupation of historical works on 
colonial psychiatry in Africa, and indeed other parts of the world that have come under 
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European colonial rule.8 Historical works on colonial mental asylums in Africa really 
begin with Vaughan’s work on Zomba Lunatic Asylum in Nyasaland [now Malawi].9 
Vaughan effectively illustrates the extent to which colonial asylums became spaces for 
the definition of the “African mind” as inferior to Europeans and threatened by 
Europeans and as spaces in which unstable African minds were sequestered from their 
communities of origin. Vaughan’s work has spawned several historical examinations of 
colonial asylums in other parts of colonial Africa. Bell has written an institutional history 
of Kissy Mental Asylum in Sierra Leone.10 McCulloch’s work highlights asylums in the 
British settler colonies of Kenya and Rhodesia.11 Sadowsky’s work on mental asylums in 
southwestern Nigeria has been particularly influential to this dissertation,12 and Parle, 
Deacon and Swartz have detailed the history of mental institutions in South Africa.13 All 
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of these works make significant contributions to the understanding of the relationship 
between the context of racial superiority that underpinned colonial ideologies and the 
practice of colonial psychiatry in the asylum setting. These works have also done a 
remarkable job illustrating the extent to which these ideologies operated similarly in 
colonial asylum settings across the continent. The result is a remarkably consistent 
historiography, but one that has until very recently been isolated in scope, concerning 
itself most significantly with the effects of colonial ideology on the development of 
psychiatric knowledge and the exercise of psychiatric power strictly within the asylum 
setting. 
A couple of recent works have moved somewhat beyond the institution as the site 
where colonial psychiatric knowledge was developed and employed. Part of Jackson’s 
work on the history of Ingutsheni mental asylum in Southern Rhodesia [now Zimbabwe] 
moves beyond the asylum setting to discuss the ways that colonial definitions of mental 
illness affected the way space was ordered throughout colonial Rhodesia.14 Keller also 
works with spaces outside of the colonial asylum in parts of his study of mental 
institutions in French Algeria, discussing the effects that colonial psychiatric definitions 
of the “Arab mind” have had on North African immigrants in France.15 In both of these 
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works, the pathologization of the indigenous African mind as itself akin to madness is 
shown to have affected not only how the “insane” were perceived but also the “sane” and 
that these perceptions have had far-reaching negative implications for Africans not only 
in colonial asylums or even colonial settings, but, as Keller has shown, in the wider world 
as well. 
This dissertation is concerned primarily with the issue that these recent works 
have only just broached: how did psychiatric knowledge developed in colonial asylums 
affect the exercise of colonial power outside of the asylum. Some historians have argued 
that the impact of psychiatric knowledge on the exercise of colonial power was actually 
quite minimal.  This argument would seem quite reasonable if the focus of inquiry is 
limited to the colonial asylum where colonial psychiatrists’ constant requests for higher 
funding to expand facilities and provide new treatments were often flippantly rejected by 
colonial governments more concerned with balancing budgets than improving public 
services. Jackson and Keller have posited that the relationship is actually much more 
complicated when looking beyond the asylum setting to the ways that psychiatric 
conceptions of mental illness framed constructions of race and space. This dissertation 
further proves this connection. As the repatriation cases involving Nigerian mental 
patients indicate, the link between colonial psychiatry and the exercise of state power 
worked both ways. Colonial psychiatric definitions of the universal “African mind”, 
stable only in its “primitive” cultural environment in Africa and perilously endangered by 
overexposure to more complex European ways, I argue, implicitly influenced the 
decisions that governments made regarding whether or not to repatriate a given patient. 
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The connection between psychiatric knowledge and the exercise of state power, often 
unrecognizable within the confines of the colonial asylum, becomes much clearer through 
the lens of international migration because, while the colonial government could ignore 
the requests of their own mental asylums over which they had more or less complete 
control, they could not ignore pressures to repatriate mentally-ill subjects instigated by 
other governments. In these discussions, covering many different territorial entities, 
government attitudes towards colonial psychiatric knowledge reveal themselves in ways 
that might be masked within a single-government context like the colonial asylum. 
PSYCHIATRY, IMPERIALISM, AND GLOBALIZATION 
The repatriation cases examined here deal with issues that transcend the boundaries of 
colonial Nigeria and even the African continent. In looking beyond the colonial asylum 
as the site wherein the construction of psychiatric knowledge about mental illness in 
Africans was developed and employed, the framework of this dissertation encompasses 
not only Nigerian history and African history, broadly defined, but also the nascent field 
of global history. At its most basic level, global history is concerned with processes and 
institutions that transcend the absolute control of the nation-state (or colonial state). 
Global history is concerned with the flow of people, goods, ideas and information, and 
social and cultural organization across nation-state, regional, and continental 
boundaries.16 In essence, it is the history what we know today by the buzzword 
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“globalization,” which Hopkins has defined in the broadest terms as “a process that 
transforms economic, political, social, and cultural relationships across countries, regions, 
and continents by spreading them more broadly, making them more intense, and 
increasing their velocity.”17 The governments of nation states and empires are factors in 
global history – they both influence globalization and are influenced by it – but they are 
not in complete control those forces which can be defined as truly global.18 
Although some historians have tried to define the history of globalization as a 
phenomenon temporally isolated to the period since the 1950s characterized by a 
teleological progression towards greater connectivity, egalitarianism, democratization, 
free trade and, presumably ultimate happiness for the world,19 and that these forces 
primarily originated in and have always been controlled by the West,20 others have 
described globalization as essentially a negative phenomenon that is impoverishing large 
parts of the world under the banner of global capitalism.21 Such arguments are polemical 
and often ahistorical, and global historians are increasingly rallying around an 
understanding that globalization is a much more complex phenomenon that is “in fact a 
process as much subject to change as any other, and that it is therefore misleading to 
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neglect its fluctuating growth and decline” over the many centuries of human 
civilization.22 Indeed, many developments occurred in the second half of the nineteenth 
century that contributed greatly to globalization as a process. Technological revolutions 
in transportation, such as the steamship, shrank the world by reducing the time it took to 
cross regional and even continental divides. Communications transformations in the form 
of the telegraph and, later, radio, allowed for information to be transmitted nearly 
instantly around the world.23 Also emerging in the second half of the nineteenth century 
was the concept of international cooperation and organization, particularly in the 
production and dissemination of scientific knowledge.24 These expedients to 
globalization greatly contributed to the bringing together of people and cultures through 
the extension of direct European political control across most of Africa and much of 
Asia, which in turn influenced migration patterns in much of the world in the twentieth 
century.25 All of these globalizing tendencies dating back to the second half of the 
nineteenth century greatly influenced the unfolding of events regarding repatriation 
procedures for mentally-ill Nigerians. 
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The study of the repatriation of Nigerian mental patients during the first half of 
the twentieth century deals with the interaction of two different global processes – 
international migration and the international scientific process of creating mental health 
knowledge, as well as how governments utilized that psychiatric knowledge in 
controlling international migration. This dissertation enlarges the geographical focus of 
where colonial psychiatry had influence, extending what has been confined to the 
historiography of colonial Africa to the level of global history. Colonial psychiatric 
knowledge about the nature of the African mind was influential not only within colonial 
Africa, but also amongst psychiatric authorities and government officials outside of 
Africa, in the UK, Europe, US and elsewhere. Racialized understandings of the “African 
mind” therefore not only affected how mentally-ill Nigerians were perceived by their 
own colonial government, but the way that mentally-ill Nigerians were perceived 
throughout the world. In this way, the construction of the “African mind” undertaken by 
colonial psychiatrists was more than a colonial endeavor; it had global consequences in 
that the knowledge created in the colonial environment spread throughout the world and 
affected colonial subjects beyond the colonial domain. The knowledge of the “African 
mind” during this period was therefore a global construction of mental illness that in 
effect treated Africans, in this case Nigerians, as colonized subjects anywhere they went.  
In making this point, I am arguing against a definition of globalization that relies 
on a deterministic trend towards greater egalitarianism and mutual respect and 
understanding between people. While this certainly has occurred in the realm of 
psychiatric knowledge production since the 1950s, there was clearly a global structure 
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existing prior to this time, controlled primarily by European powers and based explicitly 
on racial difference. Global systems of knowledge production and international migration 
control procedures that came into being in the decades prior to the 1950s were used to 
reinforce beliefs that human beings, particularly Africans, were better off remaining in 
their regions of origin, not traversing the earth as “global citizens”. The idea that the 
processes of globalization can be used to separate people as well as bring them together 
could be a provocative new avenue for research in global history. 
RESISTANCE, REFORM, AND CONTESTATION 
Because definitions of the “African mind” tended to marginalize Africans rather than 
incorporate them into colonial and global processes, these definitions were heavily 
contested by Africans themselves. Those declared mentally-ill and their families often 
resisted such definition at both the colonial level and the international level upon which 
repatriations were conducted. Similarly, over time, European-trained African 
psychiatrists contested the established knowledge of the “African mind” at both the 
colonial and the global level, ultimately reshaping the very system of global knowledge 
production and dissemination that had been used to homogenize and marginalize 
Africans to argue for a much more racially integrated psychiatric community and a more 
culturally sensitive brand of psychiatry that has developed into the cross-cultural, or 
trans-cultural, psychiatry of the current epoch. 
 Nigerians resisted definition by colonial psychiatric authorities in a variety of 
ways. Most commonly, they simply refused to believe European conceptions of what 
caused their mental illnesses, preferring to continue to consult the indigenous medico-
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spiritual practitioners who had held traditional authority in the arena of mental 
disturbance for centuries. As a result, most mentally-ill Nigerians never came to the 
attention of the colonial authorities at all. Those who did find themselves in colonial 
mental asylums often had their release petitioned for by relatives on the grounds that 
European psychiatric practices were ineffectual compared to traditional means – a 
position for which there was quite a bit of evidence considering the universally-
recognized disgraces of the colonial asylum system in Nigeria. Sometimes family 
members of those Nigerians repatriated on grounds of mental illness contested the 
diagnoses that had justified their repatriations, arguing that innate inferiority of the 
“African mind” had nothing to do with their psychological travails, which were often 
seen more as a reaction to racism, poverty, and the extreme stress associated with intense 
studies that could affect anyone regardless of racial profile. 
 The protestations of lay Nigerians show the extent to which Nigerians resisted 
being defined in negative terms, but their protests were in the main motivated by personal 
agendas to retain loved ones and avoid the familial embarrassment of mental illness. 
These protests were mostly applicable only at the individual level, and did not hold much 
influence beyond this. However, European-trained African psychiatrists often had much 
greater influence on psychiatric conceptions of the “African mind” at a much more global 
level. Certainly the most famous critic of colonial psychiatry in Africa is Frantz Fanon. 
Fanon was a practicing psychiatrist in Algeria during the war of liberation (1955-62). 
Fanon contested head on the colonial psychiatry that had defined the African (and Arab) 
as inferior, base and criminal in nature. Fanon argued not only that the colonial situation 
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based on a racist worldview affected how colonial subjects were defined, but that the 
colonial experience actually did create psychosis in colonial subjects by teaching them to 
hate their innate beings. Fanon also famously argued that the only effective catharsis for 
the psychological damage done by colonial rule was the violent overthrow of the colonial 
regime as was taking place in Algeria at the time he penned his seminal work The 
Wretched of the Earth.26 
 Although it is not clear what reach Fanon’s writings had in Nigeria, by the 1950s 
there were several psychiatrists of Nigerian origin working against colonial psychiatric 
definitions of the African mind there. The most famous of these Nigerian psychiatrists 
was T. Adeoye Lambo, the first Nigerian to receive a European degree in psychiatry and 
the first director of Aro Mental Hospital, the first fully functioning mental hospital in 
Nigeria, which opened in 1954. Where Fanon spoke in broad philosophical terms, Lambo 
tended to conduct clinical analyses in the mainstream methodologies of psychiatric 
research, focusing primarily on revealing the culturally-specific manifestations of mental 
illness in different Nigerian cultural groups and developing appropriate treatment 
regimens that took into account specific cultural forms of mental illness.27 Lambo 
therefore used psychiatric methodologies to subvert the trends in colonial psychiatry, 
arguing for a de-linking of definitions of culture from race and proving that the African 
mind was by no means a universal phenomenon. Lambo’s culturally sensitive psychiatry 
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was illustrated in the treatment regimens he established at Aro Mental Hospital, whereby 
indigenous medical practitioners were incorporated into the diagnostic process and in 
which patients were often allowed to live and work in “village” environments similar to 
their communities of origin. Lambo’s approaches proved quite effective, and, since the 
1950s, racialized colonial psychiatric models have ceased to carry weight in the global 
psychiatric community, having been replaced by new models of cross-cultural or trans-
cultural psychiatry which are more complex but also more specific in their orientation of 
how to treat non-Western persons using Western psychiatric techniques.28 
 The various responses to colonial psychiatry by Nigerians discussed in this 
dissertation therefore also contribute to historiographies of mental illness in colonial 
Africa as well as to the global history of psychiatry. The resistance of lay persons 
discussed above fits easily within a part of a well-established historiography of African 
resistance to the pathologization of their bodies and psyches at the colonial level. 
However, at the same time, however, this dissertation illustrates how efforts to resist and 
reform colonial psychiatry on the part of Nigerians were also carried out at the global 
level. The ability of Lambo ultimately to influence global trends in psychiatric 
knowledge paradigms is a strong indication of the extent to which global forces can shift 
over time, in this case from a racialized field in terms of membership and thought to a 
much more integrative community. Lambo’s use of a global infrastructure for knowledge 
production and dissemination to promote a more diversified understanding of human 
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psychology is also an intriguing example of how globalizing forces can themselves 
contribute to the understanding and survival of “local” identities. 
CHAPTER OUTLINES 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapters one and two work together to illustrate 
the multitudinous factors and circumstances that influenced perceptions of how the 
specific repatriation cases discussed in the following four chapters should be treated. 
Chapter one provides the background on mental health services in colonial Nigeria. 
Overall, colonial psychiatric services were under-funded and facilities for the 
maintenance of the mentally-ill poorly maintained throughout the colonial period. 
Because of the overall scarcity of mental asylums, the existing ones were also chronically 
overcrowded, primarily with violent, criminal or otherwise unruly patients. The 
administrative philosophy of indirect rule, predicated on the conception that colonial rule 
should be as undisruptive as possible to indigenous political and social institutions, 
justified the minimization of colonial psychiatric services.  Nigerians for the most part 
reviled colonial psychiatric services, partly because they were so poorly operated, but 
also because they preferred to treat their mentally ill at the community level, by their own 
relatives and friends, in traditional settings and through traditional means. The role of 
colonial psychiatric services in Nigeria remained largely unchanged until the opening of 
Aro Mental Hospital in 1954, the first modern mental hospital built in Nigeria and run for 
the first time by Nigerian psychiatrists including T. Adeoye Lambo. Even after the 
opening of Aro, however, mental asylums remained severely overcrowded. The result 
was that Nigeria’s colonial mental asylums were seen by everyone – government 
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officials, psychiatric authorities, and Nigerians – as terrible places for the mentally ill to 
be. 
Chapter two outlines the intellectual history of mental illness to explain the trends 
in psychiatric thinking over the course of Nigeria’s colonial period. Although indigenous 
cultures and conceptions of mental illness in those cultures are very diverse in Nigeria, 
the understandings of European colonial psychiatrists about the nature of the “African 
mind” were no different in Nigeria than anywhere else in Africa or the world. Colonial 
psychiatrists in Nigeria saw racial background as the most important factor in 
differentiating cultures and believed that overexposure to European society was the 
greatest threat to Nigerian mental stability. By the 1950s a new generation of European-
trained Nigerian psychiatrists, chief among them T.Adeoye Lambo, were beginning to 
challenge the racialized conception of cultures used by colonial psychiatrists. Nigerian 
psychiatrists tended to work within existing experimental frameworks, however, and 
were concerned primarily with the same issues of “primitive” versus “modern” 
environments. The point at this time was not to prove that African psyches were equal to 
European psyches – certainly they were not. The point that Lambo and others were 
pushing at this time was simply that African psyches varied significantly, undercutting 
the concept of the universal “African mind,” so as to provide more culturally appropriate 
treatment for mental illness within indigenous Nigerian societies.  
Chapter three turns to the repatriation case studies, focusing on mentally-ill 
Nigerian migrants in the countries and colonies of West Africa.  As discussed above, the 
arguments made by the government of Nigeria and the repatriating government for or 
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against repatriation in this region were primarily based on practical considerations. 
Conditions for the migrants were similar in most African colonies, at least in the minds of 
colonial administrators, so the decision on whether to fight for or against repatriation was 
often based on available space in local prisons or asylums, whether or not a relative could 
be found to take custody of the migrant in question, or simply whether anyone was 
willing to pay for the steamer ticket to Lagos. In these cases arguments for or against 
repatriation were never based on what would be in the psychological best interest of the 
patient.  The main purpose of repatriation between colonies was to reduce overcrowding 
in a given asylum; the patients themselves were often the least important aspect of the 
discussion. The “African mind” was not an issue in these cases because it was assumed 
that the patients were already living in much the same conditions in whatever place they 
were being repatriated from as they would be living in should they return to Nigeria. 
Chapter four turns to the world outside Africa. When dealing with the UK, the 
Nigerian government almost always ended up receiving the mentally-ill immigrant. 
Authorities in the UK could and did argue that it would be best for the migrant to be back 
in familiar surroundings, among friends and family where possible. In rare cases, the 
Nigerian government could counter that the migrant had been abroad long enough that 
the host country had become a more familiar society than Nigeria for the migrant. It is in 
the context of negotiating with the UK that the scientific and humanitarian best interests 
of the patients were most often invoked. Therefore when an African showed signs of 
mental illness in the white man’s country, it was assumed that one of the best treatment 
methods was to return him or her to familiar, primitive surroundings regardless of what 
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medical resources were available there. In these cases, conceptions of the “African mind” 
as inferior to Europeans and threatened by European “civilization” developed by colonial 
psychiatrists in colonial settings were the most common justification for repatriation of a 
mental patient. 
 Chapter five focuses on Muslim pilgrims to pose an intriguing question. While 
cases abound of mentally ill Nigerians turning up in other parts of the world, in the case 
of Muslim pilgrims there is almost no critical mass of repatriation cases involving 
mentally-ill pilgrims. Why would this be the case? It seems entirely unlikely that no such 
cases existed; thousands upon thousands of cases of stranded and destitute Nigerian 
pilgrims have been documented, many requiring at least partial repatriation to the Sudan 
from the Arabian Peninsula. This chapter offers several possible explanations for why so 
few Muslim pilgrims (in fact I have only found one case) show up in this documentary 
record. Although the chapter cannot come down definitively on what happened to 
Muslim pilgrims who exhibited signs of mental illness, it makes the argument that 
mentally-ill pilgrims clearly were not treated through the same process or with the same 
urgency as other mentally-ill immigrants, particularly those being repatriated from 
Europe or North America. It appears that the partial repatriation of destitute pilgrims to 
the Sudan met the practical political needs of the British Empire whether the repatriate 
was mentally ill or not and, as with other repatriation cases involving mentally-ill 
Nigerians, as long as the mentally-ill person was contained within an African setting, 
there was very little incentive for the colonial government to repatriate him or her further. 
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 The sixth and final chapter discusses the deportation of mentally-ill Nigerians 
from outside of the British Empire, with a particular emphasis on the United States. 
Complicating many of the repatriation proceedings discussed in previous chapters was 
the fact that Nigerians technically had the legal right to travel to and live in any part of 
the world under British rule. Mentally-ill Nigerians in foreign countries had no rights of 
residence, however, and could be deported back to Nigeria regardless of personal 
opinions or the opinions of the government of Nigeria. Nevertheless, constructed 
knowledge of mental illness played a role in the deportation of these Nigerians as it did in 
other places. This chapter argues that definitions of mental illness did still influence the 
repatriation process, particularly in cases from the US, where xenophobic ideas about the 
threats posed by immigrants combined with pre-existing notions about the mental 
inferiority of persons of African descent to form a frighteningly negative perception of 
African immigrants in the first half of the twentieth century. Deportation of African 
immigrants on grounds of mental illness was therefore less negotiable than it was in the 
British Empire, but was nevertheless justified by similar perceptions of the inferiority of 
the “African mind” that had influenced repatriation processes elsewhere. However, 
whereas repatriation was presented as in the patient’s best interests in cases from the UK, 
in cases from the United States, the “African mind” had to be returned to Africa because 
of the threat that it posed to American society. 
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Chapter 1 
Mental Illness and Colonial Rule in Nigeria 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the development of mental institutions during Nigeria’s colonial 
period. Although British colonial rule first began in Lagos in 1861, the entire territory of 
what is today Nigeria did not finally come under British colonial administration until 
1903. The first asylum for the detention of the mentally ill – “lunatics” as they were 
known in the legal parlance of colonial Nigeria – was opened at Yaba, near Lagos, in 
1906, with another at Calabar being formed shortly thereafter. After the amalgamation of 
the northern and southern provinces in 1914, the first Nigeria-wide lunacy policy was 
developed in the Lunacy Ordinance of 1916. Although policies existed for the detention 
and custody of suspected lunatics, the conditions under which mental patients subsisted 
in colonial institutions remained deplorable throughout the colonial period. Partly 
because of the philosophy of “indirect rule” promulgated by British colonial officials that 
prohibited massive expansion of European institutions and worldviews in the name of 
cultural retention and partly out of the penurious circumstances of colonial 
administrations, particularly after the onset of global depression in 1929, colonial health 
services generally and mental health services specifically remained significantly 
underdeveloped throughout Nigeria’s colonial period. Investigations into the living 
conditions in Nigeria’s asylum system repeatedly found that suspected lunatics lived in 
cramped, dirty and wholly non-therapeutic conditions. Recommendations for the 
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improvement of the asylum system were frequently made both by colonial officials and 
by mental health experts, but were rarely implemented. Until the late 1950s, when the 
first Mental Hospital opened at Aro under the leadership of Dr. T.O. Lambo, Nigeria’s 
mental institutions remained completely custodial in nature, unable to offer curative 
treatments or medications and, therefore, ultimately unable to claim any efficacy in 
improving the mental health of the persons under their charge.1  
The result was an asylum system that did not engender the respect or the faith of 
either colonial officials or subjects. Colonial officials saw the asylum as an 
embarrassment to the colonial administration at large, as something that could be pointed 
to as evidence that colonial rule did not, in fact, have the best interests of its subjects at 
heart. Nigerians themselves saw the asylum in much the same terms as a site in which, 
for obvious reasons, they did not want themselves or their loved ones to be placed. 
Nigerian asylums became one of the least attractive places to house suspected lunatics, 
either from the perspective of colonial and medical officials and the Nigerian population. 
Officials wanted to avoid exacerbating the embarrassment that came with overcrowding, 
but did not want to lay out the expenditure necessary to expand capacity and improve the 
living conditions of those behind their walls. Nigerians themselves knew that the colonial 
asylums were not somewhere that one went to get cured of a mental illness and so, if 
possible, preferred to treat loved ones at home through traditional methods, a situation 
that colonial officials felt forced to abide. Asylums became the reserve of violent, 
                                                 
1
 The most authoritative source on the development of mental institutions in colonial Nigeria is Jonathan 
Sadowsky, Imperial Bedlam: Institutions of Madness in Colonial Southwest Nigeria (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1999). See also, Alexander Boroffka, “The History of Mental Hospitals in 
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dangerous, and chronic cases and all efforts were made to prevent admission of non-
violent cases. Nevertheless, mental asylums in Nigeria remained significantly 
overcrowded throughout the colonial period. The overcrowding of Nigeria’s asylums and 
the general lack of faith placed in their curative abilities had strong implications for how 
colonial and medical authorities thought about the causes and treatment of mental illness 
among Nigerians.2 The inefficacy of the asylum system in Nigeria also had implications 
for how Nigerian officials would approach the subject of repatriation of Nigerian mental 
patients from abroad.3 
INDIRECT RULE AND PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY 
The territories that would come to make up the unified colonial state of Nigeria came 
under British control slowly, over the course of forty years between 1861, when the 
British first annexed Lagos, and 1903, with the conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate in the 
northern savannas. Because colonial rule came at different times and through different 
processes, the territories that now make up Nigeria were ruled as separate colonial 
entities until 1914. In the southwest, the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos governed 
coastal Lagos and the Yoruba territories to its interior. In the southeast, the colonial 
authority was Niger Coast Protectorate, while Lugard controlled the savanna areas of the 
north under the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Each was a distinct administrative 
entity, and, as a result, each developed distinct forms of governance. All relied on a 
model of “indirect rule” that allowed British colonial officers to rule through pre-existing 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nigeria,” Psychiatry 8 (1985): 37-43, and “A History of Psychiatry in Nigeria,” Psychiatry 8 (1985): 709-
14. 
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 See Chapter 2, this volume. 
3
 See Chapters 3, 4, and 5, this volume. 
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indigenous authorities. In the southwest, indirect rule was based on the centralized 
kingship systems that had existed for centuries in Yoruba states such as Oyo, Ijebu, and 
Ife.4 In the southeast, however, where decentralized state structures had predominated, 
British officials often had difficulty determining who the appropriate indigenous proxy 
should be. The result was the development of a “warrant chiefs” system whereby the 
British appointed indirect rulers who often had no traditional claim to indigenous 
governance but derived their power solely through the “warrant” given them by the 
British.5 In the north, Lugard made very few changes to the administrative system that 
had previously governed the Sokoto Caliphate. The emirs that had ruled the Caliphate at 
the regional level were allowed to retain their power and position with the main 
difference that instead of paying tribute to the sultan of Sokoto, they now paid taxes to 
the British colonial superstructure.  
 For British colonial administrators in the south, indirect rule was primarily a 
practical expedient. The desire was to promote the greatest possible combination of 
stability and economy, and the retention of indigenous political and social institutions 
seemed like the best way to achieve these twin aims. To colonial officers in the southern 
provinces, the civilizing mission of colonial rule was still very much linked to the 
construction and expansion of European-styled infrastructure, values, and education. 
Lagos, which as a Crown Colony was considered British soil, quickly became a locus for 
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the creation of British-inspired institutions and missionary activity, with the result that a 
significant amount of revenue was spent on social services development in the early years 
of colonial occupation. The colonial government in Lagos had established a Medical 
Department, which employed eleven European and three African doctors by 1898, a 
police service, and a Public Works Department charged with the maintenance of public 
buildings and roads and the extension of electric lighting, telegraphs, piers, and public 
transport, among other things.6  In the southeast, progressive-minded British colonial 
administrators like Ralph Moor heavily promoted the extension of European education, 
among other things.7 Such an attitude towards involvement in social services expansion 
on the part of the colonial government was partly out of an ideological belief on the part 
of colonial officials in the blessings of European civilization, but it was also partly a 
response to demands and expectations of some Nigerian subjects as well. The second half 
of the nineteenth century had been characterized in the south by the expansion of 
Christian missionary activity and the growth of a European-educated class of Africans, 
many of whom had developed European tastes and who had expectations that colonial 
rule would result in the expansion of European institutions and values. The growth of 
colonial government involvement in expanding social services in the south was therefore 
also a function of social circumstances in the south by the early twentieth century. 
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 In the north, however, indirect rule conformed to a different set of circumstances 
and took on an ideological mission very different from what had developed in the south. 
The north had had very little exposure to European ideas and customs prior to the onset 
of colonial rule in the early twentieth century. Also, the north was primarily Muslim 
whereas the south was not. Colonial officials in the north therefore believed that the 
extension of European ideas and institutions was more likely to serve as a destabilizing 
force than those in the south. Furthermore, the indigenous system of political 
administration that had been set up by the Sokoto Caliphate proved to need very little 
tinkering in order to serve British colonial purposes, the Sokoto Caliphate having itself 
been an empire of sorts. In establishing a system of indirect rule to meet the needs of the 
northern Protectorate, Lugard developed a philosophy of indirect rule that was much 
stricter and more ideological than his counterparts in the south.  
Lugard’s system of indirect rule was explicitly outlined as a “Dual Mandate” to 
run the colonies to the economic benefit of Britain while at the same time promoting 
European “progress” and “civilization” as the benefits that would accrue to Nigeria from 
the colonial arrangement. However, unlike the colonial administrators in the south, 
Lugard believed that the purpose of colonial rule was theoretically to alter only those 
customs, traditions, and institutions that the British deemed harmful to Nigerian progress, 
leaving existing cultures intact to the greatest degree possible. Unlike what was occurring 
in the south, the development of modern social services under Lugard’s indirect rule was 
to be undertaken by local native administrations, not the colonial government, at their 
own expense and on their own terms. Lugard believed that for the colonial government 
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itself to embark on such activities was a direct violation of the Dual Mandate, in that it 
constituted unnecessary colonial expenditure and purposelessly brought about the erosion 
of traditional social structures.8 
 Lugard’s philosophy of indirect rule was based on his experiences in northern 
Nigeria whereas administrators in the south developed systems of indirect rule based on 
prevailing circumstances in the regions that they governed. These differing approaches to 
indirect rule might have continued to exist if not for the amalgamation of the Northern 
Provinces with the Southern Provinces to create the centralized administration of Nigeria 
in 1914. As it happened, Lugard became the orchestrator of the amalgamation of Nigeria 
and the first Governor-General of newly-amalgamated Nigeria. As Governor-General, 
Lugard decided that his form of indirect rule should be extended to the entirety of newly-
amalgamated Nigeria. Colonial government expenditure on social services therefore 
became for the most part taboo, and the development of colonially-funded education 
services and health care systems, including mental health services, ceased to be a priority.  
COLONIAL MENTAL INSTITUTIONS 
The effect of an indirect rule philosophy based on the concept of cultural retention and 
opposed to the extension of colonially-funded European-styled institutions had a strong 
effect on the development of mental health services in Nigeria. Throughout the colonial 
period, government officials debated the extent to which “modern” facilities and 
treatments based on European models should be extended to mentally-ill Nigerians.  
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Some officials argued that the colonial government had a responsibility to expand its 
facilities to meet the needs of mentally-ill Nigerians in order to provide the benefits of 
“civilization” upon which the colonial project was based. In this interventionist spirit, two 
asylums for the containment of mentally-ill Nigerians had been developed in the 
Southern Provinces in 1906, one in Yaba, near Lagos, and one in Calabar. These asylums 
were small, however, and quickly became chronically overcrowded. Further causing 
problems was the fact that these institutions offered at best custodial care. No therapeutic 
or curative treatments were extended to the patients held in these asylums. As such, they 
became little more than prisons. As a result, some colonial officials, particularly those 
associated with the Department of Medical and Sanitary Services, regularly pushed for 
the expansion of asylum facilities and, ultimately, for the establishment of a fully-
functioning “modern” Mental Hospital. 
 Opposing the calls for the expansion of mental health facilities were colonial 
officials dedicated to the philosophy of indirect rule. On the one hand, they believed that 
issues of mental health were a cultural issue and, as such, should be left to the care of 
indigenous communities. The growth of “modern” European mental health services 
would be exactly the kind of cultural imposition that indirect rule was supposed to avoid. 
However, the more practical consideration militating against the expansion of modern 
mental health services was the cost involved. Mental hospitals were expensive to build, 
maintain and staff. They required a lot of land, access to large amounts of water, and had 
to be prepared to maintain patients for possibly many years at a time. Therefore, many 
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officials argued, modern mental health services were beyond the budgetary means of the 
colonial government for most of the colonial period.  
 Debates over the issue of expanding mental health facilities occurred at several 
times over the course of the colonial period. Thrice, the colonial government 
commissioned an independent mental health expert to travel from Europe to study 
conditions in Nigeria’s asylums, report their findings and make recommendations for 
improvement.9 Each time, the expert suggested the establishment of more and larger 
mental hospitals, but financial considerations always prohibited the enactment of these 
experts’ recommendations. Beyond the two small government-run asylums in Yaba and 
Calabar, no further colonial asylums were to be developed for another forty years until 
the opening of a new asylum at Lantoro in 1946 designed for the accommodation of 
Nigerian soldiers returning from war with mental disorders. At no point during the 
colonial period did the government-run asylums meet the needs of the mentally-ill 
population of Nigeria. Yaba and Calabar were continually overcrowded, understaffed and 
underfunded. Because the asylums at Yaba, Calabar and, later, Lantoro and Aro could not 
accommodate the mentally-ill community in Nigeria, other means of confining the 
mentally ill had to be established. Throughout Nigeria the mentally ill were confined in 
small asylums established by Native Administrations, the semi-autonomous units of 
indirect rule, or else in wings of local prisons specifically gazetted to serve as abodes for 
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the mentally ill. Most remained unconfined, under the care of family and friends in their 
communities of origin. 
Over the course of the colonial period in Nigeria, the overcrowded, unsanitary 
asylum system that could not claim to offer curative care to any of its patients was a 
continual embarrassment to the colonial government. The general opinion amongst 
colonial officials throughout the colonial period was that the existing conditions in 
Nigeria’s asylum system were unacceptable, but at no point was a suitable plan of reform 
ever implemented. For example, by the mid-1920s a movement had developed among 
officials in the Department of Medical and Sanitary Services to push for the erection of a 
new mental hospital in Abeokuta, in effect expanding the available facilities for the 
containment of mentally-ill Nigerians. According to the Director of Medical and Sanitary 
Services, as of 1926 the conditions under which lunatics were held in asylums and jails 
were unacceptable from a medical standpoint: 
Up to the present we have contented ourselves only with housing these 
unfortunates, and by compulsory isolation and supervision safeguarding the 
general community. No serious attempt has been made to treat the insane for 
mental diseases but only for physical illness or to separate the various forms in 
which insanity manifests itself. Indeed it has been quite impossible to do so when 
they have been confined in gaols all over the country or are herded together in one 
compound as they are at Yaba, where the only divisions are male from female and 
males into ordinary lunatics and criminal lunatics.10 
 
As of January 1926, the Yaba asylum was at 200% capacity, housing 48 patients in space 
designed to accommodate 24 patients.11 The DMSS went on to propose that there was a 
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need to develop a new lunatic asylum, as well as the appointment of an official, qualified 
alienist to oversee the new asylum.12 
While the DMSS pushed for the expansion of mental health facilities in both size 
and in quality, other colonial officials saw such proposals as beyond the scope of colonial 
government. Rather than expand facilities at the expense of the colonial government 
itself, many officials saw the establishment of Native Administration asylums as the ideal 
solution to accommodate mental patients. In fact, in the Northern Provinces Native 
Administration asylums were the most common institution for the confinement of the 
mentally ill. By 1925, Native Administration asylums had been established in Bauchi, 
Bida, Maiduguri, Ilorin, Kano, Katsina, Keffi, Kontagora, Makurdi, Ibi, Sokoto, Yola, 
and Zaria.13 The colonial government maintained only one small asylum at Lokoja for the 
sole maintenance of lunatics that Native Administrations would not take responsibility 
for. In 1926, the Acting Secretary of the Northern Provinces justified the use of Native 
Administration asylums in true indirect rule style, arguing to the Director of Medical and 
Sanitary Services in Lagos that there was no “urgent need for Government intervention in 
such parts of Nigeria where native laws and customs exist as opposed to administration 
on European lines.”14 The Secretary went on to argue: 
If government proposes to make itself responsible for the care and maintenance of 
all persons who are useless to their friends and relations, and whom an alienist 
might classify as ‘lunatics’, considerably more than a million pounds a year 
would probably be required for the erection and maintenance of the necessary 
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institutions. His Honour is not therefore entirely convinced of the desirability of 
contemplating action on a large scale.15 
 
As far as officials in the North were concerned, mental illness was an issue best handled 
by indigenous communities, not by the colonial government. 
 The logic of the Secretary of the Northern Provinces was also held by some 
officials in the South. In 1926, the Acting Chief Secretary for the Government in Lagos 
reiterated the same ideas with reference to the South, noting that: 
 as regards lunatics, all that appears to be required in the Southern Provinces is a 
small institution in which to house cases for which no Native Administration will 
accept responsibility…. In His Excellency’s opinion the Native Administrations 
in the Southern Provinces should make themselves responsible for persons of 
unsound mind in the locality, as they do in the northern Provinces, and it is very 
desirable that Government should not commit itself to a large expenditure on a 
project which so much concerns the Native Administration and which might so 
easily be abused.16 
 
The philosophy of indirect rule and the desire to avoid heavy public expenditure clearly 
influenced officials in the South as well. 
 The debate between colonial medical officials who believed that mental illness 
was a medical disorder that should be treated and, ideally cured, in government-run 
facilities using the scientific methods of modern European medicine and psychiatry 
clearly clashed with the attitude of many colonial officers that mental health was, in 
essence, a cultural problem and, via the dictates of the indirect rule philosophy, ought to 
be handled by indigenous communities and at limited expense to the colonial 
government. At contest here was a central contradiction of colonial rule in Nigeria: how 
could colonial rule be both non-intrusive and penurious and yet simultaneously bestow 




upon its subject populations the virtues of “modern” civilization that were also central to 
the colonial mission? This ideological conflict was never fully reconciled at any point in 
the colonial history of Nigeria and, in the case of the handling of mental illness in 
Nigeria, the result was a constant struggle between a recognition on the part of colonial 
officials that the existing asylum system was inadequate and the knowledge that direct 
intervention to improve the system would be both costly and possibly culturally intrusive. 
 The colonial government of Nigeria went through several cycles of debate on the 
issue of whether or not to expand mental asylum facilities and treatment options. On 
three different occasions the government, unable to reach a consensus within itself, 
commissioned reports from distinguished and independent European alienists who 
surveyed the existing asylum system, assessed its merits and demerits, and offered advice 
on what needed to be done to improve it. All three of these reports maligned the 
conditions in which the mentally ill were confined in Nigeria’s existing asylums and 
suggested the massive expansion of these institutions and the extension of more humane 
and modern treatment methods. After each of these reports, the government of Nigeria 
took some initial steps to implement the alienists’ suggestions but either fell far short of 
the goals set in the report or quickly abandoned the improvement schemes altogether. 
 The first independent report on Nigeria’s asylum system was commissioned in 
response to the 1926 debate between officials in the Secretariat and the Department of 
Medical and Sanitary Services discussed above. In 1927, the Colonial Office 
commissioned Bruce Home to report on the forms of mental illness in Nigeria and report 
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his recommendations for future care of the mentally ill. Home toured 25 regions of 
Nigeria in 1928 and compiled data from questionnaires sent to colonial Residents and 
Medical Officers.17  Home’s conclusions were that Nigeria’s asylums were woefully 
inadequate for the treatment of mental patients. Home noted that facilities in Nigeria’s 
asylums were overcrowded, unsanitary, and, at times inhumane, particularly in the use of 
chains to restrain the more restive patients.18 He compared the government-run asylums 
at Yaba and Calabar to prisons in their focus on containment rather than treatment,19 and 
urged the government to remodel Nigeria’s asylum system based on the design and 
methods of European mental hospitals.20 In addition to offering more therapeutic and 
curative treatment for mental patients, Home also urged the government to expand the 
size of its existing facilities. He believed that the population of insane Nigerians was 
likely to rise over the course of time and proposed that the government should expand its 
asylum system to accommodate up to 4,000 patients at a time.21  
 Home’s report clearly vindicated the position of the DMSS that Nigeria’s asylum 
system needed strong government involvement and a relatively large outlay of 
expenditure to improve existing conditions. Based partly on Home’s recommendations, 
the colonial government began making plans in 1928 to build a new mental asylum in the 
Southern Provinces. The purpose of the new asylum would be to “(a) remove the lunatics 
from Lagos Prison, (b) relieve the serious overcrowding at Yaba, (c) enable the asylum at 
Calabar to be abolished and (d) to provide accommodation for the increasing number of 
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cases of acute insanity which are occurring throughout the Southern Provinces, and for 
whose accommodation police cells and prisons have now to be used.”22 Dr. Home 
himself accompanied a government entourage to the Alake of Abeokuta, roughly sixty 
miles inland from Lagos, to request a lease of 150 acres upon which the new asylum was 
to be built. According to the Resident of Abeokuta Province, the Alake and his council 
“needed no pressing whatever to grant the lease, and they themselves suggested the 
terms, namely a lease, say, for 99 years, at the nominal rent of 1/- per annum.”23 With the 
site selected, plans for building had only to be finalized. 
 The intended size and scope of the new asylum at Abeokuta continued to be a 
sticking point for many colonial officials, who could not get behind the need for a heavy 
expenditure on a government-run mental asylum. Apparently, Home suggested that the 
new asylum should have at least 500 beds, enough presumably to handle not only the 
violent and criminal lunatics but also a sizeable number of “harmless” lunatics. The 
Acting Chief Secretary to the Government, however, made it clear that although a new 
asylum was to be built, it would not be as large as medical authorities envisioned. 
According to the Secretary: 
for financial reasons alone it is impossible for Government to contemplate the 
construction of a hospital of 500 beds at the present time and that all that is 
immediately required is an institution for the treatment of the more acute cases on 
a site which will lend itself to expansion as funds and circumstances permit. It is 
quite impossible at present on financial grounds for Government to undertake the 
housing and treatment of harmless mental defectives, and His Excellency 
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considers that nothing should be done to encourage the relatives of such persons 
to transfer their burden to the Government.24 
 
Some authorities suggested that the new asylum should originally contain only 50 beds, 
with space available to expand facilities over time.25 
 In the end, a compromise was reached in 1930 by which the asylum would be 
built piecemeal in three separate units. Unit A would accommodate 230 males; Unit B 58 
males; and Unit C 188 females, bringing the ultimate total accommodation of the new 
asylum to 476 patients, very near Home’s suggested total of 500. However, the building 
would be a long term process. In fact, the total estimated cost for building the three units 
of the Abeokuta asylum was set at just over •40,000. However, in 1930-31, the first year 
of construction, the asylum was only budgeted •7000, not enough even to build Unit B, 
the smallest of the three units.26 
 One of the main reasons that the colonial government was willing to undertake 
such a large project at all was because an opportunity arose from 1929 in the form of the 
Colonial Development Fund whereby the colonial government could apply for imperial 
grants and loans from Britain to fund agricultural, industrial and social service programs 
in the colonies. The goal of the Fund was primarily to enhance colonial trade as a means 
of improving the British economy in the years of global depression that characterized the 
late 1920s and 1930s. Although no particular funding preferences were ever stated, in 
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practice colonial railways and public health ventures took precedence.27 Originally, the 
colonial government in Nigeria had hoped that the asylum could be funded through this 
Fund. In fact, the first •7000 allocated in 1930-31 were to come from the Colonial 
Development Fund.28 However, as the economic crisis in Britain and the colonies 
deepened in the early 1930s, new priorities emerged. As Falola has noted, “Inevitably, 
most of the public health projects [financed through the Colonial Development Fund] 
were abandoned because they involved heavy annual recurrent expenditures in addition 
to other expenses such as staff accommodations.”29 The asylum at Abeokuta quickly 
became one of these abandoned public health projects. Before construction could even 
begin, the Lieutenant Governor of the Southern Provinces ordered that all work on the 
new mental asylum at Abeokuta should cease owing to “financial pressure.”30 Despite 
objections from the DMSS, the project became moribund. Although never completely 
scrapped since funding for the asylum was not denied but was rather perpetually deferred 
to future budgets, the Abeokuta asylum was never built. 
 The failure of the colonial government to enact the recommendations of the Home 
report meant that Nigeria’s asylum system remained overcrowded, understaffed and non-
therapeutic even after an official and professional course of improvement had been 
offered. The pattern of seeking advice for the improvement of the asylum system and 
then failing to implement that advice continued until the late 1950s. The issue of 
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inadequate accommodations for lunatics arose again in 1934, this time at the behest of the 
Director of Prisons for the Southern Provinces, who argued that urgent action needed to 
be taken to find more appropriate means of custody for mental patients than cramming 
them into local prisons. According to the Director of Prisons, housing lunatics in prisons 
was cruel to both lunatics and the general prison population. The accommodation of 
lunatics in prisons caused a security problem for prisons because: 
There being little suitable accommodation for lunatics in the provincial and 
divisional prisons most of them have to be accommodated in the Convict prisons 
at Lagos, Port Harcourt, and Calabar. Though this procedure solves the problem 
of the custody of lunatics it increases the prison problem by using up all the 
special accommodation which was intended for the segregation of criminals who 
by reason of their character and habits are unfit to be kept in association with 
other prisoners.31 
 
At the same time, according to the Director of Prisons, the lunatics in the prison tended to 
have a negative psychological effect on the prisoners of sound mind: 
Apart from the question of accommodation, however, the detention of large 
numbers of lunatics in convict prisons is altogether wrong. The temporary 
detention of a few mental cases who are only subject to periodical spells of acute 
mania may be justified but to detain permanently large numbers of violent and 
homicidal lunatics, who rave and shout for days on end, in an institution where 
some hundreds of persons of normal mentality are serving terms of imprisonment 
with hard labour appears to be unreasonable.32 
 
 Beyond the problem of the suitability of prisons for the custody of the mentally-
ill, the prison system also suffered from the problems of overcrowding, which was 
repeatedly noted by the Lagos Prisons Visiting Committee. For example, in 1930, the 
committee reported: 
                                                                                                                                                 
30
 Director of Medical and Sanitary Service, Lagos, to Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos, 24 
March 1931, NAI CSO 26/3 26793, vol. II, 127. 
31
 Dirctor of Prisons, Southern Provinces, to Secretary, Southern Provinces, Enugu, 21 July 1934, NAI 
CSO 26/1 01507, vol. IV, 526. 
 52 
members of the Visiting Committee have repeatedly called attention to the 
undesirability of confining lunatics in the prison, and we sincerely hope that this 
practice will soon be discontinued altogether. But what we particularly desire to 
bring to notice is the fact that 42 lunatics (of whom 10 are criminal lunatics) have 
16 cells only. These cells do not appear to be more than large enough for one 
lunatic apiece. We regard the overcrowded condition of these unfortunate people 
as deplorable.33 
 
The continued use of prisons to house mentally-ill persons in need of medical care 
became a major embarrassment for the colonial government, which recognized the 
unacceptability of this practice, but which remained unwilling to take the necessary steps 
to ameliorate the situation. 
 In response to these repeated admonitions concerning the existing asylum system, 
the colonial government commissioned another official report on Nigeria’s mental health 
services to be compiled by Dr. R. Cunyngham Brown in 1936. With the building of the 
new asylum at Abeokuta still on hold in 1936, very little had changed in Nigeria’s 
asylums in terms of material conditions or treatment options since the Home report of 
1928. It is therefore not surprising that the critiques and recommendations offered in the 
Brown report were largely similar to those provided by Home eight years earlier. The 
Brown report criticized the overcrowding of Nigeria’s asylums generally and the 
government-run asylums in the South specifically.34  The report also repudiated the use of 
prisons to house lunatics35 and lamented the paucity of staff and lack of curative or 
therapeutic treatment.36 The report disparaged the use of leg irons, which were commonly 
used as mechanical restraints on inconsolably violent lunatics, calling them “evidence of 
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failure on the part of the institution to adopt other and more proper means.”37 Although 
Brown did not expect the conditions in Nigeria’s asylums to compare favorably with 
those in Europe, he noted that overall they fell below the standards that should be 
expected of even colonial circumstances. 
 Brown’s recommendations focused on the issue of accommodation, arguing for 
the building of new asylums, such as the proposed one at Abeokuta. Although Nigerian 
asylums housed roughly 500 lunatics at the time of Brown’s visit, he noted that the 
number of Nigerians needing mental health services was likely to increase in the future, 
with the result that any new asylums built should be “at least three or four times in extent 
that which would be adequate for the numbers to be accommodated at the time of 
purchase.”38 Brown also recommended the demolition of the existing asylum at Lokoja in 
the Northern Provinces and the erection of a new asylum capable for 1,000 patients.39 
 Brown recognized that even if new asylums should be built they would unlikely 
be able to accommodate all of the non-violent civil lunatics in Nigeria, the majority of 
whom would continue to be cared for in their local settings by family and friends. 
Nevertheless, Brown argued that home care lunatics should not be abandoned by the 
colonial government. He argued for the establishment of a domiciliary care system in 
which officially sanctioned mental health professionals would have the power to select 
and approve of the local guardians of lunatics, followed by regular if infrequent 
inspection of the care of patients in their homes. Brown argued that such a system made 
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sense for a country like Nigeria, where “the great mass of the mentally deranged are in 
their villages….” Besides which, “The family care of the insane, thanks to the widely 
diffused and deeply rooted family system of West Africa, already exists throughout 
Nigeria.”40 However, home care in Nigeria according to Brown was “greatly in need of 
visitation, medical guidance and aid,”41 by which he meant the intrusion of European 
methods and supervision.  
Striking a compromise with indirect rule stalwarts, Brown argued that such a 
system need not be particularly disruptive to local customs and institutions. “In the 
administrative and medical services with the cooperation of chiefs of wards and headmen 
of villages,” argued Brown, “the structure of such organization and means of aid are 
already furnished.”42 Furthermore, continued Brown, domiciliary care would free up 
space in Nigeria’s asylums, thereby reducing both the expenditure on construction of new 
asylums and the recurrent expenditure on maintenance of a large number of patients.  
“The development of the system may be slow and partial,” declared Brown: 
but it can be initiated at any time and from any centre: it will bring to notice 
remedial cases urgently in need of medical treatment; it will facilitate the 
discharge from institutions of selected civil cases no longer likely to benefit by 
asylum treatment to domiciliary care under a measure of supervision and medical 
guidance, for lack of which they will continue in the asylum, and according to its 
form and degree of development it will obviate the need for institutional 
accommodation for mentally deranged people suitable for this form of care.43 
 
Brown’s idea of domiciliary care seemed to be based on the understanding that the 
colonial government was likely to balk at any suggestion that required a great capital 
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expenditure. Domiciliary care was therefore a compromise between the stance of medical 
authorities who believed the mentally ill should be given modern, European-styled 
treatment to the greatest degree possible and colonial officials influenced by the dictates 
of indirect rule who prized budgetary thrift and non-interference in local cultural 
institutions above all else. 
 Colonial officials, both within the Department of Medical and Sanitary Service 
and in other branches of government, lauded Brown’s recommendations, particularly the 
idea of domiciliary care. The Acting Chief Commissioner of the Northern Provinces 
noted that Brown’s report correctly recognized that “existing institutions for the care of 
lunatics are unsatisfactory.” However, he continued, “it is equally obvious… that their 
improvement is directly relative to the ability of the protectorate to finance new 
schemes.”44 He urged, however, that “it is essential to frame any proposals for the 
amelioration of existing conditions with the strictest regard for economy.”45 In this way, 
domiciliary care offered an invaluable alternative because Brown’s report offered “little 
criticism of the existing domiciliary care of the majority of lunatics… his report shows 
that the organization for the care of lunatics which has come into being almost 
fortuitously can be utilized as the basis for a more highly-developed scheme.”46 However, 
the Acting Commissioner did have one caveat to Brown’s domiciliary recommendations. 
Whereas Brown suggested that home care should be monitored to ensure that the 
mentally ill were receiving humane and proper care, the Acting Commissioner disavowed 
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this kind of cultural encroachment arguing that “anything in the nature of registration 
should be avoided,” but that “these people should be encouraged to declare their charges 
to Village Heads and to avail themselves of the facilities provided at district 
dispensaries.”47 This would presumably reduce expenditure even more by eliminating the 
need for a bureaucratic process or the hiring of medical staff to conduct home visits. In 
essence, the forms and processes of domiciliary care would continue exactly as they had 
prior to Brown’s report.. 
 The Director of Medical and Sanitary Services agreed that domiciliary care would 
be a viable compromise. The DMSS declared: 
 Cunyngham Brown’s recommendations are undoubtedly sound as a means of 
dealing with the lunacy problem, but although they appear simple they are likely 
to prove costly and in time will absorb an increasingly large proportion of the 
Medical Department’s funds. It has to be considered how the best value and the 
greatest benefit to the health of the population can be obtained from the limited 
funds which are available for the Medical Services and it would probably be 
unwise to spend a large proportion of them on lunacy.48 
 
The DMSS went on to declare that until curative care could be offered for harmless 
mental patients, an event unlikely to occur in the near future, the main purpose of 
asylums would continue to be the “detention and not treatment” of “dangerous and 
criminal lunatics.” Although a deplorable set of circumstances, the DMSS continued that 
“if detention is accepted as the main function of asylums it is not illogical that the Prisons 
Department should take the chief share in the custody of lunatics….”49 The DMSS 
suggested that priority should be given to arranging new prison asylums at Lokoja and 
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Abeokuta, followed by the search for an appropriate site near Yaba for the construction 
of the new 1,000 bed hospital suggested by Brown. The vast majority of non-violent 
lunatics, however would have to continue in the care of their families and communities so 
as to “avoid a policy which would place the Government at an ever increasing burden for 
the care of all lunatics.”50 Resignation to the need for economy had by this time 
penetrated even the medical services that for so long had pushed for modern, curative 
treatment for the mentally ill along European lines. 
 The official sanctioning of home care provided a medical excuse for failing to 
expand the asylum system in the years after the Brown report. Although published in 
1938, very little in terms of the expansion of asylum facilities took place until after the 
Second World War. In 1946, an asylum was opened at Lantoro for the treatment of 
soldiers who returned from the war with mental problems. In the early 1950s, the 
government finally began the development of Aro Mental Hospital in Abeokuta, which 
became the first mental institution in Nigeria to offer modern treatments like electro-
shock and deep insulin therapy, and therefore became the first mental institution with a 
claim to more than custodial care. The development of Aro was a long process, and the 
first inpatients were not admitted until 1958, just two years before Nigeria became 
independent from British colonial rule. Even with these developments, Nigerian asylums 
remained overcrowded, and the majority of non-violent lunatics remained beyond the 
reach of formal treatment. 
 In 1955, the colonial government commissioned one more report on the 
psychiatric services of Nigeria, this time to be carried out by J.C. Carothers, a noted 
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colonial psychiatrist with many years of experience in African mental asylums, having 
served as the director of Mathari Hospital in Nairobi, Kenya, for twelve years. The 
Carothers report came in the context of the decolonization of Nigeria, as British colonial 
authorities increasingly worked with European-educated Nigerian nationalists to 
negotiate the conditions for the transfer of power to Nigerians and the ultimate 
independence of Nigeria from British colonial rule. Carothers’ mission was therefore not 
only to report on the nature and functioning of psychiatric services in Nigeria, but also to 
offer suggestions on how mental health services should be administered in a federated 
and, ultimately, independent Nigeria. Carothers toured Nigeria between September and 
November of 1955. With Aro Mental Hospital not yet accepting in-patients at the time 
that Carothers visited Nigeria, the institutional structure and conditions within Nigerian 
asylums did not differ much from those reported by Brown nineteen years earlier. In the 
case of the Yaba asylum, Carothers noted that Brown’s assessment continued to apply, 
“except that it is now more crowded and much more dilapidated.”51 Carothers deplored 
the continued use of mechanical restraints in some asylums, and vehemently declared that 
“Prison Lunatic Asylums must not continue to be used for the indefinitely prolonged 
accommodation of either “civil” or “criminal” insane,”52 criticisms that Brown had made 
in 1936.  
Overall, Carothers lamented, “it is sad to reflect that, if Dr. Brown’s excellent 
advice could have been followed at that time, there might have been no need for the 
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present commission of enquiry.”53 As such, Carothers’ recommendations in many ways 
mirrored those of Brown. Whereas Brown had suggested the building of an asylum with 
accommodation for 1,000 patients, Carothers expanded upon this, arguing that there 
should be one psychiatric bed per 10,000 of gross population. Thus Nigeria, “with a 
population of 33 million, should provide a minimum psychiatric accommodation of 3,300 
beds.”54 This was far in excess of the roughly 1150 beds that existed in Nigeria at the 
time of Carothers’ visit, and about half of those were in prison asylums which Carothers 
believed should be abolished entirely.55 However, like Brown, Carothers also believed 
that the vast majority of mental patients could continue to be cared for in their home 
communities by family and friends.  
Carothers also pushed for the development of regional parity in the extension of 
psychiatric services. Partly this was out of a belief on Carothers’ part that “many millions 
of Nigerians must spend by far the greater part of their lives within a few miles of their 
homes… and are only really familiar with the way of life that obtains in their home area. 
They would often find life in more distant parts of Nigeria very strange and 
perplexing.”56 Moving mental patients far away from their familiar surroundings for 
asylum care was therefore likely to be detrimental to their recovery process because of 
the stress that unfamiliar surroundings was likely to cause. Partly, however, the push for 
regional parity was also based on constitutional developments in Nigeria related to the 
decolonization process. Under the constitutional reforms of 1946, 1951 and 1954, Nigeria 
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became a federated state, split into three regions – North, West, and East – with a Federal 
Territory at Lagos. Under the 1954 constitutional revisions, medical services became the 
purview of the Regional governments. Since psychiatric services had traditionally been 
the charge of the federal Medical and Sanitary Services (with the exception of prison 
asylums which were run by the Prisons Department), it stood to reason that psychiatric 
services would come under the administration of the Regional governments as well. It 
was therefore important to Carothers that each Regional government have available the 
necessary resources to handle the mental health needs of the Region. As of 1954, they did 
not. Due to issues of overcrowding, many mental patients had to be transferred to 
asylums in Regions other than their home Region, with the result that at the time of 
Carothers’ survey, “not less than one in five, and probably one in four,” of all detained 
lunatics were “accommodated in Regions other than their own.”57 Such a situation 
became problematic in a federated Nigeria because, once Regional governments took 
control of the psychiatric services in their respective Regions, they were no longer 
required to provide accommodation to lunatics from other regions. The problem was 
further exacerbated by the fact that Aro asylum, which was to become the first modern 
mental hospital in Nigeria, was located within the Western Region. Therefore, Aro, once 
opened, was likely only to benefit the Western Region, not Nigeria as a whole. It was 
therefore imperative that each Region expand its psychiatric services to be able to meet 
its specific needs, in Carothers’ view.58 
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 The issue of the cost of implementing Carothers’ recommendations once again 
plagued colonial officials after the release of the report. Efforts were made to find a 
suitable site for a new asylum at Yaba and plans were drawn up for the erection of a new 
asylum. In a particularly intemperate memo to the Acting Secretary of the Southern 
Provinces, the Acting Secretary to the Government at Lagos proclaimed: 
We discussed the cost of a Lunatic Asylum and you have mentioned figures from 
•750,000 downwards. I should say that there is not the faintest hope of getting any 
sum of this order… We will never get a vast sum of money for a lunatic asylum 
and if we do not set our sights reasonably low we will be in the position where, 
because we cannot have something like an expensive nursing home, be compelled 
to tolerate something which is indescribably filthy. It constantly mystifies me that 
the medical mind in particular can never see any half way house in matters of this 
nature, and I flatly refuse to believe that •100,000 could not build reasonable 
accommodation for 1,000 lunatics.59 
 
According to the Secretary, “to think in terms of •750,000 for 300 lunatics is merely 
baying for the moon and can only perpetuate the present situation which I gather is 
plainly disgusting.”60 Carothers’ recommendations went the way of Home’s and 
Brown’s. 
 The result was that even by the late 1950s, and despite frequent declarations by 
officials and visiting specialists that the Nigerian asylums were unsanitary, overcrowded, 
and unsuitable for confinement of the mentally ill, conditions remained largely what they 
had been in the 1920s. In 1954, the Medical Officer for the Yaba Asylum reported that 
255 lunatics were being confined in space allotted for just 180.61 By 1957, the prison 
asylums in the Eastern Region, at Calabar Enugu and Port Harcourt, housed 400 lunatics 
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in space designed for 333.62 Material conditions within the asylums had not improved 
either. In 1955, the Superintendent of Prisons noted that accommodation for lunatics in 
prisons in Port Harcourt “remains as deplorable as ever. I saw several violent lunatics 
shivering naked in dark damp cells chained like animals to a ring in the floor; others also 
naked, wandered aimlessly around a barbed wire enclosure. Since the more violent 
destroy any clothing or bedboards issued to them they are obliged to sleep naked on 
damp cement….”63 Despite several different inquiries into the psychiatric services and 
mental health institutions in Nigeria, conditions were largely the same in the late 1950s as 
they were in the 1920s. 
OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO COLONIAL MENTAL INSTITUTIONS 
The explication of the debates surrounding how much and what kind of care to provide 
mentally ill subjects provided above is important for understanding how both Nigerian 
subjects and colonial officials felt about the viability of these institutions. The fact that 
conditions within the asylum system were regularly condemned by medical officials 
within the Nigerian colonial government and by contracted specialists over the course of 
four decades is an indication of how ineffective these institutions were at providing 
appropriate medical treatment for those suffering from mental illness. The fact that the 
same recommendations for the improvement of the asylum system were made by several 
different specialists with no result illustrates the inertia within the colonial government 
                                                                                                                                                 
61
 O.J. Vanderpuye, Medical Officer in charge of Yaba Lunatic Asylum to Senior Medical Officer, Lagos, 
30 October 1954, NAI MH 3420, 50. 
62
 M.B. Hall, Acting Permanent Secretary, Department of Internal Affairs to Permanent Secretary, Ministry 
of Health, Eastern Region, Enugu, 20 December 1957, NAI MH 3313, B. 
63
 J.G.C. Allen, Superintendent of Prisons, Port Harcourt, to Director of Prisons, Prisons Department, 
Lagos, 18 July, 1955, NAI MH 3313, 31. 
 63 
that prevented any major overhaul of the system even though most officials believed 
current conditions to be unacceptable. It is therefore not surprising that the asylum system 
in Nigeria came to be seen by both colonial officials and Nigerians themselves in a 
negative light, as a place to avoid at all cost, as a place of absolute last resort meant for 
those mentally unstable persons who became incarcerated in the system primarily 
because they fell afoul of the law.  
Throughout Nigeria’s colonial period, the lunatic asylum was an institution that 
very few had faith in to provide beneficial services and bring about the improvement of 
the people in its charge. Nigerians for the most part tried to avoid sending their relatives 
to asylums if at all possible. Partly, this was due to the stigma that mental illness placed 
on individuals and families. Carothers found stigma to be a significant factor accounting 
for the prevalence of home care, noting that “in Nigeria insanity is, in general, regarded 
as a stigma for the family concerned and people hesitate to marry into such a family. So 
the fact of the occurrence of insanity is often kept secret as far as possible….”64 
Sadowsky has commented on the persistence of this stigma to the present day.65 But 
public shame was not the only element influencing Nigerian attitudes against seeking 
asylum care for their mentally ill loved ones.  
It must be recognized that Nigerians had very little trust in mental institutions that 
offered no curative treatment, either European or indigenous. In 1945, the West African 
Pilot, one of the largest independent Nigerian newspapers run by Nnamdi Azikiwe, a 
prominent nationalist and later first President of independent Nigeria, ran a story 
                                                 
64
 Carothers, “Report,” 7. 
65
 Sadowsky, Imperial Bedlam, viii. 
 64 
excoriating Yaba asylum. The article drew on many of the well-known issues of 
overcrowding and poor sanitation, using vivid imagery to illustrate the horrendous 
conditions in the asylums. Among other things, the Pilot accused Yaba employees of 
using the same buckets to draw water that were used for latrines, leaving some rooms 
vacant while crowding patients into others, and leaving nurses and inmates in the sun to 
the point of fainting.66 The government denied all charges,67 but the article does indicate 
the extent to which the lunatic asylum was seen in a wholly negative light by Nigerians. 
The possibility of bad press even caused some colonial officials to question whether the 
Carothers report, with its criticisms of the asylum system, should be published on its 
release in 1957.68 
Nigerians with family members in asylum custody regularly petitioned for their 
release under the belief that they would be more responsive to treatment by traditional 
medical practitioners. The archival record is filled with letters from average Nigerians 
requesting release of their loved ones on these grounds. For example, one Wilson D. 
Agagah pleaded with the Commissioner of Lagos Colony for the release of his brother, 
Force Alaibi, so that he could be taken back to his home town Kaiama, “where I can try 
him with some native medicine.”69  One P.O. Ihezue petitioned for his brother, Uzuoma 
Oparah, to be released “so that I may send him home at once for native treatment.”70 On 
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the one hand these petitions illustrate a preference for traditional medicine over detention 
in European asylums. They were also clearly meant to convey to the colonial government 
a sense of responsibility for their relatives, in effect promising that they would be well 
looked after should they be allowed to undergo home care. However, at the same time 
they are also evidence of the frustration that Nigerians felt with an asylum system that 
locked up their loved ones indefinitely without providing the treatments necessary to 
improve their conditions to the point where they might no longer need institutional care. 
The frustrations felt by Nigerians towards the asylum system are perhaps best put in a 
letter from Moses Ogede requesting the release of his wife from the Yaba asylum. “I 
wonder why you don’t respond to my letters” says Ogede:  
Don’t you know that if a person dies, there must be some people to take him to 
the grave? I am on my knee begging for permission to take my wife from the 
hospital for the worriness [sic] of her parents are becoming greater day in and day 
out. I cannot endure any further. I am fed up with her position there. I therefore 
want his honour to give me a note to the doctor in order to discharge her at once.71 
 
These are just a few of the dozens of petitions submitted by family members to have their 
loved ones removed from the Yaba asylum between the 1920s and 1950s. Clearly to 
many Nigerians the asylum system was not offering effective treatment and traditional 
medicine had a better chance of healing their loved ones.  
Some traditional medical practitioners even lobbied to provide their treatments 
directly to colonial asylums. In 1935, the Herbal Kingdom Society of Lagos wrote to the 
colonial government at Lagos requesting the government “to give us a trial treatment of 
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the lunatic patients in the Yaba asylum.”72 The colonial government denied the Society 
access to the asylum,73 but the implication is clear: since modern European medicine was 
apparently incapable of providing treatment for the mentally ill residents of its lunatic 
asylums, then traditional medical practitioners believed they should be allowed to attempt 
their cures for the benefit of the patients. The refusal to allow traditional medical 
practitioners access to the asylums probably saved the colonial government some 
embarrassment by preventing a public display of the conditions within the asylum, but 
such a refusal also probably contributed to the belief amongst Nigerians that asylums 
were places of detention, not treatment, and that therefore asylums should be avoided at 
all cost. 
Nevertheless, although colonial officials did not want to compete with traditional 
medicine practitioners within the walls of the asylums, they were by no means opposed to 
using them as proxies through which to conduct domiciliary care of harmless lunatics. As 
far as colonial officials were concerned, anything that might keep people out of the 
asylum and thereby reducing overcrowding was a good thing.  In several instances it is 
clear that the colonial government itself saw the asylum as an evil to be avoided at all 
costs. In 1931, at roughly the same time that work on the Abeokuta asylum ceased, 
officials in Lagos declared a moratorium on further admissions of suspected lunatics to 
the Yaba asylum and Lagos prisons strictly on grounds that the institutions were too 
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overcrowded.74 As late as 1957, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs declared that “the position of lunatics in prisons is considerably worse than it 
would be if they were left to wander the streets.” He declared that “the treatment of 
lunatics in prisons is appalling; no treatment, no attention, close incarceration. Outside 
the prisons they might wander the streets but at least somebody would pay them some 
attention.”75 Even on the eve of independence, some officials in the colonial government 
apparently found the asylum system so dysfunctional that it literally caused more harm 
than good. 
 With the general desire to keep even the mentally ill out of the asylums, it is not 
surprising that colonial officials were more than willing to accede that traditional medical 
practitioners could be useful in the domiciliary care process. In fact, petitions on the part 
of Nigerians to have their relatives released from asylums and placed in the care of 
“native doctors” were granted so long as the patient in question did not exhibit violent or 
dangerous tendencies.76 Some medical officials even believed that traditional medical 
practitioners might be well suited to treat mentally ill Nigerians. Brown’s report, while 
remaining cautious about the efficacy of indigenous medical practitioners’ ability to treat 
mental illness, argued that “as a body they do their best for the patients according to their 
lights for small pecuniary reward, meet with a certain measure of success 
notwithstanding the great defects of their practice.”77 Brown further noted that traditional 
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medical practitioners “give careful individual attention to their patients, who in turn 
regard them with respect, trust, and oft-times affection.”78 This was more than could be 
said of the asylums which were so regularly criticized for offering no individual care. 
Ultimately Brown argued that the colonial government should respect traditional medical 
practitioners as well “because of the public esteem in which they are held and because 
they at present and probably will for long fill with some success a great want,”79 i.e. 
trained and qualified psychiatric staff. Carothers, for his part, mimicked Brown’s 
assessment when speaking of a particular practitioner who ran a private mental institution 
in a rural area: “I am convinced that, within the framework of the rather highly developed 
indigenous culture of that area, this man is doing a necessary job of work as humanely 
and intelligently as possible, and it is even not improbable that some of the techniques 
that are practiced by him and others like him might be of general value.”80 In fact, 
Carothers argued, “mildly demented” and mentally defective conditions, whether due to 
“chronic and incurable organic illness, epilepsy or schizophrenia,” as well as neurotic 
states “of recent onset and not of anti-social behaviour” were in his opinion best treated 
by traditional medical practitioners.81 
The generally negative perception of asylum care and slightly more positive view 
of home care continued to be held by both Nigerians and colonial officials throughout the 
colonial period. Not until the opening of Aro Mental Hospital in 1958 did the perception 
of the mental institution begin to change, and this was due largely to the ingenuity of 
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Nigerian psychiatrists T.A. Lambo, Tolani Asuni, and A.A. Marinho among others. Aro 
became the first institution to offer modern, European therapeutic treatments, which had 
previously been unavailable in Nigerian asylums, which helped to alleviate perceptions 
that asylums were not places where one went for treatment or cure. At the same time, Dr. 
Lambo and his staff were very conscious of the need to make the mental hospital an 
organic part of Nigerian society. Whereas previously colonial administration had been 
reluctant to give traditional medical practitioners access to asylums, Lambo integrated 
them into the diagnostic and treatment process as well as to serve as intermediaries 
between patients and staff. Lambo also developed what has been called the “village 
system”, creating a large outpatient community near the hospital whose treatment 
regimen was based on productive agricultural work as a means of therapy and 
reintegration into “normal” society. Under Lambo’s leadership Aro became an 
internationally renowned institution for the practice of ethnopsychiatry, even serving as a 
one of the focal points for the World Health Organization’s comparative study on 
schizophrenia.82 Aro’s eventual rise to prominence, however, came mostly after the 
independence of Nigeria from British colonial rule in 1960, and therefore is not 
representative of the conditions in lunatic asylums or perceptions of official attitudes 
towards psychiatric services throughout the colonial period. The fact remains that 
throughout the colonial period, mental asylums were seen as in many ways the worst 
possible place for a mentally ill person to be, and this attitude was shared by both 
colonial officials and Nigerian subjects. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lunatic asylum system in Nigeria was a blight on the colonial record throughout the 
colonial period. Although the colonial government recognized from an early stage the 
terribly overcrowded, unsanitary and inhumane conditions within the asylums, at no point 
was the colonial government willing to make the expenditure necessary to improve the 
facilities of its asylums to the degree necessary to adequately serve the Nigerian 
community. Despite three separately commissioned reports by independent psychiatric 
specialists calling for increased accommodation and the development of curative care and 
therapeutic treatment options within the asylums, conditions for incarcerated lunatics was 
largely the same in the late 1950s as it was in the 1920s. Throughout the colonial period, 
the government justified its failure to provide adequate institutional care for the mentally 
ill on the philosophy of indirect rule which demanded, in principle, great economy and a 
general non-interference in matters relating to indigenous cultures, which were to be 
preserved to the greatest degree possible and not rapidly transformed by the intrusion of 
“modern” European institutions and values, in this case represented by psychiatric 
medicine and institutions for the confinement of the insane. The result was an asylum 
system that neither colonial officials nor Nigerian subjects had any faith in; neither group 
wanted people committed to the asylums if there was any other option. This led to a 
preponderance of home care attended to by traditional medical practitioners and a general 
disbelief in the asylum as an effective site for the recovery of the mentally ill on the part 
of both colonial officials and Nigerians. 
As will be seen, the poor conditions and overcrowding in Nigeria’s lunatic 
asylums served as one set of factors influencing the repatriation process for Nigerians 
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found mentally-ill outside of Nigeria. However, the development of a psychiatric 
definition of the “African mind” also contributed to how medical and administrative 
officials thought about the prospect of repatriating mentally ill Nigerians from abroad. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the ideology of indirect rule that contributed to the 
underdevelopment of psychiatric services and the asylum system in Nigeria also 
contributed to the intellectual development of psychiatric theories as to what caused the 
“African mind” to become unbalanced to the point of needing institutional custody and 
care. The field of ethnopsychiatry in Africa during the first half of the twentieth century 
based some of its key findings on the idea that too much “modernization” of African 
societies would be detrimental to the cultures and, by extension, the psyches of the 
populations exposed to this modernization, an idea that was also a key justification of 
indirect rule practices. Ethnopsychiatry therefore contributed to the policies of indirect 
rule that left psychiatric services underdeveloped. Ethnopsychiatry also influenced the 
spatial categories into which colonial and medical officials divided the world between 
“primitive” and “modern” areas. These boundaries, I will argue, implicitly determined 
whether or not mentally ill Nigerians would be repatriated from abroad. It is therefore to 
the intellectual development of ethnopsychiatric definitions of the “African mind” and 
the use of these definitions to delineate these spatial categories that we now must turn. 
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Chapter 2 
Racism, Migration and the “African Mind” in the History of Colonial  
Psychiatry 
INTRODUCTION 
The problems associated with the development and expansion of mental health services 
in Nigeria described in the previous chapter were remarkably similar throughout colonial 
Africa. At no point during their tenure were colonial governments willing to spend the 
necessary funds to grow their asylum system and its therapeutic offerings to the levels 
necessary to meet the needs of their respective indigenous populations. In British 
colonies like Nigeria, the underdevelopment of mental health services was partly 
buttressed by a governmental philosophy of “indirect rule” that required colonial 
governments to intrude as little as possible into the lives of their subjects so as to avoid 
causing political, social and cultural upheaval to the greatest extent possible. Under this 
philosophy, it was seen as most beneficial to let indigenous communities control their 
own mentally-ill populations, incarcerating in colonial asylums only violent and criminal 
“lunatics.” The philosophy of indirect rule, however, was not the only ideological 
construction supporting the underdevelopment of colonial mental asylums. This chapter 
argues that also contributing to colonial governmental conceptions of the role of 
“modern” European mental health services in African colonies, including Nigeria, were 
pseudo-scientific theories of the nature of the “African mind” and what caused it to 
become mentally unstable. Furthermore, these theories of the “African mind”, combined 
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with the overall underdevelopment of the colonial mental asylum system in Nigeria, 
ultimately had great influence in determining how the colonial government of Nigeria 
treated mentally-ill Nigerian migrants. 
 European anthropologists, philosophers and, most importantly for this discussion, 
colonial psychiatrists like J.C. Carothers, tended to define the “African mind” primarily 
in contradistinction to the “European mind”, creating a racial binary that would permeate 
colonial psychiatry throughout the colonial era in Africa. The African mind, in general, 
was assumed to be inferior to European minds intellectually and morally. While debates 
over the causes of this inferiority were abundant, the majority of psychiatric specialists 
pointed the finger at African culture, which they believed arrested the intellectual 
development of Africans at a young mental age, and which discouraged innovation, 
creativity, and individual achievement, thereby reducing incentive for intellectual 
exceptionality. Because the assumed division between mentalities was made at the racial 
level, colonial psychiatrists tended to equate race with culture in this construction, 
declaring, in essence, all African cultures to be deficient in the same ways.  
 Colonial psychiatrists argued that this racially defined African culture, however, 
actually shielded Africans from developing many of the mental illnesses that affected 
Europeans. Because the pressure on the individual was so low in African societies, they 
argued, and because African intellects were stymied before they developed enough to 
ruminate on existential phenomena, Africans were less likely to become mentally ill, and 
the mental illnesses that did exist were for the most part best treated by traditional means. 
In the colonial context, however, the real threat to the “African mind” came with 
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European contact, also called “detribalization.” Colonial psychiatrists argued that the 
intellectually stunted “African mind” could not negotiate more sophisticated and 
complicated European values, social institutions, and worldviews. As a result, colonial 
psychiatrists believed, those Africans with greater exposure to European cultures were 
more vulnerable to mental illness. Such ideas had strong implications for how African 
migration was viewed. Africans who moved to more “modern” cities within Africa were 
seen to be at risk for developing mental illness because of the cultural shock of being 
nearer European-type institutions. Likewise, Africans who traveled to Europe were in 
danger of mental breakdown because of a perceived inability to cope with such drastic 
cultural change. 
 Theories surrounding the nature of the African mind remained that: just theories. 
Scientific endeavors to prove them were always inconclusive at best, contradictory at 
worst. Particularly from the 1950s, these racialized theories were also increasingly 
challenged by the first generation of Africans to gain European medical degrees and 
specialties in psychiatry. In Nigeria, the most famous representative of this generation 
was T.A. Lambo, the founder of Aro Hospital discussed in the previous chapter. Lambo, 
like many of his indigenous African colleagues, fought for the dismantling of the racial 
underpinnings of colonial psychiatry. Lambo argued against the inherent inferiority of 
African intellect and for a recognition that African cultures were far too heterogeneous to 
be lumped together as a single “African culture.”  
 This dismantling of an ideology in which race was paramount towards one in 
which ethnicity was paramount marked the beginning of a change from the predominance 
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of colonial psychiatry to that of ethno-psychiatry in the Nigerian setting. Over the long 
term, Lambo was largely successful in illustrating the deficiencies in the theories of the 
“African mind” and in focusing on ethnically-based, culturally-specific diagnostics and 
treatments for mental illness in Nigerians. In the short term, however, Lambo’s work 
engaged directly with ongoing debates in colonial psychiatry, placing at the fore the 
question of whether “detribalization” affected the African mind and, if so, in what ways. 
The result was a continued preoccupation with questions of racial difference at the 
expense of the kinds of cultural nuance that Lambo also articulated. By the time Nigeria 
became independent in 1960, the racial boundaries of colonial psychiatry were still very 
much affecting how the colonial government treated mentally-ill Nigerian migrants. 
COLONIAL PSYCHIATRY AND THE “AFRICAN MIND” 
Accompanying the colonial project of taking control of African territories in the name of 
“civilization” and “progress” was a strong intellectual curiosity amongst many Europeans 
to explain why there seemed to be such a difference in the developmental stages of 
Europe and Africa. It seemed obvious to most Europeans that European societies had 
reached a higher level of material culture, scientific progress, and, many would say, 
humanitarian sentiment than African societies, and it became a preoccupation of many 
European philosophers and scientists to determine why Europe had managed to advance 
where Africa had not. The idea that became widespread amongst Europeans was that 
Africa had failed to develop along the lines of Europe because of intellectual deficiency 
in Africans that caused them to remain at a “primitive” stage of evolution, incapable by 
their very nature of progressing in the way that Europeans had. The innate inferiority of 
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Africans carried over into the realm of psychiatry, where colonial psychiatrists, searching 
for the tools by which they could explain and treat mental illness in Africans, developed a 
concept of the universal “African mind” that defined the basic character traits of 
Africans. 
Such definitions and explanations of the nature of the “African mind” are 
discussed in depth in J.C. Carothers’ monograph The African Mind in Health and 
Disease, commissioned by the World Health Organization (WHO) and published in 
1953. Carothers’ monograph is the example par excellence of how colonial psychiatrists 
conceived of the “African mind” for several reasons. First, it represents a synthesis of 
European opinion on the nature of the “African mind”. Carothers was the most famous 
colonial psychiatrist with clinical experience in sub-Saharan Africa by the early 1950s. 
He had spent over12 years, from 1938 to 1951, as the head of the Mathari Asylum in 
Nairobi, Kenya, and during that time had published many scientific papers concerning the 
“African mind” as he had experienced it. Indeed, Carothers’s stature as a vanguard 
colonial psychiatrist was certainly the primary reason that the WHO commissioned him 
to write such a monograph. Carothers’ monograph is essentially a synthesis of the 
existing scholarship on the “African mind” as of the 1950s. Carothers cites dozens of 
works by other colonial psychiatrists with experience in Africa over the course of the first 
half of the twentieth century. The African Mind in Health and Disease therefore 
represents to a great extent a consensus of European opinion on the nature of the “African 
mind” presented and analyzed by the leader of the field of African colonial psychiatry.   
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The African Mind in Health and Disease therefore serves as a valuable document 
crystallizing European conceptions of African mentality as of the early 1950s. The work 
was also important in terms of the influence it had at the time it was published. The fact 
that this monograph was commissioned and disseminated by the WHO is evidence of the 
extent to which the ideas contained in the work had become mainstream thought not only 
at the level of specific colonies, or colonial sub-Saharan Africa in general, but at a global 
level. The influence of Carothers’ monograph can be seen in the specific context of 
Nigeria. In 1955, the government of Nigeria commissioned Carothers to report on the 
status of mental health services in Nigeria. The choice of Carothers for this project was 
based largely on the publicity he had generated as a result of writing The African Mind in 
Health and Disease for such a highly-esteemed international organization as the WHO.  
Because of the significance of Carothers’ work as a synthesis of opinion and as an 
influential work in its own right, it is useful to unpack Carothers’ definitions of the nature 
of the “African mind.” In general, Carothers defines the African mind as it has been 
determined by European philosophers and scientists to consist of the following traits: 
However completely they may, and can, be explained away, these attributes are 
apparent to most observers and are worth summarizing. The African accordingly 
has been described as conventional, highly dependent on physical and emotional 
stimulation; lacking in spontaneity, foresight, tenacity, judgment, and humility, 
inapt for sound abstraction and for logic, given to phantasy and fabrication, and, 
in general, unstable, impulsive, unreliable, irresponsible, and living in the present 
without reflection or ambition, or regard for the rights of people outside his own 
circle. To counteract these ruderies, he has also been described as cheerful, 
stoical, self-confident, sociable, loyal, emotionally intuitive, and eloquent, and as 
bearing grudges and having an excellent memory, a large vocabulary, and an 
aptitude for music and dance.1 
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It is important to note that this definition applied for all black Africans, regardless of 
religious or cultural background. As far as Carothers was concerned, “African mentality – 
East, West and South - is, for certain reasons, more uniform than that of literate cultures, 
such as that of Europe.”2 Although Carothers recognized that there is some distinction in 
African cultures, primarily between Christian/Muslim and indigenous religious 
practitioners and between the “tribal” and the “detribalized,” Carothers also believed that 
those distinctions masked a set of core traits that all Africans possessed.  According to 
Carothers, “Although many, if not most, Africans today diverge in some degree from the 
model as defined, the ancient cultural modes are a far more vital force than these remarks 
imply.”3 The conception that African cultures and societies were largely similar, at least 
when compared to European cultures and societies was, according to Carothers, “indeed 
the chief justification for the writing of this monograph.”4 Carothers based this definition 
of the “African mind” on the idea that Africans, as a race, were largely similar in terms of 
mentality, character traits, and social and cultural organization, particularly vis a vis 
Europeans.  
In so doing, Carothers was working well within the established practices of other 
European colonial psychiatrists with experience in Africa. Colonial psychiatrists, for the 
most part, considered Africans, as a group, to be different from Europeans. Furthermore, 
Africans, as a group were different from Europeans in largely the same ways. By virtue 
of shared difference from Europeans, Africans, regardless of their cultural backgrounds, 
were regularly lumped together as a single demographic unit based primarily on racial 
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difference from Europeans. By denoting the differences between Africans and Europeans 
in negative terms – i.e. Africans were “unreliable” and “irresponsible” compared to 
Europeans – colonial psychiatrists worked within a racialized worldview in which 
Africans as a uniform entity were inferior to Europeans as a similarly uniform entity. 
The dubious character traits of the “African mind” synthesized in Carothers’ 
definition served to define Africans as intellectually inferior to Europeans, as having 
failed to reach the level of intellectual sophistication that Europeans had, and, as a result, 
offered an adequate explanation to most Europeans for why African societies had failed 
to develop along the lines of European societies. There is no need to tarry on the 
multitudinous reasons why this logic was flawed: the work of countless social scientists 
over the last seven decades has effectively debunked such racialized theories of human 
development. What must be noted here, however, is that European colonial psychiatrists 
took this theory of racial difference for granted. That racial difference existed and led to 
different mental characteristics between the races was rarely seriously questioned by 
colonial psychiatrists in the first half of the twentieth century. As Geoffrey Tooth put it in 
his study of mental illness in the Gold Coast as late as 1950, “there is… no doubt that 
races and individuals differ widely in their natural endowment, in the use that they make 
of these two components of mentation [feeling and thinking] and in their ability to switch 
from one to the other.”5 Notice that the only two distinctions that Tooth makes are 
between race and individual: not culture, nationality, class, or any other demographic 
characteristic that could be used to distinguish people from each other. 




In fact, racial difference was the foundation upon which the field of colonial 
psychiatry was founded. The “African mind” was so different from European minds that 
colonial psychiatrists, because of their specialized knowledge relating to the workings of 
the mind, considered themselves integral to the process of understanding Africans and 
fostering inter-racial dialogue. As Parrinder, quoting a Belgian missionary, put it in 1951, 
in order to understand the “African mind”: 
it is necessary… to make a tabula rasa of our own conceptions in psychological 
matters, and prepare ourselves for the eventuality of ending with a very different 
conception of man from that which we hold in honour. We have nothing better to 
do than to listen to and analyse what the black people say about this being that we 
are accustomed to call a ‘reasonable animal.6 
 
The implications in Parrinder’s quotation are clear. European understanding of humanity 
and how humans should live and interact is so different from the way that Africans 
understand these issues that bringing European conceptions into the equation would 
actually inhibit understanding Africans. Presumably this is because in Parrinder’s mind 
Europeans are innately “rational animals” while Africans are not. It was therefore the job 
of the colonial anthropologist, administrator, and, of course, psychiatrist to study the 
“African mind” and uncover its true nature, because the mental divide between the races 
would otherwise be too large to overcome. 
  In this way, colonial psychiatry quickly became linked to colonial ideologies of 
bringing “civilization” to otherwise “backward” people. Since African societies were 
deemed to be inferior, most European colonial psychiatrists believed it was the duty of 
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the European to understand the “African mind” because Africans lacked the intellects and 
scientific skills necessary to understand themselves. Once the “African mind” was 
understood by Europeans, Europeans could help Africans to ameliorate their conditions, 
ultimately helping along the way towards “civilization” and “development” as defined by 
Europeans. In furtherance of this idea, Parrinder continued to expropriate the words of his 
Belgian missionary thusly: 
We do not pretend that the Bantu are capable of presenting us with a treatise of 
philosophy, explained with adequate vocabulary. It is for us to make a systematic 
development of it. It is we ourselves who can tell them, in a precise way, what is 
their intimate conception of beings, and they, recognizing themselves in our 
words, will then acquiesce by saying: ‘You have understood us, now you know us 
completely….’”7  
 
Understanding the “African mind” meant ingratiating colonial rule and, ultimately, 
advancing European-styled “civilization.” 
European colonial psychiatrists, working from an assumed position of racial 
difference based on European superiority, did not question whether Europeans and 
Africans had distinct psychic qualities. The main goal of most European colonial 
psychiatrists was to determine why Africans developed such negative character traits. 
Scholars of African societies offered many different interpretations of why the “African 
mind” had developed the way it had. Debates over the relative importance of these 
various factors were common, largely because tests to determine their validity were 
almost always inconclusive.  
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 Some European scholars and scientists attempted to make the argument that 
Africans were biologically distinct from Europeans. Growing out of the increasingly 
accepted ideas of Darwinian evolutionism, many European scientists posited whether 
perhaps Europeans had “evolved” to a higher stage of being than Africans, who remained 
in a “primitive” state both culturally and evolutionally. Many European scientists 
believed that a biological distinction between African and European brains was quite 
likely given the other recognized physical distinctions between the races, most notably 
skin color, hair type and facial features. If the African brain were proven to be 
biologically different from the European brain, then the extrapolated argument would be 
that physical differences in brain type would result in differences in mental capacity. Of 
course, biological distinctions between African and European brains were never proven, 
leading Myrdal, for example, to conclude in 1944 that 
 the presumption has been, and still is, among most students that, because there 
are certain physical differences between Negroes and whites, there may also be 
expected to be certain psychological differences. This does not necessarily 
follow… Everything we know… about development in the individual indicates 
that specific psychic traits, especially personality traits, but also the components 
of intelligence, are not present at birth and do not ‘maturate’ but actually develop 
through experience.8 
 
Despite the lack of evidence for biological differences in brain type between the 
races, traces of this line of thinking persisted well into the 1950s. In The African Mind in 
Health and Disease, Carothers seemed to grant some credence to the evolutionary line, 
speculating: 
it seems to the present writer that it is very unlikely that there will not be some 
differences [between European and African psychology]. The African stock 
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diverged from the European at least 30,000 years ago. Their common ancestors 
could be described as grandfathers at least a thousand times removed. It would be 
surprising if no divergent evolution had occurred in so many generations.9 
 
In a 1951 study, Carothers infamously purported that the fully formed “African mind” 
could be compared to the lobotomized European. As evidence, Carothers noted that “at 
least one of the few Europeans leucotomized in Kenya has, since his operation, consorted 
much more happily with Africans than with Europeans, in marked distinction from his 
previous behaviour and to the great embarrassment of his relations.”10 Postulations on 
differences in the biology of the brain between the races were therefore slow to die, but 
were only one of myriad suggested theories in any case. 
With biological theories largely unproven, most colonial psychiatrists argued that 
the inferiority of the “African mind” must be caused by environmental factors. Some 
scholars argued that the physical environment was the cause of the underdevelopment of 
the African mind. As Huntington notoriously asserted “So far as climate is concerned the 
hard reality seems to be that at present, both by its direct action and through natural 
selection, a warm, monotonous, and unstimulating climate [such as could be found in 
most of sub-Saharan Africa] tends to reduce human activity both physical and mental, 
regardless of race.”11 He concluded that “the climate of many countries seems to be one 
of the great reasons why idleness, dishonesty, immorality, stupidity, and weakness of will 
prevail.”12 The characteristics described here could easily be transposed with the 
characteristics of the “African mind” as defined by European colonial psychiatrists. 
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Explanations of climatic determinism could no more be proven than biological 
differences, however, leaving room for further theorizing on the causes of the inferiority 
of the “African mind.” 
 By far the most common explanation for the inferiority of the African mind was 
African culture. Because Africans were lumped together as a single demographic unit 
based on race, European colonial psychiatrists tended to talk about African culture as a 
uniform as well, undifferentiated across space. Perhaps the most important cultural factor 
contributing to the underdevelopment of the African mind was childhood development, 
primarily the worldview that Africans, as a whole, learned from an early age. According 
to Carothers, in African societies: 
Teaching is entirely by example and by the spoken word and is relatively personal 
and dramatic. General principles are taught only in particular social contexts: and 
truth, justice, and right and wrong are confused and the question “Why?” must 
always be answered in magical and animistic terms which do not permit of further 
speculation. Childish curiosity is thus effectively stifled at a much more 
immediate level than obtains with European children. Lack of building blocks, 
balls, and mechanical toys leaves little opportunity for the development of 
manipulative skill and solid-form production. On the other hand, social 
deportment is highly mature; and the child is treated as a responsible person from 
a surprisingly early age. In general, it would seem that instruction on the lines 
described may be excellently suited to the needs of little children; but that it fails 
most signally to pave the way for further individual development….13 
 
By the time an African reached full adult maturity, according to Carothers: 
 the seeds are sown. Life is governed by rules and taboos which remain as before, 
meticulous and anchored to the land. Since, as in rural societies everywhere, 
everyone knows everyone else’s business as well as he knows his own, public 
opinion is dominant; and, since everyone knows virtually the whole culture of the 
group, infringement of rules implies unsocial motives. Conformity is the rule, and 
even solitary or outstandingly successful people are suspect. Logic, speculation, 
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and the search for true causes are supplanted by magic and animism, which 
supply the answers and the lines of action.14 
 
Some Europeans argued that African sexual mores were the cause of arrested 
development of adolescent Africans. Davidson, writing in the context of Northern 
Rhodesia in 1949, argued that: 
Up to puberty there is in my opinion very little difference in the intelligence and 
learning ability between Bemba and European children. After that a marked 
difference occurs, the European far outstripping the African child. This, I think, is 
due to the early release and gratification of the genital sexual impulse in the 
average African child…. the pubescent African, unlike the European who is 
carefully taught to sublimate his sexual desires by education and sport, gratifies 
his erotic desires to the full. This considerably detracts in the establishment of a 
stable culture and stops the development of a scientific enquiring mind, which is 
in part dependent on the unsatisfied curiosity about sexual factors.15 
 
The sexualization of “inferior” races was, of course, a common preoccupation of 
Europeans. The result of such criticisms of African culture explained adequately, and in 
relatively “scientific” terms, why the “African mind” was inferior to Europeans.  
European intelligence tests conducted on Africans tended to support the idea that, 
at a racial level, Africans had a significantly lower “intellectual age” than Europeans, and 
that cultural difference was the primary explanation for these different results. For 
example, Fick, working with indigenous populations in South Africa in 1939, determined 
that the average mental age of the African population as a whole was 4 to 5 years lower 
than that of the European population of the same chronological age.16 A similar study of 
African intelligence undertaken by Olivier in Kenya in 1932 determined that “the average 
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cerebral and mental development of natives of East Africa is in the neighbourhood of 
85% that of Europeans.”17 Although most compilers of such intelligence tests explicitly 
recognized the cultural bias of the tests – such as language barriers and the lack of 
cultural assimilation into the European cultures in which the intelligence tests were 
compiled18 - they nevertheless continued to publish their results thereby lending greater 
credence to the generally-held conception of African “inferiority.”  
The inability of such tests to provide conclusive results, moreover, did not cause 
many colonial psychiatrists to question the general assumption that African intelligence 
was inferior to Europeans. In fact, it merely caused Carothers to lament that the 
appropriate tests had not yet been established to prove this difference. He argued that the 
general understanding that intelligence tests carried such inherent flaws had led to a 
situation by the 1950s in which “no on in Africa has had the temerity to plunge into seas 
which are so inviting, yet have such treacherous undercurrents.”19 The underlying 
assumption therefore remained that African intellects as a whole were inferior to 
Europeans’, but without proper evidence to prove it.  Nevertheless, the idea that cultural 
bias existed in intelligence tests could also be used to support the idea that African 
cultures were responsible for the deficiencies of the “African mind” in so far as African 
cultures clearly did not stress the same intellectual factors that had made Europe and 
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Europeans so “civilized” and powerful. This recognition of a culture bias also continued 
to work primarily on the racial level – marking the primary cultural distinction as that 
between “African” culture and “European” culture without giving attention to the stark 
cultural differences within these categorizations.  
Although European scholars suggested several different factors as the primary 
cause of the inferiority of the African mind, the most commonly held belief was that a 
uniform African culture hindered the development of African minds from the point of 
adolescence. According to the cultural causation models, African intellectual 
development stagnated at a relatively early age – curiosity was stifled because the 
universe was explained only in supernatural terms, social development ceased because an 
adolescent was considered an adult and could interact as a social equal with his elders. 
Any deviation from communal practices was considered anti-social, and as a result 
innovation was deemed suspicious and individual accomplishment without honor. There 
was no incentive for intellectual development in the individual, and as a result, group 
development also stagnated. 
THE “AFRICAN MIND” AND MENTAL ILLNESS 
What were the implications of these definitions of the nature and causes of the “African 
mind” for the study of and development of policies regarding mental illness in colonial 
Africa? For the most part, European psychiatric experts believed that mental illness was 
caused mostly by cultural factors, and that in pristine, “primitive”, rural African societies 
the rates of mental illness were actually much lower than in European societies. 
Carothers, for example, declared that “the incidence of insanity among Africans living in 
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their natural environment is probably very low.”20 The same forces that caused the 
African mind to be so underdeveloped and inferior compared to the European were also 
responsible for this low level of mental illness in African societies. It was presumed that 
levels of stress were low in African societies since they believed the communal lifestyle 
that expected very little of the individual and the cosmology of so many African societies 
prevented the existential curiosities that drove Europeans into despair and torpor. As 
Westermann explained: 
The consciousness of being an organic and well-protected member of a group 
gives the individual a definite self-consciousness and dignity… he is not easily 
embarrassed. Within his own circle he is never in a position where he does not 
know how to behave or what to do… work is not specialized in the same way as 
with us and therefore the non-expert ‘layman’… does not exist. The African is 
able to enlarge with ease on any subject; he does not suffer from social 
disabilities, for there is hardly any economic dependence, nor is there a distinction 
between servant and master, rich and poor. Hence nobody suffers from an 
inferiority complex… It is natural for him to express his real personality, for 
everybody knows everybody else, and no one can therefore permanently conceal 
his nature.”21 
 
Carothers expanded on Westermann’s comments, proclaiming that “[i]n spite of age 
statuses the prevailing feeling is one of equality – each man after all will be of high status 
one day if he lives long enough. His attitude to sex is equally self-assured and healthy.”22 
In such a healthy and secure social environment, argued most colonial psychiatrists, 
levels of mental illness were likely to be much lower than in the fast-paced, 
individualistic world of modern, “civilized” Europeans. 
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 Again, as with intelligence tests, conceptions of mental illness prevalence based 
primarily on ideas of racial difference seemed to be supported by statistical analysis. As 
of 1939, the rate of institutionalization for mental derangement in England and Wales 
stood at 4 per 1000 of the total population. In contrast, colonial psychiatrists noted, rates 
of institutionalization in African colonies were much lower. Tooth estimated the rate of 
institutionalization in Gold Coast to be 0.3 per 1000 in 1950.23 In Nyasaland (Malawi), 
Shelley and Watson estimated the rate to be 0.06 per 1000 as of 1936.24 Carothers 
estimated an institutionalization rate of 0.1 per 1000 in Kenya in 1953,25 and, according 
to the Commissioner for Mental Hygiene, the rate was 1.2 per 1000 in South Africa in 
1950.26 Such numbers led to the general belief that incidence of mental illness was much 
lower among African populations than among European populations. 
 Most colonial psychiatrists recognized that there were many problems with the 
data of incidence of mental illness. First, the data were compiled only in the asylum 
setting. This meant that the data did not account for any mentally ill Africans who were 
not institutionalized, which were by all accounts the vast majority of African insane. 
Unlike in England and Wales, where therapeutic treatment and voluntary admission were 
increasingly the goals of mental health services, in most African colonies asylums were 
designed to accommodate only the most dangerous of the mentally ill population – those 
with violent or criminal tendencies.27 The overwhelming majority of mentally ill persons 
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in African societies, it was assumed, were “harmless”, and were therefore treated in their 
homes, most likely never even coming to the attention of colonial authorities. Colonial 
psychiatrists recognized that this fact meant that incidence rates for mental illness must 
be much higher than the numbers based on institutionalizations would indicate, but no 
accurate compilation of data on home care patients was ever achieved. Most colonial 
psychiatrists continued to believe that even if such data were available the rates of mental 
illness in rural, “primitive” African societies would still prove to be lower than in Europe. 
 The general assumption amongst colonial psychiatrists was that the simple, 
communal, “primitive” lifestyle of rural Africans resulted in a remarkably stable, if 
intellectually stunted “African mind”. But in the context of European colonial rule, 
colonial psychiatrists recognized that the “primitive” and “traditional” rural lifestyle of 
Africans was in flux, as African cultures came into ever closer contact with Europeans. In 
the long term, it was believed that this contact would be a good thing – it would lead to 
the “civilization” of “primitive” peoples. But in the short term, colonial psychiatrists 
feared that this contact could be dangerous to an “African mind” not equipped to cope 
with the more sophisticated, modern, and civilized cosmologies and social institutions 
presented by contact with Europeans. As Gallais and Planques, working in French 
Algeria declared, Western civilization “swamped these countries [African colonies]” with  
a veritable tide of political, social, and religious ideas, entirely new,… 
submerging the natives under an ocean of concepts for which nothing had 
prepared them, and in which they were incapable of discriminating good from 
bad. Already the frequency of mental states among uprooted natives (soldiers, 
sailors, dockers), with their frequent frenzies, bears witness to the influence on 
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their mentation of a conditioning quite different from that of the environment to 
which they were adapted.28 
 
The effect of what Europeans called “detribalization” on the African mind was far and 
away the main preoccupation of colonial psychiatrists.  
If the advent of modern European civilization was itself the greatest threat to 
African mental health, in what ways? Geoffrey Tooth, among others, hypothesized that 
literacy might be a main factor contributing to the destabilization of the African mind. As 
Tooth saw it, literacy could conceivably lead to mental illness in a couple of ways. First, 
in order to obtain literacy, Africans had to come into contact with Europeans. The process 
of literacy therefore exposed Africans to ideas and customs that threatened their 
traditional worldviews and therefore potentially unbalanced them. Tooth also suggested 
that literacy led to better paying, more individualistic jobs for Africans. The better pay 
and the need to live in an urban environment often away from the traditional extended 
family caused Africans to be pulled in two directions. They had to live the life of a 
modernized African in the city, but their social obligations to extended family did not 
end. The literate African was expected to maintain his traditional responsibilities in 
addition to his modern ones and even to distribute his largesse back to the community. 
The literate African was therefore faced with a dilemma of whether or not to cut ties with 
his traditional past in order to effectively adapt and live in his new environment. The 
stress of this circumstance, believed Tooth, could easily lead to mental unbalance. 
Tooth’s clinical study was inconclusive, his hypothesis admittedly unproven by his work 
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to the extent that he concluded that “Europeanisation is unlikely to be a significant causal 
factor in psychosis.”29 Nevertheless Tooth was unable to let the idea go completely, 
arguing that “although this analysis of a small sample suggests that endogenous factors 
are as common in the psychosis of literates as illiterates, it may still be true that the 
strains inherent in literacy play a part in precipitating a mental illness where there is a 
latent hereditary predisposition.”30 The belief that somehow, some way, the African mind 
must be thrown off balance by the challenge from European “civilization” was simply too 
engrained ever to be discounted.  
Margaret Field provides a slightly different analysis linking literacy and the 
European-styled rat race to mental conflict and breakdown in Africans in her study on 
witchcraft in Gold Coast. As Field put it: 
The reason for the literate breakdown appears, in rural Ashanti, not far to seek. In 
any village or small country-town, on any morning of the week, are to be seen 
numerous able-bodied men sitting under trees drinking palm wine or playing 
draughts while other idlers look on. They are all farmers, but only during planting, 
harvesting and weeding need they do any active work, and even then, if they feel 
disinclined, some kinsman or wife will usually take over. No demands are made 
on most men in the way of regularity or punctuality.31 
 
Field’s main point here is not that a European lifestyle causes mental illness necessarily, 
but that pre-existing mental illnesses may become more apparent in the “modern” 
context. Whereas in traditional African settings, the mentally ill might often function 
satisfactorily because so little is expected of them, in the “modern” context mental illness 
prevents proper functioning. It was for this reason, argued Field, that mental illness 
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appeared to be more prevalent amongst “detribalized” Africans. Nevertheless, the 
underlying argument is the same: the “African mind”, because of its “primitive” nature, 
could not handle the rigors placed on it by attempted transference to European social 
norms. 
 As with other theories related to the African mind, there were many caveats 
indicating the “detribalization” crisis was something of a red herring, and many colonial 
psychiatrists recognized this at the time. For example, Cunyngham Brown, in his report 
on mental illness in Nigeria, argued that there was little evidence indicating that rates of 
mental illness were higher amongst Nigerians with greater contact to Europeans than 
among rural communities where contact with Europeans was minimal. “However 
reasonable on psychological grounds the ‘clash of culture’ theory may sound, the 
observations of the reporter [Cunyngham Brown] certainly lend it no support….”32, 
declared Cunyngham Brown. He was willing to admit that “the social and mental 
adjustments involving unduly great effort and emotional strain – e.g. in the course of 
higher education [which could only be undertaken in a European-influenced 
environment] – may have ill effects in some cases,” but he also argued that this was true 
of the “African or any other.”33 The most likely explanation for the apparently high rates 
of mental illness among Africans with high levels of exposure to Europeans, according to 
Cunyngham Brown, was that “the subjects of mental disorder living within easy reach of 
administrative centres are more likely to come under official attention than those 
inhabiting areas more removed… In distance, or lack, of communication, not in contacts 
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and clash, the explanation seems to lie.”34 Unfortunately, Cunyngham Brown’s thesis on 
this issue was no more substantively proved than that of his erstwhile opponents. The 
result was that the “detribalization” hypothesis continued to intrigue colonial psychiatrists 
for a long time. Such interest by learned authorities lent the “detribalization” hypothesis 
gravitas despite the lack of definitive evidence proving its veracity. 
THE “AFRICAN MIND” IN COLONIAL NIGERIA 
This body of knowledge on the African mind and what caused it to become mentally 
unstable was established by colonial psychiatrists working across the African continent 
and had become mainstream thought in the field of psychiatry in general by the 1950s.35 
As such, it should be no surprise that the relationship between race, culture and mental 
processes was also a central theme in the colonial psychiatry of Nigeria. Interestingly, the 
psychiatric experts that advised the colonial government in Nigeria (but never actually 
worked there for any length of time) consistently argued that in a large, multi-ethnic 
country like Nigeria recognition of the differences in culture across space was of 
paramount importance to the understanding and treatment of mental illness. Ultimately, 
however, these specialists always fell back on the tendencies to lump all Africans 
together as a single cultural unit and to define that unit in contradistinction to Europeans 
– perpetuating the racialization of colonial psychiatry.  
As early as the 1930s, colonial psychiatrists began trying to conceptualize a 
definition of culture in Nigeria that was de-linked from race. For example, Cunyngham-






Brown’s report from 1938 tried to argue that cultural difference within Nigeria should be 
a paramount concern to mental health officials: 
Certainly in respect of bodily diseases, in which modern medical practice is much 
the same in every civilised country, regard for local customs and traditions may 
be unnecessary or even out of place. But when dealing with mental patients, in 
whom adjustment to their social surroundings is both an aid to treatment and the 
hall-mark of success, an understanding of and an allowance for their inborn needs 
and customs is an essential prerequisite.36 
 
Cunyngham Brown recognized that “the presumed causes of mental disorder… vary from 
tribe to tribe in consonance with locally current mythology and belief…,”37 and argued 
that it was important for psychiatric experts to know the cultures within which they were 
treating. Cunyngham Brown, however, had no such specific cultural understanding, 
having spent only a few months on a whirlwind tour of Nigeria. As a result, he quickly 
fell into familiar patterns of cross-cultural generalization, noting that: 
belief in certain of these causes is fairly general. For example the influence of the 
moon at full or change in producing madness, especially of the periodically 
recurring forms (manic-depressive insanity), naturally is common in the African 
as it is been in most other peoples in the course of their racial development. Bad 
dreams; apparitions, whether asleep or waking, and especially of djinns bearing 
firebrands; the trespass  of sacred places or of such as are haunted by “fairies” 
(generally maleficent); touching or seeing “spirits”; sleeping in certain places, for 
example under a tamarind tree; and the violation of any ban or prohibition of the 
genius loci, are all frequent alleged causes; but by far the most commonly 
entertained are, first, possession by evil spirits (especially in the cases of acute 
and chronic mania), and second, “ill-wishing’ by evil-minded persons (especially 
in delusional forms of insanity).38 
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Of course, even these generalizations do not apply broadly. For example, the concept of 
the djinn applied most significantly to the Muslim populations in northern Nigeria and 
was a far less commonly held belief in southern Nigeria. 
 One might be tempted to give Cunyngham Brown a pass on these kinds of 
generalization because he was an outsider with no previous experience in Nigeria and did 
not claim to have any specific understanding of cultural differences within Nigeria other 
than that they certainly existed. But Cunyngham Brown also illustrated in his report the 
extent to which racialized definitions of human mentality impinged upon his judgment. 
For example, Cunyngham Brown was quick to point out “the wide dissimilarities in 
mentality, including in this term intellectual, emotional and ethical qualities, which in the 
average distinguish the West African from the European.”39 Cunyngham Brown refused 
to comment on the ongoing debate about the causes of these differences, and explicitly 
stated that the recognition of racial difference was “no question of good and bad, or of 
superior and inferior, but only one of difference,”40 a fairly liberal idea for its time. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that at a basic level he defined culture in terms of race, just as his 
colleagues did. “[T]he fact remains,” argued Cunyngham Brown:  
that the emotional or affective processes, which are at once the source of feeling, 
habit and custom and the mainspring of conduct, are so deeply implanted in every 
individual and race that they are peculiarly insusceptible of  alteration by external 
conditions with which they are not in essential agreement, and persist beneath the 
surface, in powerful operation, generation after generation.41 
 
As others had done before him and others would do after him, Cunyngham Brown spoke 
in terms of individual and race, not culture, ethnicity, nationality, or any other possible 
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subdivision of humanity. Perhaps most telling, a close reading of Cunyngham Brown’s 
report reveals that he makes several references to the “African” and a few to 
“Mohammedans”, but not a single reference to any of Nigeria’s hundreds of distinct 
ethnic groups. 
 Seventeen years later Carothers, fresh off his publication of The African Mind in 
Health and Disease, toured Nigeria at the behest of the colonial government for the 
purpose of updating Cunyngham Brown’s presumably outdated observations and 
recommendations. Carothers, however, largely reiterated Cunyngham Brown’s findings. 
Like Cunyngham Brown, Carothers recognized the cultural differences within Nigeria, 
noting “a striking lack of cultural unity… probably much greater even than any seen in 
Europe.”42 As a result of this cultural difference, argued Carothers, “patterns of behaviour 
which are normal in one part of Nigeria would be quite abnormal in another….”43 Like 
Cunyngham Brown and others, Carothers argued that this made it very difficult for 
European psychiatrists to offer effective services in indigenous environments because “it 
must take years of local experience before any man is really in a position to say of a 
particular case ‘This behavior is within the limits of normality’, and still longer before he 
can say ‘This pattern of thinking is normal.’”44 Carothers actually espoused the 
importance of indigenous healers in helping to bridge this cultural gap. 
As in his other works, Carothers continued to argue that culture was the main 
factor affecting mental development in humans and the main factor impinging upon the 
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manifestation and treatment of mental illness. His discussion of the cultural differences 
within Nigeria seemed to be an articulation of a more nuanced understanding of the effect 
of culture on human development, one that might be moving away from the explicit link 
between race and culture that he had so firmly illustrated in his other works. Carothers 
even argued that there was a strong need in Nigeria to reorganize the asylum system on 
regional lines so that the mentally ill could be treated nearer to their familiar home 
environments. As Carothers put it: 
whatever may be the merits and demerits of regionalization from a general 
medical point of view there is much to be said for it from the psychiatric angle. 
Men’s minds, unlike their bodies, are mainly products of their social and cultural 
environment and in Nigeria to-day local cultures vary very much on regional 
lines. The incidence of insanity and even the forms that mental derangement takes 
may be expected to vary somewhat on this basis and the psychiatric needs are thus 
also likely to vary on these lines.”45 
 
Carothers clearly believed that the psychiatric needs of Nigeria’s populations would 
differ across regions because of the different cultures represented within those regions. 
 As the report later illustrated, however, the definition of cultural difference across 
regions was inextricably bound up in the “detribalization” debate in Carothers’ mind. The 
primary marker of cultural difference, according to Carothers, was the relative extent to 
which British values and cultural norms had infiltrated the lifestyles of indigenous 
societies. This categorization of cultural groups in Nigeria can be quite effectively seen in 
Carothers’ discussion of Nigeria’s different Regions – North, South and West. Of the 
Eastern Region, Carothers declared: 
The people by and large are ambitious and adventurous and have availed 
themselves in high degree of the European type of education, and often travel or 
go to work outside their Region. In these circumstances conflicts between the old 
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ways and the new must often be acute and take a corresponding toll in mental 
health and happiness.46 
 
Comparatively, Carothers described the people of the Western Region as: 
 
 hav[ing] developed, independently of recent European influence, a way of life to 
which they are firmly attached and which includes a considerable degree of 
urbanization. In these circumstances it would seem, firstly, that European ways 
make less appeal to them than to peoples of the Eastern Region and secondly, that 
they can absorb these ways more easily and less conflictually than can many 
African groups. In these circumstances an increase of mental breakdown due to 
the impingement of the new ways on the old is likely to be less dramatic. 
Urbanization itself, however, and which is such a striking feature in this Region, 
has important implications for psychiatry since it makes home care so much more 
difficult than is the case in purely rural societies.47 
 
 
In extreme distinction from the Eastern and Western Regions, which were both located in 
southern Nigeria near the coasts and which therefore had the greatest amount of contact 
with Europeans, Carothers defined the predominantly Muslim Northern Region as: 
On the whole… and especially by comparison with the peoples of the southern 
Regions… hav[ing] in common a considerable complacency in regard to their 
traditional ways of life and little inclination for their change. In all those 
circumstances it is not to be expected that demands for psychiatric care and 
treatment are likely to increase very rapidly unless they are powerfully 
encouraged to do so.48  
 
So as far as Carothers was concerned, the cultural differences within Nigeria existed 
primarily at the Regional level, and these cultural differences were based primarily on the 
relative exposure of the peoples in these regions to British culture, education, and social 
institutions. Those with high exposure to British ways, the significantly “detribalized,” 
were assumed to be in greater danger of developing a mental imbalance because of the 
cultural conflict, and therefore, Carothers suggested that mental health infrastructure 
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needed to be boosted in the South, where there was a greater number of such 
“detribalized” Nigerians. In the North, where British influence was less, Carothers argued 
there was less need for an expansion of mental health infrastructure and services. The 
concept of the “African mind” as threatened by European society was still very much 
alive in Nigeria as of the late 1950s. 
CONTESTING THE “AFRICAN MIND” 
Not until the waning years of colonial rule in the 1950s were significant strides made 
toward reconceptualizing the relationship between race and culture in the Nigerian 
context. This reconceptualization was accomplished by the first generation of European-
trained indigenous Nigerian psychiatrists, who worked to point out the deficiencies of 
theories of the African mind and work towards a more culturally sensitive model to 
explain differences in the causes and effective treatments of mentally-ill Africans. The 
best example in the Nigerian context is T.A. Lambo, the first European-trained Nigerian 
medical doctor to specialize in psychiatry. Lambo is most remembered as the founder of 
Aro Hospital in Abeokuta, which opened in 1954 and through which major contributions 
to the development of cross-cultural psychiatry as a discipline were made. From an 
ideological perspective, Lambo criticized European ideas of the African mind, reducing 
the field of colonial psychiatry to a pseudo-science designed to buttress a racial order that 
had no place in modern scientific thinking. As Lambo eloquently put it:  
The study of mental disorders among primitive peoples is a comparatively new 
field for medical research but it should be realized that so many of the so-called 
primitive peoples studied today are in varying stages of acculturation… The 
literature on the subject is extremely inadequate and in some cases the clinical 
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conclusions were founded on the treacherous sands of unscientific methodology. 
Paradoxically, others justify their inferences (which often extend beyond the 
range of observation) by appealing to “our age’s gods – science and scientific 
objectivity”…. Objectivity can sometimes become an obstacle in the search for 
truth. This has happened in varying degrees with some of the accounts given by 
modern exponents of the subject of “race” and disease. At their worst, they have 
been but glorified pseudo-scientific novels or anecdotes with a subtle racial bias; 
at their best, they are abridged encyclopedias of misleading information and 
ingenious systems of working hypotheses, useful for the guidance of research, but 
containing so many obvious gaps and inconsistencies, giving rise to so many 
unanswerable questions that they can no longer be seriously presented as valid 
observations of scientific merit.49 
 
The seeming unwillingness of colonial psychiatrists to move beyond questions of an 
inconclusive and unproven hypothesis of racial difference in matters of the mind, 
according to Lambo, was preventing the development of meaningful advances in 
psychiatric theory and practice in African settings.   
One of the fundamental problems with colonial psychiatry according to Lambo 
was the tendency to define cultural differences in terms of a universal African race. 
“There is no such thing as ‘African culture’ and therefore ‘African mentality’” argued 
Lambo. “Even if we admit that ‘human societies are never alone,’ diversity of human 
cultures in Africa has been emphasized by many competent anthropologists. This 
diversity is brought about much more by the relations between the various groups and, to 
a less extent, by the isolation between the groups.”50 As far as Lambo was concerned, 
race should be eliminated as a demographic category for determining cultural difference. 
“[C]ulture, strictly speaking,” argued Lambo: 
implies environment but in its totality. The racial concept is based on the 
assumption that genetically determined mental differences do exist between 
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different races but the fact should be stressed that, in the light of our present 
knowledge, while the range and levels of innate mental capacities between races 
have not been proved to exceed those that are usually encountered in individuals 
of the same race, there is no evidence to support the view that psychological 
differences between groups are racially determined.51 
 
Lambo consistently argued for a de-racializing of the concept of African culture, in favor 
of a more nuanced and culturally-sensitive brand of psychology.  
Lambo argued that mental illness clearly manifested itself differently in different 
cultures. The need to treat all mentally-ill people, including Africans, within their cultural 
frameworks was extremely important to Lambo. The key distinction to be made was the 
delimitation of what constituted different culture groups. Colonial psychiatrists had 
tended to see the treatment of mental illness as largely similar across African 
communities, therefore leading to an overall generalization that African cultures, 
particularly in regard to the treatment of mental illness, were more or less uniform. As 
Cunyngham-Brown had characterized indigenous conceptions of mental illness as “fairly 
general” in his report of mental health services in Nigeria in 1938,  focusing on 
explanations of causation rooted in witchcraft, spiritual affliction, or other supernatural 
phenomena.52 Even a cursory glance at the current literature on indigenous health 
systems in Nigeria evidences the myriad different ways that mental illness was conceived 
and treated both within and across cultural groups in Nigeria. For example, although the 
Hausa of northern Nigeria recognize “evil spirits” as the most common cause of mental 
illness, they also recognize different forms of mental illness as being linked to biological 
and social ailments. ‘Kwa’kwalwa ta fashe, or “breaking of the skull” in Hausa is defined 
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as mental illness originating from physical trauma to the head, such as a blow or an 
automobile accident. Simialrly, giya da kafsu, mental illness as the result of the abuse of 
drugs and alcohol, is a strictly physical and natural explanation for mental illness in some 
persons. The Hausa also recognize different degrees of mental illness, from the 
permanent madness of a congenital affliction to the “temporary insanity” of spirit 
possession as is found in the famed rituals of the bori cult.53  
The Yoruba of the southwest also made the intra-cultural distinction between 
mental illnesses caused by witchcraft, gods, and natural causes. Even natural diseases 
could be exacerbated by supernatural agents, however. Many mental illnesses were 
explicitly understood in terms of Yoruba religious beliefs. For example, it is widely 
believed among Yorubas that Sopono, the orisa, or deity that brings smallpox, can also 
bring mental illness. While Sopono is the primary orisa associated with mental illness, it 
is also believed that other orisas may send Sopono to afflict any human who offends 
them. Again, the diffuse explanations for mental illness within a single cultural group are 
clear, as are the distinctions between conceptions of mental illness across cultural groups. 
The idea of deities specifically linked to mental illness, for example, would not be found 
in the largely monotheistic, Islamic culture of the Hausa.54 
Developing a strong understanding of these inter- and intra-cultural conceptions 
of mental illness and treating patients within their specific cultural frameworks was the 
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main agenda behind the therapeutic regime Lambo established at Aro Hospital. 
Ultimately, Lambo believed, understanding how mental patients conceived of their own 
illnesses in cultural context would both allow psychiatric professionals to convince 
patients that they were being treated for their specific maladies and help to provide the 
familiar, safe environment that is so important to the recovery process. Lambo justified 
this argument, declaring:   
It would seem, therefore, that under stress, emotional or otherwise, newly 
acquired and highly differentiated social attitudes and ideologies are more 
susceptible to “damage”, leaving the basic traditional beliefs and indigenous 
moral philosophy functionally overactive. The realization of this fact led me to 
recognize the part played by indigenous psychotherapeutic approaches in the total 
management of the patient, without any lowering of standards or medical practice. 
Although by Western standards this approach is indefensible and although some 
of these indigenous cultural factors may be caricatured as primitive and 
antediluvian, they are nevertheless emotionally reinforced. They are an historical 
and traditional legacy, and the behavioral scientist working in an African cultural 
setting must be sensitive to their implications.55 
 
While this statement seems to uphold the “detribalization” theory of the causation of 
mental illness in the “African mind” to the extent that it focuses on stress as a causative 
factor and a very clear differentiation between Western and traditional treatment 
methods, it is important to note that Lambo is not speaking here in racial terms. The 
stress involved could come from any change in a person’s environment, not simply 
contact with European social organization. Furthermore, Lambo does not refer to 
traditional cultures as uniformly “African” but leaves space for broad differentiation of 
cultures within racial designations. Aro Mental Hospital famously incorporated 
indigenous medical practitioners into the diagnostic and treatment process of mental 
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patients, thereby serving as important intermediaries between patients who often saw 
their illnesses as rooted in indigenous causality and European-trained psychiatric staff 
who did not have the cultural understanding to engage patients’ concerns.  
 This is not to say that Lambo was completely liberated from the assumptions and 
categorizations that had been built into his chosen discipline. Despite arguing for a de-
racialization of psychiatric theory and practice, Lambo himself often employed racialized 
categories and terminologies very reminiscent of colonial psychiatrists like Carothers. 
Although Lambo argued that there was no such thing as a uniform African culture, he 
also tended to lump African cultures together by their similarities. For example, Lambo 
had no problem essentializing African cultures when comparing them to other 
“civilizations” thoughout time, arguing that “African cultural institutions… may lack the 
beauty of the Greek, the durability of the Chinese, the profound mysticism of the Hindu, 
and the effective knowledge of scientific facts and control over natural forces acquired in 
the West.”56 In a discussion of the Yoruba of southwestern Nigeria, Lambo declared: 
There is no evidence, however, to support the view that Yoruba cultural 
institutions are significantly different from those of the other African tribes. A 
review of the literature on this subject reveals the fact that there are important 
points of similarity. Insofar as his personality structure is influenced by the 
cultural pattern, a rural (non-literate) Yoruba, for practical purposes, is a fair 
representative of the primitive African.57 
 
Lambo’s reference to the “literature” in the above quote is also something of a 
contradiction. Presumably this is the same literature that Lambo had previously debunked 
as unscientific and based on a series of racialized assumptions. His use of the term 
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“primitive African” is also clearly a holdover from colonial psychiatry of the “African 
mind” that referred to the African in his purest state as rural and “primitive”.   
 Even Lambo’s work, while instrumental in changing attitudes about the 
relationship between race, culture and mental disorder, continued to rely in part on 
conceptions that culture was the most important factor affecting mental processes, a 
reasonable suggestion. However, the boundaries between what could be considered 
distinct cultures remained blurred: Lambo seems to have believed that that culture could 
in some ways be defined in racial terms, in some ways not. These theories had major 
implications when it came to determining what should be done with migrant Nigerians 
who developed a mental illness outside of their familiar cultural environs. 
MIGRATION AND THE “AFRICAN MIND” 
If, as colonial psychiatrists argued, the African mind was stable largely because it was 
cradled by a stable cultural environment that allowed it to remain in a “primitive” state, 
then what happened when the African mind traveled out of said cultural environment? 
Simultaneously, if, as Lambo argued, specific cultural conceptions and treatment 
processes were essential for the effective amelioration of mental instability, what 
happened to a mentally unstable migrant who was not surrounded by the necessary 
cultural bromides to ease his personal turmoil? 
The effects of migration on the African mind were a major concern of colonial 
psychiatrists and indigenous ethno-psychiatrists alike. In an argument that was 
intrinsically linked to the “detribalization” theory, many colonial psychiatrists posited 
that since African minds were incapable of internalizing social and cultural change, 
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migration of Africans to places with social and cultural institutions different from their 
own posed a significant threat to their sanity. For example, Carothers, in a study on 
migrant Kenyans, concluded that “so long as an African remains at home he is very 
unlikely to be certified insane, but as soon as he leaves his home his chances of being 
certified are much increased.”58 Even Lambo noted mobility was a threat to mental 
stability in Africans, declaring that:  
The African societies are turning into an increasingly mobile people, pushing 
away from tribal areas and into peri-urban concentrations of shanty towns in 
which the individual becomes isolated and alienated in a fragmented society of 
heterogeneous sub-culture, thereby frustrating his expectations, shattering his 
previous experience and forcing him to become dependent upon synthetic forms 
of social organization for his emotional security. All this constitutes a ‘threat to 
mental health so vast as to dwarf any other.’59 
 
Clearly migration of Africans was a concern of psychiatrists on both ends of the 
ideological spectrum. 
The question that determined how European colonial psychiatrists and indigenous 
ethno-psychiatrists thought about this issue was what level of socio-cultural difference 
constituted a threat to a new migrant? As far as psychiatrists (and this included both 
colonial and cross-cultural psychiatrists) were concerned, there were two types of 
migration that could bring about the circumstances necessary to destabilize the African 
mind. These were rural-urban migration and international migration. The quotes provided 
above by Carothers and Lambo were both concerned with rural-urban drift. Carothers’ 
was speaking of Kenyans who migrated a relatively short distance from the reserves to 
                                                 
58
 J.C. Carothers, “A Study of Mental Derangement in Africans,” 560. 
59
 T. Adeoye Lambo, “Socioeconomic Changes in Africa and Their Implications for Mental Health,” in 
Man And Africa ed. Gordon Wolstenholme and Maeve O’Connor (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1965), 133-4. 
 108 
the city. Cities, however, were where Africans came into greatest contact with European 
“modernity” and therefore posed the greatest threat to destabilizing African minds 
through “detribalization”. Lambo was also concerned with the heterogeneity of urban 
areas, not so much out of a fear of “detribalization,” but because of the possibility of 
social alienation, instability, and extreme poverty that could result from being alone in a 
new, big place.  
Lambo, however, noted that in the Nigerian environment particularly, this threat 
was often mitigated through socio-cultural cohesion within urban environments. “Among 
some African migrants powerful sociocultural mechanisms exist which act as a safety-
valve tending to reduce the development of psychosocial disorders,” explained Lambo. 
Using the migrant Igbo population in Yoruba cities as a case study, Lambo concluded 
that mental illness rates among this group were actually lower than among Yoruba 
populations in the same area and lower than non-migrant Igbo populations. Lambo’s 
explanation for this phenomenon was the intensity of what he called “chain migration” in 
which existing migrant Igbos incorporated new migrant Igbos into a social infrastructure 
that provided them accommodation, aid in finding employment and the proper advisers to 
help new migrants “learn current social conditions and opportunities” in a foreign place.60 
Both Carothers and Lambo recognized rural-urban migration as a threat to African mental 
stability, but for different reasons. Carothers’ concern was clearly based on racialized 
conceptions of the “African mind” and the effects of “detribalization”. Lambo, on the 
other hand argued from a non-racial perspective that placed greatest concern on intra-
racial forms of cultural heterogeneity and social dislocation associated with rural-urban 
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drift. Neither pole of the psychiatric profession seemed particularly concerned with rural-
rural or urban-urban migration. 
The second form of migration that concerned colonial and ethno-psychiatrists was 
that of international migration, particularly of Africans to European countries. As with 
rural-urban migration, the concerns of colonial psychiatrists like Carothers were based on 
the effects of “detribalization”, while those of ethno-psychiatrists like Lambo were most 
concerned with the socio-cultural alienation that could result from such a drastic change 
in environment. Indeed, the plight of West African students in Britain became a major 
preoccupation of colonial and ethno-psychiatrists alike from the 1950s. Field made 
mention of the extent to which “in England, Ghana, and Nigeria, at the present time 
[1960] concern is being expressed about the large number of young Africans who go to 
Britain for study-courses and there suffer mental breakdown,”61 although she recognized 
that cases of mental illness among primary school leavers who remained in West Africa 
were “probably no fewer” than those amongst migrants to Britain. In a 1960 article on a 
syndrome dubbed “brain fag” in Nigerian students, Prince noted the “good deal of 
concern expressed in the Press, both in Nigeria and Ghana, over the high incidence of 
psychiatric disturbance among West African students in the United Kingdom,” 62 but 
noted that a large proportion of cases of “brain fag” seen in psychiatric hospitals in 
Nigeria were in students who had never left the country.  
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Nevertheless, the perceived prevalence of mental breakdown among migrant 
Nigerians in Great Britain was great enough that Lambo and others conducted clinical 
studies specifically on the plight of Nigerian students in Britain in 1957. Lambo 
concluded that mental illness was caused not by the inability of the African mind to cope 
with British society per se, but more because, in so doing, migrant Nigerians were 
“stripped of all the cultural and moral support to which [they were] accustomed.”63 
Lambo noted that in 90% of the cases studied, Nigerian students suffering mental 
instability in Britain believed their problems to have traditional, indigenous causes such 
as bewitchment.64 Without the proper cultural outlets to treat such perceptions, the 
students’ conditions were unlikely to improve while in Britain. The assumed links 
between migration, “detribalization” and mental illness in Africans proposed by colonial 
psychiatrists therefore became part of the agenda of cross-cultural psychiatrists, who, 
concerned with de-racializing the theory of the African mind, simultaneously perpetuated 
some of the same preoccupations held by colonial psychiatrists. It should be noted that 
both Field and Lambo showed greatest concern with the international travel of West 
Africans to Britain, across a largely racial divide. No studies of migrants traveling 
between African countries were conducted either by colonial psychiatrists or by cross-
cultural psychiatrists during the colonial era in West Africa. The overwhelming concerns 
as related to the link between migration and the “African mind” were the effects of rural-
urban migration as “primitive” Africans came into contact with “modern” environments 
and the effects of European (in this case British) society on international African 
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migrants. The effects that African cultures and societies had on each other were largely 
ignored by psychiatric professionals throughout the colonial period, whether they 
believed in the relationship between race and mentality or not.  
CONCLUSION 
Colonial psychiatrists like J.C. Carothers and others constructed an ideology in the first 
half of the twentieth century that defined the “African mind” as inferior to the “European 
mind,” influenced most significantly by a racially-uniform “African culture” and, in its 
“primitiveness” unprepared for change. Proximity to European “modernity”, although 
scientifically unproven, was seen as the primary stressor leading to instability in the 
African mind. This ideology was increasingly contested, particularly from the 1950s, by 
the first generation of indigenous African cross-cultural psychiatrists who repudiated the 
racial categorizations of culture and mentality constructed by colonial psychiatrists. 
Cross-cultural psychiatrists like T.A. Lambo of Nigeria sought to disprove the links 
between race, mentality, and culture by proving two points: first, that African culture was 
too heterogeneous to be considered uniform and; second, that proximity to European 
“modernity” did not cause mental illness in Africans; rather, European psychiatry was 
simply poorly equipped to diagnose and treat mental illnesses that were steeped in 
culturally-specific belief systems. 
 Both of these conceptions had a similar influence on the way that colonial 
governments thought about African mobility. Both colonial psychiatrists like Carothers 
and cross-cultural psychiatrists like Lambo believed that Africans who migrated outside 
of their familiar cultural environments were theoretically at a greater risk of developing 
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mental illness, if for different reasons. The question was where the boundary delimiting 
cultural environments should be drawn. Carothers and other colonial psychiatrists by and 
large drew the line at race, arguing that all Africans were culturally similar, particularly 
in comparison to Europeans. Lambo and other ethno-psychiatrists had a much narrower 
conception of African cultures that differentiated within race. Lambo, however, chose to 
discuss these distinctions primarily within the already-constructed framework of a 
racialized European-African dichotomy, trying to break this structure down from the 
inside by arguing that mentally-ill Africans in “modern” European environments reacted 
differently based on their specific cultural backgrounds. He did not study in the same way 
the effects that African cultures had on each other. The effects of migration between 
African societies on the mental stability of Nigerians therefore lacked scientific data, and 
the question of social stressors between racial categories continued to have life until well 
after Nigeria gained independence in 1960. 
As the remaining chapters of this volume will prove, the racialized psychiatry 
practiced by colonial psychiatrists implicitly influenced how migrant Nigerian mental 
patients were treated. Those Nigerians exhibiting symptoms of mental illness in the UK 
or other European countries needed to be repatriated as quickly as possible “in their own 
best interests” because it was presumed that their presence in the UK was itself 
contributing to their mental troubles. Those Nigerians who became mentally ill within 
Africa did not need such treatment because they were seen already to be held within 
largely the same psychiatric environment that they would face if they were repatriated to 
Nigeria. While never official colonial policy, the implicit influence of psychiatric 
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definitions of the African mind is clear in the remarkable consistency of this pattern over 
time and space. The following chapters offer compelling evidence of the extent to which 
the accumulation of psychiatric “knowledge” in the colonial setting both reinforced and 
influenced a racialized colonial order that had implications not only within the colonial 
boundaries of Nigeria, but which resonated across the world. 
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Chapter 3 
Repatriations from West Africa 
INTRODUCTION 
Quite a few repatriation cases involving mentally-ill Nigerians resident in other parts of 
West Africa occurred over the course of the colonial period and, taken together, these 
cases illustrate the various approaches that colonial governments took to avoid taking 
responsibility for persons who had ceased to be productive members of society. During 
the colonial era in West Africa, many Nigerians traveled to other colonies and countries 
in the region for various reasons. Some went seeking education; others went seeking 
employment. Some went because of family connections; some went simply because they 
could. While in other countries and colonies of West Africa, some of these Nigerians 
began to exhibit signs of mental illness and, as a result, came under government purview, 
either as prisoners who had committed crimes or, more commonly, as patients in 
government-run mental asylums and hospitals. Usually destitute and unable to function as 
productive members of society, these mentally-ill Nigerians became public charges in 
their host countries. As such, the host country often sought to repatriate such cases to 
Nigeria (or any other country the patient might call home for that matter) in order to 
avoid long-term expenditure on chronic cases or to prevent the possibility of relapse in 
those cases deemed fit for discharge. The government of Nigeria, for its part, did not 
desire to reclaim these patients, since they would most likely become public charges back 
in Nigeria as well. This chapter examines the cases of Nigerian mental patients caught in 
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the middle of negotiations between the repatriating country and the government of 
Nigeria over whether or not they should be repatriated, who should pay for the 
repatriation, and what should happen to the patients once repatriated. The negotiations 
often became protracted. In most cases it is clear that the well-being of the patients was 
rarely, if ever, considered, and psychological knowledge and theory, however 
rudimentary and racist it may have been, had little influence in the decision-making 
processes of either the repatriating government or the government of Nigeria.  
The government of Nigeria wanted to avoid repatriating as many mental patients 
as possible, while repatriating countries were often willing to go to great lengths to 
ensure that repatriation took place. Both the repatriating country and the government of 
Nigeria used different lines of argument to advance their own interests. Since mental 
institutions in West Africa at this time were underfunded and overcrowded everywhere, 
neither the repatriating government nor the government of Nigeria could argue that 
chronic cases were best served by moving the patient from one inadequate asylum to 
another. However, governments could use the issue of overcrowding as an excuse not to 
accommodate new patients. Repatriating countries sometimes argued that Nigerian 
mental patients needed to be sent back to Nigeria to ease overcrowding in their asylums; 
simultaneously Nigeria argued back that their own asylums were hopelessly 
overcrowded, so there was no point in repatriating the patient as conditions would be no 
better for him or her once back in Nigeria.  
The established practices for repatriation cases in West Africa worked in the 
government of Nigeria’s favor. Legally, since Nigeria was under British rule until 1960, 
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Nigerians were allowed to reside in any other country under British rule. Certified mental 
patients could be repatriated against their will, but there was no legal responsibility on the 
part of the colonial government of Nigeria to accept such repatriations. Non-certifiable 
mental patients, however, had to consent to their repatriation. Presuming they consented 
to be repatriated, though, the government of Nigeria was under no obligation to pay the 
costs of repatriation of mental patients because it was protocol that the country which had 
most to gain from removing a mental patient, i.e., the repatriating country, should bear 
the cost of repatriation. Furthermore, if the mentally ill migrant was in the custody of a 
country outside the British Empire, the person’s consent did not have to be obtained to 
have him or her sent back to Nigeria. However, the responsibility to pay for removal of 
illegal aliens fell on the country doing the deporting. The government of Nigeria often 
agreed to search out family or traditional local rulers of the person to be repatriated to see 
if they would be willing to pay the cost of repatriation, but the costs were usually far in 
excess of what Nigerians could afford to pay. Thus, the burden of cost in these cases 
usually fell on the country doing the repatriating. In some cases this caused repatriating 
governments to rethink the cost-effectiveness of repatriation.  
 While the procedure for repatriation worked in the government of Nigeria’s favor, 
the lack of access to the patients themselves worked against it. Since the patients resided 
in other countries and had been examined by medical authorities in those countries, the 
government of Nigeria had little choice but to take the analyses and recommendation of 
repatriating countries at face value when deciding how a particular patient’s cases should 
be handled. In several cases coming from the Gold Coast (now Ghana), it is clear that the 
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Gold Coast government manipulated diagnoses of mental patients to make them seem 
more recovered than they actually were in order to make the prospect of repatriation more 
palatable to the government of Nigeria. If patients could be made to look reasonably fit to 
be discharged from the asylum in Accra, then they would presumably not have to be 
institutionalized once back in Nigeria. They could be released into the custody of family 
and friends. Several cases deemed fit for discharge relapsed either before or after they 
were scheduled for repatriation, bringing into question the motivations for medical 
diagnoses performed on these patients. Other patients deemed fit for travel disappeared 
either before or during their repatriations.  
 Each case discussed below has its individual characteristics. Taken together, 
however, the repatriation cases involving Nigerian mental patients in West Africa reveal 
a political atmosphere in which medical knowledge concerning the psychological profiles 
of individual cases was far less influential in the decision-making processes of colonial 
governments than was the pressing institutional need to avoid unnecessary expenditure 
and to safeguard the environment and reputation of local mental institutions. The theory 
of the “African mind” as threatened by contact with Europeans and its incipient link with 
migration was not particularly applicable in these cases because colonial officials 
considered the cultural and material surroundings for mental patients were largely similar 
across West Africa, at least in comparison to the European environments against which 
they measured African situations. 
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CASES FROM THE GOLD COAST: THE POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS 
The majority of cases of repatriations involving mentally-ill Nigerians came from the 
Gold Coast, another British colony in West Africa which is now the modern state of 
Ghana. When dealing with repatriation requests from the Gold Coast, the government of 
Nigeria typically prevented repatriation in the vast majority of cases based on the 
argument that there was no space in Nigerian asylums to accommodate repatriated 
“lunatics” from the Gold Coast. In 1916 and again in 1931 the Gold Coast government, 
desperate to relieve the congestion in its asylum at Accra, approached the Nigerian 
authorities with a view to repatriating en masse all Nigerians currently held in the 
asylum. After Nigeria declined for the second time, the Gold Coast government decided 
to take a new approach. By deliberately re-evaluating the patients in their asylum in 1932, 
Gold Coast concocted a list of patients who, while not of “sound mind”, had “sufficiently 
recovered” their sanity so as to be fit for discharge. While the effort only resulted in the 
repatriation of one person to Nigeria, the process by which Gold Coast authorities 
attempted to force the repatriation of mental patients illustrates the extent to which the 
colonial government tried to manipulate the diagnosis of mental patients to achieve short-
term political goals. These cases from the Gold Coast illustrate the extent to which in the 
colonial context in West Africa not only was psychiatric knowledge about African mental 
illness and the patients’ “best interests” unimportant, but that in this context medical 
opinions could themselves be politicized, influenced by the goals and objectives of 
colonial governments. 
In 1916 the Gold Coast made its first effort to repatriate eight Nigerian lunatics on 
grounds that “the Accra Lunatic Asylum is very congested.” The Governor of the Gold 
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Coast urged the Governor-General of Nigeria that “it would be a great relief to the 
authorities in charge of the institution if Your Excellency’s Government [Nigeria] could 
assist in this matter by arranging for the repatriation of some, if not all, those lunatics 
who are natives of the Colony under your administration….” Since these foreigners were 
still considered “lunatics”, they would have to be transferred from the asylum in Accra to 
one of the two in Nigeria at the time. Therefore, the Governor added the qualification that 
Nigeria only need accept the repatriation of these lunatics, “if it should chance that your 
asylum has more room.”1 Lord Lugard, the Governor-General of Nigeria, responded that, 
unfortunately, the two asylums in Nigeria were “completely full” and he urged that the 
Government of the Gold Coast retain them until arrangements were made to increase the 
custodial capacity for lunatics in Nigeria.2  
The repatriation of Nigerian mental patients in 1916 failed because the Nigerian 
Government could not guarantee that conditions for the repatriates would be any better in 
Nigeria than they were in the Gold Coast. Their refusal to accept the mental patients was 
therefore perfectly legal under the laws of the United Kingdom and British colonial West 
Africa where there was no precedent for the repatriation of mental patients. In fact, even 
as of 1932, the UK Foreign Office proclaimed to Gold Coast officials that “there seems to 
be a sort of idea that wherever people become lunatics, there they remain.”3 The Attorney 
General of Gold Coast suggested that there was no legislation that allowed for the 
repatriation of mental patients “if the convenience of the Gold Coast is the primary 
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objective,” although it could presumably be accomplished if the removal of the mental 
patient “is likely to be for his benefit, and that proper arrangements have been made for 
such removal and for his subsequent care and treatment.”4 Clearly this was not the 
situation in Nigeria, which could not claim to offer mental patients any more beneficial 
custodianship than they were receiving in the Gold Coast. The Gold Coast therefore 
could not legally force Nigeria to accept repatriation of its mental patients if they were 
going to require further institutionalization upon returning to Nigeria.  
By the early 1930s, conditions in the Accra asylum had become a serious political 
liability for the colonial administration of the Gold Coast. In 1932, the new Governor of 
the Gold Coast decided something had to be done to alleviate the overcrowding of the 
asylum because of the negative image it was creating for the colonial administration. He 
declared: 
The grave overcrowding of the lunatic asylum at Accra – stigmatised by Sir 
Ransford Slater over two years ago as a ‘scandal’ – is a source of chronic 
embarrassment to Government. It is now acute, the average number of patients 
being roughly one hundred persons in excess of the maximum capacity of the 
available accommodation…5 
 
In 1933, the asylum suffered further public embarrassment, when the Supreme Court of 
the Gold Coast Colony chastised the asylum over the violent death of one of its inmates 
at the hands of another inmate. The Court found that the death of the patient, called John, 
“was caused… by shock and haemorrhage from fractured ribs and lacerated right lung, 
caused by an act of violence by one Dombor, a lunatic, not criminally responsible for his 
actions.” The Court instead found fault with the asylum system itself: 
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The night attendants Ankra and Kito seem to have had no conception of the duties 
of night nurses in an Infirmary. In the infirmary, no treatment seems to be 
attempted by night, even in extremes. The supervision of the Asylum by night is 
inadequate, where violent patients are in open wards with other patients. The 
structure of the asylum is unsatisfactory and accommodation inadequate. In these 
respects conditions in the Colonial Lunatic Asylum, fall far short of the standards 
required in public mental institutions.6 
 
Overcrowding clearly contributed to conditions such as these and so it was 
overcrowding that the colonial government of Gold Coast sought to alleviate as the most 
expedient means towards improving the reputation of the asylum. The colonial 
government had a few options in this regard. The first, and most obvious, was to increase 
the custodial capacity of Gold Coast’s asylum system. As early as 1926, efforts had been 
undertaken to find and develop sites suitable for the building of a new lunatic asylum in 
the Kumasi area. However, due to the financial outlay necessary, the process was tabled 
in 1931.7  
With the financial impossibility of expanding institutions during the depression of 
the 1930s, the colonial government sought other means of reducing congestion in the 
Accra asylum. Repatriation of lunatics immediately emerged as the most reasonable 
option. The same report that had bemoaned the fact that the Accra asylum typically 
housed “one hundred persons in excess of the maximum capacity” also noticed the 
interesting coincidence that “of 368 inmates of the asylum about 100 emanated from the 
neighbouring French West African Colonies and were thus, presumably, French 
subjects.” The memo then posed the question “whether anything should, or can, be done 
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to induce or compel the French Authorities to accept the responsibility for these 
unfortunate persons thereby relieving the Gold Coast taxpayer from the obligation to 
house, maintain and nurse them.”8 Among the foreign lunatics in the asylum were also 39 
Nigerians. 9   
Because of the political pressure to do something about the overcrowded asylum 
in Accra, Gold Coast authorities approached the Nigerian Government in 1932 about 
possibly repatriating those of the 39 Nigerian lunatics currently in the Accra asylum “as 
are fit to be moved”10 and got much the same response that they had in 1916. The 
Nigerian Government’s first reaction to this new and larger request was to search for any 
Gold Coast natives in its asylums, with the hope of essentially trading mental patients. 
Unfortunately, the Director of Medical and Sanitary Services (DMSS) for Nigeria 
indicated that there was only one native of Gold Coast in Nigeria’s asylums and 
expressed “doubt as to whether any ship would take him in his present condition.” The 
DMSS went on to say that “it would be quite impossible for the Medical Department to 
accommodate 39 lunatics at present. All the Asylums and Prisons with accommodation 
for lunatics are overcrowded now.”11  Nigeria therefore declined to accept all 39, but did 
agree to the repatriation of five females, citing available space in the female ward of the 
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new asylum at Lokoja.12 The Gold Coast government, interestingly, did not take Nigeria 
up on this offer, stating that “the removal of five women patients would not materially 
assist in relieving the congestion at the Accra asylum.”13 For the second time in sixteen 
years, the Gold Coast had failed to repatriate Nigerian mental patients because of general 
overcrowding in Nigeria’s asylums. 
The refusal of Nigeria to accept the repatriation of Nigerian mental patients in the 
Accra asylum left the Gold Coast government in a quandary: the need to reduce the 
number of patients in the Accra asylum was pressing, but there was no chance of 
reducing this crowding by moving patients from the Accra asylum to asylums in their 
native Nigeria. By the end of 1932, Gold Coast authorities had recognized that the 
problem that prevented the repatriation of Nigerian lunatics lay not so much in their 
status as Nigerians but in their status as “lunatics.” In March 1933 the colonial 
government in Gold Coast began reevaluating patients the Accra asylum in an attempt to 
discharge as many as possible. The Attorney General of Gold Coast advised the Colonial 
Secretary on a reinterpretation of the existing confinement law, pointing out that “the 
law… provides that any person adjudged a lunatic and a proper subject of confinement 
shall be confined in an asylum by order of the District Commisioner…. ‘Sanity’ however 
is a matter of degree. Plenty of persons are of unsound mind, but the security of the 
community does not require their confinement.” In order to discharge a patient from the 
asylum, the Attorney General continued, the DMSS “has not to satisfy himself that the 
person discharged is of sound mind, but merely that he has sufficiently recovered his 
                                                 
12
 G. Hemmant, Officer Administrating the Government, Nigeria to Governor, Gold Coast, 8 November 
1932, NAI CSO 06285, vol. I. 
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sanity so as to be a proper person to be discharged.”14 Once the patient was deemed 
sufficiently recovered, the government could ask if he or she would like to be repatriated. 
If the patient agreed,  the government of Nigeria, or any other colony, could no longer 
refuse the repatriation since the patient would presumably no longer need to be confined 
in an overcrowded asylum once back in his or her homeland. Presuming relatives of the 
repatriate or the Gold Coast government were willing to pay for the cost of repatriation, 
the government of Nigeria could not disallow the repatriation.  
The DMSS was thus ordered to conduct an investigation into how many inmates 
of the Accra asylum could be considered “‘sufficiently recovered’ and discharged to the 
care of their families.” This included “a number of the persons mentioned [who] are 
either of Nigerian or foreign birth, and in a number of cases their homes are not 
known.”15 Under this reinterpretation of existing law, forty-four inmates of the Accra 
asylum were re-evaluated as fit for discharge and return to the custody of their family and 
friends.16 Of these forty-four, nineteen were Gold Coast natives, sixteen came from 
neighboring French territories, and nine were natives of Nigeria.17  
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 Governor, Gold Coast to Governor of Nigeria, 29 December 1932, NAI CSO 06285, vol. I. 
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 Attorney General to Colonial Secretary, 11 March 1933, NAG (Accra) CSO 11/8/13. 
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 Internal memo, 10 April 1933, NAG (Accra) CSO 11/8/13. 
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 Acting Director, Medical and Sanitary Service, Gold Coast to Secretary for Native Affairs, Gold Coast, 
25 March 1933, NAG (Accra) CSO 11/8/13. This letter contains a list, divided by ethnic affiliation, of all 
forty-four inmates deemed “sufficiently recovered”. 
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Director, Medical and Sanitary Services, Gold Coast to Secretary for Native Affairs, Gold Coast, 7 April 
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Nigeria, because two of them, Labaran and Akonyo Hausa, were ultimately proposed to Nigeria for 
repatriation. The Nigerian origin of the other two, Abudu Delia and Malam Hausa, is proposed in a letter 
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 While no detailed case histories are available, circumstantial evidence 
suggests that the list compiled by the DMSS of Gold Coast was clearly motivated by the 
short-term political need to reduce overcrowding in the Accra asylum and not by the best 
available medical knowledge of the individual cases. Many of the cases had not 
recovered enough to be fit for discharge or repatriation. The list of forty-four inmates 
declared “sufficiently recovered” by the DMSS was quickly whittled down to twenty-six 
by the Medical Officer in charge of the Accra asylum. Perhaps most startling and 
potentially scandalous recommendations for discharge on the DMSS’s list concerned 
several natives of the Gold Coast. The Medical Officer in charge of the Accra asylum 
decided many of these patients were also not “sufficiently recovered” in the eyes of the 
asylum staff because of their continued violent tendencies. The Medical Officer stated: 
I consider it to be inadvisable to discharge Ebenezer Tandah, Yaw Boudi and 
Josiah Ampafo at present. Ebeneser Tandah is not much improved, and is liable to 
injure himself if he gets hold of a knife. Yaw Boudi has fixed delusions of 
persecution against three people in Kintampo, and has threatened to kill them. 
Though he has been quiet since admission, I think there is definite danger of his 
relapsing and attempting to carry out his threat if released. Josiah Ampafo 
assaulted several women before admission in 1931. Though he is now quiet, I do 
not feel satisfied that he will remain harmless if released. 
 
Three of the patients that even the asylum considered fit for release in April 1933 had 
“relapsed” by October and could not be discharged.18  
                                                                                                                                                 
from the Medical Officer in charge of the Accra Asylum to the Medical Department, 13 May 1933, NAG 
(Accra) CSO 11/8/13. 
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 Colonial Secretary to Commissioner Northern Province, Commissioner Eastern Province, Commissioner 
Western Province and Acting Commissioner Central Province, 24 June 1933, NAG CSO 11/8/13. This 
memorandum is accompanied by a list of fourteen “sufficiently recovered” lunatics for each province and 
in five cases indicates that the patient was, in fact, “discharged.” Two others “relapsed” and could not be 
released. One of them apparently died before being discharged, while another’s relatives could not be 
contacted, leaving no one to take custody of him. Interestingly, all of these inmates, whether from Gold 
Coast or Nigeria, were male. 
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Several of the individuals proposed for discharge and repatriation had lived in 
Gold Coast for more than twenty years, and some of them had been in the Accra asylum 
nearly all this time. In fact, one of the eight lunatics suggested for repatriation to Nigeria 
in 1916, a man named Salami Lokoja, was still in the asylum in 1933, and was again 
suggested for repatriation.19 Of the nine Nigerians proposed for discharge and 
repatriation, the Medical Officer cleared only seven for repatriation. One of the 
Nigerians, Abudu Delia, refused to be repatriated, as was his right as a British subject, 
and another, Malam Hausa, “cannot be induced to give an answer,” indicating not only 
that he continued to suffer from his mental illness to a significant degree, but also that he 
did not confirm his willingness to be repatriated. The same kinds of problems were found 
with many of the French West Africans proposed for repatriation. The Medical Officer in 
charge of the Accra asylum declared two of the five Moshi “unfit to be discharged at 
present”; one of the two Fulani, Tarfa Fulani, “can give no account of himself and his 
home cannot be traced”; while only one of the remaining nine French West Africans, 
Alfa Saidu Basaberimi, “is capable of looking after himself until he reaches his home….” 
As for the rest, “the homes of Braima and Kofi Wangara cannot be traced, and though the 
homes of the rest are known, none of them are capable of looking after themselves until 
they reach their villages.” 20 Clearly the DMSS of the Gold Coast had been willing to 
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 Colonial Secretary to Commissioner Northern Province, Commissioner Eastern Province, Commissioner 
Western Province and Acting Commissioner Central Province, 24 June 1933, NAG CSO 11/8/13. 
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repatriate many lunatics under the supposition that they were fit to be moved and could 
be released to the care of their family once back home. If the patients were to relapse 
once back in Nigeria or a French West African colony, they would be placed in an 
asylum in their native region thereby achieving the repatriation of mental patients that 
Nigeria had declined in both 1916 and 1932. 
The decision to discharge and repatriate mental patients from the Accra asylum 
cannot be seen as a watershed event in the history of mental illness in colonial Africa. It 
did not end the problem of overcrowded asylums by a long-shot. In the end only seven of 
the Gold Coast natives were ultimately discharged to return to their families as a result of 
the reinterpretation of confinement policy.21 Two French West Africans were deemed 
sufficiently recovered and were deported under the Aliens Ordinance. They were dropped 
off at the northern border and given enough money to make their own ways home.22 
Because of difficulties locating friends and family, only one of the seven Nigerians, a 
man named Labaran, was repatriated.23 Gold Coast’s grand hopes of reducing congestion 
through discharge and repatriation ultimately failed. The asylum was overcrowded by 
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 Acting Director, Medical and Sanitary Service, Gold Coast to Secretary for Native Affairs, Gold Coast, 7 
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roughly one hundred patients, and this number only dropped by ten as a result of the 
policy transformation allowing for discharge and repatriation. 
The relative failure of the plan to reevaluate the relative sanity of mental patients 
in the Gold Coast in 1933 did not prevent the colonial government there from continuing 
to propose the repatriation of mental patients to Nigeria whose mental faculties remained 
suspect. In 1945, the Gold Coast government informed the government of Nigeria that a 
man named Lawani Lagos, a native of Obatiwejeye village near Offa in Nigeria, “has 
recently been discharged from the Accra lunatic asylum as completely recovered.”24 The 
cost of repatriation was paid by the Gold Coast. Since Lawani Lagos was “completely 
recovered” the implication was that he would not have to be placed in an asylum in 
Nigeria and he would not be a public charge or nuisance once back in his country of 
origin. Since Lawani Lagos was amenable to repatriation and since the Gold Coast was 
willing to pay for it, the government of Nigeria had no choice but to allow the 
repatriation. Unfortunately for Nigerian authorities, it soon became clear that Lawani 
Lagos was not completely recovered. The Chief Secretary to the Government of Nigeria 
cautioned the Secretary of the Northern Provinces in Kaduna, under whose jurisdiction 
Lawani Lagos came once he returned to his home near Offa, that on the journey back to 
Nigeria, Lawani Lagos had been erratic and violent. “He has been discharged from a 
lunatic asylum in the Gold Coast as being cured,” wrote the Chief Secretary. “His 
behaviour en route to Lagos suggests, however, that he is still liable to fits and is of a 
violent nature.” As evidence of the instability of Lawani Lagos, the Chief Secretary 
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noted that “[a]t one stage in the journey he had to be bound to prevent him throwing 
himself out of the lorry.”25 Because Lawani Lagos had been discharged and repatriated 
as a mentally sound person, no accommodation had been guaranteed for him in an 
asylum in Nigeria. As such, despite his “fits” on the return journey, the government of 
Nigeria decided to send him back to his home village. The only precaution taken by the 
government was a notice to the Secretary of the Northern Provinces “that he should be 
watched.”26 It is unclear whether Lawani Lagos ever had to be readmitted to an asylum 
in Nigeria. His repatriation file ends with his return to his hometown. However, the case 
of Lawani Lagos serves as another case in which it appears that the Gold Coast 
government was willing to manipulate the diagnosis of mental patients in order to effect 
their repatriation. Although declared “completely recovered” in the Gold Coast, it 
quickly became clear to Nigerian authorities that his recovery was less than complete. 
In yet another case, the Gold Coast released a man named Idrissa Tudu from the 
Accra asylum in 1946 to return to his home in Zaria, in northern Nigeria. Unlike in other 
cases in which repatriated mental patients traveled with one or more custodians, Tudu 
was considered sound enough to travel on his own. The Labour Officer of the Gold Coast 
informed the Labour Officer, Lagos, of Tudu’s repatriation, stating: “Idrissa Tudu, who 
has been recently discharged from the Mental Hospital here, is being repatriated… He 
has been provided with transport to Lagos and subsistence en route at the expense of this 
Government. May he please be assisted forward.”27 Tudu did not reach Zaria, however, 
at least not through the arranged channels. He never arrived at Minna, one of the rail 
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stops in Nigeria on the way to Zaria. It is not clear what prevented him from reaching 
Minna. He could have decided not to return to Zaria. He could have taken a different 
route. He may have suffered a relapse and been incapable of completing his journey. 
Regardless of the reason, the decision to send Tudu back to Nigeria unaccompanied 
presented the image to the government of Nigeria that the man was completely recovered 
and capable of looking after himself, therefore making repatriation uncontestable. At the 
same time, however, the decision to have Tudu travel alone put a man with a history of 
mental instability in the stressful position of having to find his own way back to his 
family and friends in Nigeria. This approach was uncommon, as most repatriated mental 
patients were escorted to their homes either in the care of qualified mental nurses, paid 
ship’s employees, or in the care of family members. Since we do not know the outcome 
of Idrissa Tudu’s case, it cannot be considered a tragic miscalculation on the part of Gold 
Coast authorities; nevertheless it is yet another example of the manipulation of 
procedures relating to the treatment of the mentally ill on the part of the Gold Coast to 
achieve the repatriation of Nigerian mental patients. 
 Overall, the government of Nigeria was successfully prevented the repatriation of 
mental patients from the Gold Coast because it was able to argue that overcrowding in 
Nigerian asylums prevented Nigeria from being able to accommodate certifiable mental 
patients. The Gold Coast government, for its part, was not allowed legally to repatriate 
mental patients if the only benefit accrued to the Gold Coast. Therefore, the only way that 
the Gold Coast was able to repatriate mental patients to Nigeria was to reevaluate the 
definition of insanity and discharge patients from their asylum. Once discharged, they 
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could be repatriated as normal migrants at Gold Coast expense and there was nothing the 
government of Nigeria could do to prevent it. The plan to discharge mental patients 
backfired in many cases, however, as Gold Coast authorities attempted to discharge 
patients that had not fully recovered in an effort to transfer as many Nigerian mental 
patients back to Nigeria as possible. In the end, only a handful of Nigerian mental 
patients were ever repatriated from the Gold Coast, but the cases clearly illustrate a 
situation in which the colonial government of the Gold Coast was willing to manipulate 
the treatment and procedures for dealing with mentally-ill persons in order to achieve the 
short-term political goal of reducing overcrowding in the Accra asylum.  
WHO SHOULD PAY?: THE CASES OF BENJAMINE FASHEUN, WILLIAM JONES, AND 
GRAHAM YOUNG BRIGGS 
Nigeria argued in many cases that repatriations should not go forward because its 
asylums were too crowded to accept new patients. However, this was not always the case. 
In some cases, mental asylums were able to make room for a repatriated mental patient 
from elsewhere. Just because there was space for a repatriated mental patient, however, 
did not mean that the government of Nigeria was willing to facilitate the repatriation of 
that patient. The issue of who should pay for the repatriation of mental patients often 
became an issue over which the government of Nigeria and other West African 
governments wishing to repatriate Nigerian mental patients argued. The reason that the 
Gold Coast government was able to repatriate any of its mental patients to Nigeria was 
because it was willing to bear the cost of the repatriation. Other governments were not 
necessarily willing to incur these costs in order to relieve themselves of an undesirable 
mental patient. In these cases, the government of Nigeria was able to use the issue of cost 
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as a tool to prevent, or at the very least, stall the repatriation of mental patients. Refusing 
to pay for the repatriation of mental patients not only saved the government of Nigeria 
undue expenditure, which was always a primary concern of the colonial government, but 
it also made the prospect of repatriation of mental patients somewhat less attractive to 
other governments.  
 When the government of a West African colony or country approached Nigeria 
about the repatriation of a mental patient, the first thing that the government of Nigeria 
did was try to locate the family of the person to be repatriated. Locating the family served 
three purposes. First, it proved that the potential repatriate was, in fact, Nigerian. Second, 
if the potential repatriate did not require further institutionalization he or she could be 
released into the custody of the family. Finally, if the family could be located then they 
could also be asked to pay for the cost of repatriating their distressed relative. The 
government of Nigeria regularly asked families of potential repatriates to pay the cost of 
the repatriation of their relative, but in most cases the family was unable to oblige. Most 
Nigerians eked out a meager existence and could not raise the funds required to pay for 
ship passage from another country nor to pay the escorts which were required in most 
cases.  
Only in two cases of repatriation from West Africa is there evidence that the 
family agreed to pay the cost of repatriating their mentally-ill relative. The first case was 
that of William Olujimi Adebayo Jones in 1946. Jones was a Nigerian who had worked 
for the United States Public Health Mission in Liberia. While in Liberia he had gone 
“slightly mental” and had to be admitted to hospital. He was later released into the 
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custody of his sister, who took him to see a “witch doctor” about his illness. The 
treatment Jones received from the “witch doctor” did not cure his ailments, however, and 
he applied for repatriation to Nigeria. Jones’ mother agreed to pay the cost of his 
repatriation and deposited the amount of •7.6.3d in a government account for this 
purpose. Jones was repatriated on July 23, 1946.28 
 The second case of relatives agreeing to pay for the repatriation of a mentally-ill 
relative also came from Liberia. In 1949, Graham Young Briggs appeared before the 
British Legation in Monrovia requesting to be repatriated to Nigeria on the grounds that 
“he is destitute and is unable to get work as he is mentally ill.” Briggs had no funds to 
pay for his repatriation himself, but suggested that his brother and uncle might be willing 
to pay the cost. The government of Nigeria tracked down Briggs’ relatives who were 
indeed able to pay the cost of his return. However, Briggs was not repatriated because he 
never appeared at the British Legation again to complete the repatriation process. It is 
unclear if he ever returned to Nigeria.29 
 The cases of Jones and Briggs notwithstanding, most families could not afford to 
pay the costs of repatriating their mentally-ill relatives. In such cases the burden of cost 
fell to one of the two governments involved in the repatriation negotiations. For its part, 
the government of Nigeria routinely refused to pay the cost of repatriation, forcing the 
government that desired to repatriate a mental patient to determine whether it was in their 
economic best interests to pay the cost of repatriation, or whether they were better of 
simply retaining the patient. The government of Nigeria’s refusal to pay the costs of 
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repatriation in cases of mental patients was not unique. In fact, it was part of well-
established policy both within Great Britain and the British Empire. According to a 
government of Nigeria circular, which was often quoted in repatriation negotiations with 
other countries, “The general principle which the Government of Nigeria has always 
attempted to observe has been that the Government deriving the advantage from the 
repatriation should bear the cost.”30 In the case of mental patients, the government doing 
the repatriating clearly derived the advantage insofar as through repatriation it rid itself of 
a public charge and potential public nuisance.  
 On at least one occasion the refusal of the government of Nigeria to pay for the 
repatriation of a mental patient caused a dispute with the government of Sierra Leone, 
another British West African colony. Benjamine Fasheun, a Nigerian from Ijeda in Oyo 
province who made a living as a traveling evangelist was committed to the Kissy Mental 
Hospital in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in 1953. Fasheun had apparently made his way from 
Nigeria to Sierra Leone by foot, preaching his version of the Gospel. Fasheun had a 
history of mental illness and had been committed to the mental asylum in Abeokuta, 
Nigeria, for over three years between 1947 and 1950 before embarking on the journey 
that led him to Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone wished to repatriate Fasheun, but on two 
conditions: first, that suitable accommodation was guaranteed for him once he returned to 
Nigeria and, second, that the government of Nigeria pay the cost of his repatriation. The 
government of Nigeria guaranteed the government of Sierra Leone that Fasheun could be 
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admitted to Yaba Asylum near Lagos, but the question of who should bear the cost of the 
repatriation was not so easily resolved. 
 The first step in the repatriation process was for the government of Nigeria to 
locate Fasheun’s relatives and see if they would be willing to pay the cost of his 
repatriation. Fasheun’s relatives were not only unwilling to pay for his repatriation, they 
were unenthusiastic about his possible return. The British Resident for Oyo Province 
reported that “I am sorry to say that the Ijesha Divisional Native Authority cannot afford 
the exorbitant cost of repatriation of [Fasheun] because his people have shown a non-
concern attitude in this matter. It is very unlikely if they will repay the Native Authority a 
brass farthing after bringing back their insane son to Nigeria.”31 Under the circumstances, 
the government of Nigeria reported to the government of Sierra Leone that Nigeria would 
not pay the cost of repatriating Fasheun. 
 The government of Sierra Leone, however, was not willing to take no for an 
answer and provided the government of Nigeria with three precedents in which the 
country of origin paid for the cost of repatriating individuals. In the cases of one Miss 
Ramatu Abdul and Delay Odu Eto, the government of Nigeria had paid for their 
repatriation from Sierra Leone, while Sierra Leone had agreed to pay the cost of 
repatriating one T.B. Williams from Nigeria in 1944. The government of Sierra Leone 
was obviously looking for a quid pro quo in which the government of Nigeria would pay 
for the repatriation of Benjamine Fasheun based on these precedents. The government of 
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Nigeria, however, did not see these cases as equal and continued to justify its refusal to 
pay for Fasheun’s repatriation, arguing: 
It is true that this Government accepted in 1944 to repatriation expenses of Miss 
Ramatu Abdul and Delay Odu Eto… but these were regarded as special cases…. 
Both had relatives pleased to welcome them back to this country. The Sierra 
Leone Government accepted liability for the repatriation of T.B. Williams…but, 
in fact, Mr. Williams eventually declined repatriation and no expenditure was 
incurred.32 
 
Adding to the unreasonableness of the government of Sierra Leone’s argument from the 
perspective of the government of Nigeria was the fact that none of these cases involved 
the repatriation of mental patients. An internal memo in the Nigerian file on Fasheun 
sums it up thus: 
I do not think that Fasheun’s case can be regarded as in all [illegible] with that of 
T.B. Williams. Williams was decrepit and destitute, but he was sane and he had 
identified relatives in his own country even though it was doubtful if they would 
have supported him. Fasheun is a certified lunatic who… has… nobody to look 
after him if he has to be confined in an asylum again. On his return here he will be 
a charge on public funds: if he is not confined, he is still likely to be a source of 
embarrassment to the local authorities wherever he lives. Sierra Leone has 
everything to gain by his repatriation, Nigeria nothing.33 
 
The government of Nigeria was obviously not willing to make Fasheun’s repatriation 
easy on Sierra Leone.  
Realizing that the ploy attempted to cajole the government of Nigeria into paying 
for the repatriation of Fasheun had failed, the Governor of Sierra Leone decided on 19 
June 1954 that it was not worth the cost of repatriation to be rid of Fasheun. In a 
statement to the government of Nigeria, he declared, “Since [the] Nigerian Government is 
not prepared to pay [the] cost of repatriation of Fasheun, he will remain in Mental 
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Hospital at Kissy, Sierra Leone.”34 Nigeria’s refusal to pay the costs of repatriation had 
prevented the repatriation of an undesirable mental patient from occurring, for a time. 
Eighteen months later the government of Sierra Leone caved and agreed to pay the costs 
of repatriating Fasheun. Once repatriated, Fasheun was placed in Aro Mental Hospital in 
Abeokuta.35 
The cases of Briggs, Jones, and Fasheun indicate another element in the 
negotiations over repatriation of mental patients to Nigeria. Even when arguments were 
not being made regarding the conditions of asylums in Nigeria or the repatriating colony, 
arguments over who should pay for the repatriation were still a possibility. Just as no 
government wanted the responsibility of caring for mental patients as public charges, 
neither did any government want to pay for the repatriation of mental patients. The 
government of Nigeria, for its part, was not required to pay for the repatriation of mental 
patients and regularly refused to do so. If relatives could be located and induced to accept 
the charges, then both the government of Nigeria and the repatriating government were 
pleased to be rid of the burden. If relatives could not pay, then the government of Nigeria 
placed the burden on the repatriating government since it was in that government’s best 
interest to be rid of a public charge and potential public nuisance.  
As in the case of Benjamine Fasheun, sometimes forcing the repatriating 
government to pay for repatriation resulted in a reevaluation of the desirability of 
repatriating at all. At the very least, the government of Nigeria saw that its own interests 
were at least partially met: if Nigeria had to take on the liability of accepting mental 
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patients back into the colony, then at least the government did not have to pay for such an 
inconvenience. As in the cases where overcrowding of Nigeria’s asylums was used as an 
excuse to prevent repatriation, in cases where repatriation was accepted, the government 
of Nigeria was clearly meeting its own short-term political interests by refusing to pay. 
The patient’s best interests were not part of the discussion: indeed, in the case of 
Fasheun, for example, it appears to have mattered little to anybody whether Fasheun 
remained in an asylum in Sierra Leone or was admitted to an asylum in Nigeria. The 
conditions were largely the same in either place. The circumstances of the individual 
cases mattered much less than the needs of the government in cases that involved the 
movement of mental patients from one West African colony to another. 
OUTSIDE THE EMPIRE: THE CASE OF OKON ESO 
The government of Nigeria, which so effectively delayed and prevented repatriations of 
mental patients from colonies within the British Empire, was less successful at preventing 
repatriations from colonies and countries outside of the British Empire. In cases 
involving mental patients from outside of the Empire, which in West Africa meant mostly 
Nigerians in French colonies or the independent country of Liberia, the government of 
Nigeria was not expected to pay for the repatriation, or, in some cases, deportation. 
However, it also could not refuse to accept these mental patients. Whereas British 
colonial subjects had rights of residence anywhere within the British Empire, this was not 
the case outside of the Empire, where they lived as foreigners and could be deported 
without their consent. In cases where the mental patient was repatriated from outside of 
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the Empire, the government of Nigeria simply could not argue against repatriation or 
throw up barriers to a smooth repatriation process.36 
Although the government of Nigeria was unable to prevent repatriations of mental 
patients from outside the British Empire, it was still able to avoid incurring the costs of 
repatriation for these individuals. In repatriation cases originating outside the Empire, not 
only did the argument still stand that the country which stood to benefit from repatriation 
of a mental patient should pay the costs of that repatriation, but it was also common 
practice that any country wishing to deport a foreigner paid the cost of deportation, 
assuming, of course, that the relatives of the individual could not pay. Sometimes, as we 
have seen, the relatives did undertake to pay the costs of repatriating their mentally-ill kin 
from outside the Commonwealth. The cases of Briggs and Jones, explained above, both 
of whom were repatriated from Liberia, are examples of this. Both Briggs and Jones were 
mild cases and were released into the custody of family members. These circumstances, 
coupled with the fact that Briggs and Jones were being repatriated from Liberia, an 
independent country outside of the British Empire, caused the government of Nigeria not 
even to try to prevent the repatriation of these two individuals. 
Even cases where no relatives were willing to pay and in which the patient 
required further institutionalization were not stonewalled by the government of Nigeria if 
the patient was being repatriated from outside of the Empire. For example, in the case of 
Okon Eso, a Nigerian declared criminally insane in the French Equatorial African colony 
of Gabon, the government of Nigeria never questioned the French over the issue of 
                                                 
36
 A situation which arises again in Chapter 6 concerning the deportation of Nigerian mental patients from 
the United States. 
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repatriation. Eso was a laborer recruited from the Eastern Region of Nigeria to work in 
Gabon. In February 1956, he killed a fellow Nigerian laborer named Joshua Akpan while 
still in Gabon. According to the Commissioner of Labour for Gabon, Eso had “set fire to 
the deceased’s house and when the latter came to rescue his belongings he was mortally 
wounded by Okon Eso. On the approach of other Nigerians, Okon Eso escaped into the 
bush and was arraigned by his compatriots some time later and handed over to the 
police.”37 Eso was taken to prison, but no motive was ever discerned for his action. He 
was later put under medical surveillance and declared insane. The murder charge was 
dropped and he was placed in the Libreville hospital, Gabon having no mental asylum at 
the time.   
When the British Vice-Consul in Gabon approached the government of Nigeria 
about the possibility of repatriating Eso, the government of Nigeria did not attempt to 
prevent it. Instead, Nigerian officials immediately went about making arrangements for 
Eso’s arrival. They decided that he could return home on a mail vessel traveling to Lagos, 
where, since he was considered a “dangerous lunatic” he would be placed in a local 
prison rather than Yaba asylum until he could be transferred to the Eastern Region, where 
he was from. Unlike cases that originated within the British Empire, the Nigerian 
authorities made little effort even to find Eso’s relatives, clearing him for repatriation on 
the grounds that his name was clearly Efik (an ethnic group in and around the area of 
Calabar in eastern Nigeria). However, before Eso could be repatriated he died in 
Libreville hospital in March 1957.  
                                                 
37P.H.M. Vischer, British Vice-Consul and Labour Officer, Libreville, Gabon to Commissioner of Labour, 
Lagos, 28 Feb. 1956, NAI CSO 03028/S.1209/3. 
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Although Eso’s repatriation did not occur, the case illustrates the relative 
weakness of the government of Nigeria to contest repatriations that originated from 
outside of the British Empire. Here the primary motivation for the government of Nigeria 
in deciding how to handle the repatriation of mental patients lay not in the capacity of the 
colony’s mental asylums to accommodate patients, as it had with the Gold Coast, or in 
the issue of cost, as it had with Fasheun’s case in Sierra Leone, but with the need to avoid 
provoking an international incident with a foreign government. Clearly, the government 
of Nigeria decided how to deal with repatriation cases on a case-by-case basis and 
decisions were made based not on the individual circumstances of the case, but on the 
short-term political interests of the government based on when and from where each case 
arose. 
CONCLUSION 
The negotiations between the government of Nigeria and other West African countries 
and colonies regarding the repatriation of mentally-ill Nigerians illustrate two important 
points about the relationship between colonial psychiatry and colonial administration. In 
the first place, the cases described above point to a colonial administration in Nigeria that 
made decisions on a case-by-case basis, and their decisions on whether to allow 
repatriation or not were based much more on prevailing circumstances within Nigeria and 
on short-term political goals vis a vis relations with other countries or colonies. In the 
case of the repatriations from Gold Coast, the government of Nigeria was repeatedly able 
to prevent the repatriation of mental patients on the grounds that the asylums in Nigeria 
were overcrowded and there simply was not space to accommodate an influx of mental 
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patients from the Gold Coast. The government of the Gold Coast could not force 
repatriation of certified mental patients unless it was satisfied that repatriation was in the 
best interests of the patient, not of the government.  Nigeria’s argument that patients 
should not be repatriated due to overcrowding was therefore guaranteed to prevent 
repatriation because it was assumed that conditions would not be better for Nigerian 
mental patients in an overcrowded asylum in Nigeria than they were in an overcrowded 
asylum in Gold Coast. These repeated refusals prompted the government of the Gold 
Coast to manipulate the definition of insanity in its own overcrowded asylum so as to 
repatriate as many “recovered” mental patients to Nigeria (and other places) as possible. 
This reevaluation of patient diagnoses ultimately failed to result in the repatriation of 
many Nigerian mental patients. Most of the “recovered” Nigerians either relapsed or 
could not have their nationality verified, and therefore could not be repatriated. Only one 
out of nine Nigerians initially declared “recovered” was ultimately repatriated.  
 Although paucity of space in asylums and mental hospitals was always a problem 
in Nigeria, the government of Nigeria did not always stymie repatriations based on the 
issue of overcrowding. In some circumstances, the government of Nigeria was able to 
find space for mental patients or to locate relatives who could take custody of the non-
dangerous patients who no longer needed constant institutionalization. Nevertheless, the 
government of Nigeria was still looking out for its own short-term interests in these 
cases. Cost often became an issue. The government of Nigeria was more likely to allow 
the repatriation of a mental patient if he or she was not in need of further 
institutionalization once back in Nigeria. In these cases, the person did not become a 
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public charge on the government of Nigeria, but became the responsibility of relatives. In 
no case did the government of Nigeria agree to pay for the repatriation of a mental 
patient. If patients’ relatives could be induced to pay for repatriation, then this was the 
route taken, as was the case with Briggs and Jones who were repatriated from Liberia. If 
relatives could not pay, the government of Nigeria successfully argued that the 
government that stood to benefit from the repatriation of an undesirable person should 
pay for the repatriation. Under the circumstances, the government of Nigeria did not 
stand to benefit from repatriating mental patients who posed the constant potential to 
become public charges or nuisances. In the case of Benjamine Fasheun, the government 
of Nigeria avoided repatriation for nearly two years because it refused to pay the costs 
involved. Therefore, even in cases where repatriation was agreed to in principle, the 
preoccupation of the government of Nigeria became the need to avoid accepting financial 
responsibility for the individual repatriate. 
 Through these two means, the government of Nigeria was able to avoid 
repatriating most of its mental patients in other West African countries and colonies. 
However, most of the cases came from within the British Empire, where Nigerians had 
right of residence as British subjects. In cases where a Nigerian mental patient was to be 
repatriated from outside of the Empire, where British subjects did not necessarily have 
right of residence, the government of Nigeria could do very little to prevent repatriation. 
As in other cases, the government of Nigeria avoided paying for the repatriation, but 
could not argue that it should not take responsibility for its mentally-ill subject. In the 
cases of Briggs and Jones from Liberia, the government of Nigeria was able to push the 
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costs of repatriation off on relatives, and in both cases relatives were able to take custody 
of the patient (although Jones was never actually repatriated, he had been released to the 
custody of his sister in Liberia). As a result these cases posed no financial or 
accommodation problem for the government of Nigeria. However, in the case of Okon 
Eso, the criminal lunatic in French-controlled Gabon, the government of Nigeria accepted 
the repatriation and made space available for him without any argument and before his 
nationality could even be verified. Although Eso died before he could be repatriated, his 
case illustrates the extent to which politics played into the decision of the government of 
Nigeria to facilitate repatriation or to argue against it. The government of Nigeria could 
rankle the government of Gold Coast, which was within the British Empire, but could not 
afford to strain relations with Gabon, which was a part of the French Empire.  
 The second point that the cases of repatriation involving mentally-ill Nigerians 
from West African countries and colonies illustrate, however, requires them to be viewed 
collectively. As a whole, arguments for or against repatriation are not made based on 
psychiatric opinions about what would be in the best interests of the patient. Presumably, 
this is because by and large governments assumed that conditions for mental patients 
would be largely the same anywhere in West Africa. Mental institutions, where they 
existed at all, were overcrowded and for the most part offered only custodial care, not the 
medical treatment that many patients needed to improve their conditions. Under such 
circumstances, it did not matter if the patient was held in custody in an overcrowded 
asylum in Gold Coast, an overcrowded asylum in Nigeria, or a prison cell for that matter. 
Conditions were deplorable everywhere. Presumably it could have been in the best 
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interests of a partially recovered patient to be released into the custody of his or her 
family in familiar surroundings, but this was never the argument posed by governments 
in West Africa when pursuing repatriation. The primary bases for arguments for or 
against repatriation were blatantly centered on practical issues such as available space, 
cost, and political circumstances.  
No cohesive policy on how repatriation cases involving mental patients should be 
handled ever developed. Colonial governments in the region found it to be in their own 
best interests to treat each case individually and make decisions on a case-by-case basis. 
However, even on a case-by-case basis, the considerations surrounding repatriation cases 
within West Africa never revolved around psychiatric diagnoses or opinions of what was 
in the patient’s best interests, but solely on what was most convenient for the 
governments involved in any given circumstance. As in the Gold Coast cases, even 
patient’s diagnoses could be changed and their legal status artificially commuted in order 
to meet the needs of the government. This was partially the result of a system that 
disallowed the repatriation of subjects against their will and without safeguards for their 
best interests. But contributing greatly to the context was a larger psychiatric framework 
that could not see patients’ best interests as being particularly affected one way or another 
so long as they required institutional treatment within an African asylum, where 
conditions were seen to be largely similar culturally and materially across the region. As 
we will see in the next chapter, however, when patients were repatriated from wealthier 
and more medically and technologically advanced countries in Europe and North 
America, the condition of the patient often did become part of the negotiation process, 
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Repatriations from the United Kingdom 
INTRODUCTION 
The repatriation of mental patients to Nigeria from places outside of Africa had 
completely different dynamics from repatriation cases that originated within Africa. 
Cases that took place within Africa rarely resulted in the repatriation of the patient 
because of a generalized assumption that mentally disturbed Africans faced roughly the 
same environment and circumstances regardless of where they were in Africa, thereby 
making practical considerations such as overcrowding and cost of paramount importance 
in the decision making processes of colonial officials in Nigeria and in the countries and 
colonies that wished to repatriate. However, repatriation cases involving mentally-ill 
Nigerians that originated in the United Kingdom almost always resulted in the 
repatriation of the patient to Nigeria.  
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze why repatriation cases involving 
mentally-ill Nigerians were treated differently when they originated in the United 
Kingdom than they were if they originated particularly within British colonies in West 
Africa. All were parts of the British Empire and, as such, Nigerians had the same rights 
and privileges in both places. So why were the outcomes of repatriation cases so different 
so often? Using cases of mentally-ill Nigerians in the United Kingdom, the argument 
proposed here is that while decisions about whether to repatriate mental patients to 
Nigeria from within Africa were based on practical considerations about overcrowding 
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and cost, the decision whether to repatriate to Nigeria from the United Kingdom was 
based largely on the conceptions of the “African mind” and how it was best treated 
detailed in Chapter 2. Overall, the motivations for proposing repatriation remained the 
same whether the patient came from a country or colony within Africa or from the United 
Kingdom. Primarily, governments wanted to reduce their financial and social liability for 
persons who could no longer take care of themselves. However, in cases that originated 
in the United Kingdom, another motive was also articulated on many occasions. In cases 
that originated in the UK, psychiatric and government officials often argued that 
repatriation would be in the “best interests” of the patient, an argument that was never 
made in the African setting where it was largely seen that conditions for the care and 
treatment of the patient would be poor whether they were repatriated or not.  
 Who decided what was in the best interests of a mental patient though? Could a 
patient in a disturbed mental state make this determination for him or herself? Under 
what circumstances would a psychiatric evaluator make the decision on the patient’s 
behalf? In some cases, psychiatric records from UK mental institutions that housed 
Nigerian patients indicated that the patients were recovered enough to be discharged, or, 
at the very least recovered enough to decide whether they wanted to return to their 
families in Nigeria, which many did. In these cases the wishes of the patients themselves 
were paramount. However, in many cases, the patient was in such a poor state as to be 
unable to make such a decision. In these cases, psychiatric evaluators decided on the 
patient’s behalf that returning to Nigeria offered the best chance for any recovery to 
occur.  
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The implicit argument made by psychiatric specialists, government officials, and, 
sometimes, even Nigerians themselves was that the patient’s best chance for recovery 
was to be removed from the stressful and overwhelming environment that Africans faced 
in the UK. In this way, the assumptions about African mental health upon which 
arguments for repatriation were based drew heavily upon racist interpretations of the 
“African mind” developed by colonial psychiatrists. Since it was widely held psychiatric 
belief that Africans possessed “primitive”, fragile and childlike minds that reacted slowly 
and often poorly to the changes of “modern” European social norms, the best way to 
induce recovery in an unstable African mind was to remove it from the surroundings that 
were believed to be causing the affliction and return it to familiar surroundings. No 
doubt, the stress of travel and of assimilating into a new society is significant. Adding to 
the pressures that Africans faced in Britain was the race prejudice that followed them 
everywhere they went. Often persecuted, discriminated against, and isolated in a foreign 
place, it is not surprising that some Nigerians suffered mentally, nor is it surprising that 
many would wish to return to the relative comfort of their homes and families. But such 
conditions are not necessarily unique to Africans traveling in the UK. Therefore, the 
argument made by psychiatrists and government officials as to why returning to Nigeria 
was in the best interests of these patients was not centered on the therapeutic value of 
familiar surroundings, but rather on the importance of removing the fragile minds of these 
patients from the stressors of British society. The issue of importance was not that they 
return to their homes and families per se, but that they be extracted from current 
surroundings in the UK that had proven too much for them to handle. In this sense, the 
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argument is based implicitly, never explicitly, on the racial understanding that “African 
minds” thrived only in African environments and was threatened by European social 
surroundings. 
 The issue of whether it was actually in mental patients’ best interest to be 
repatriated from the UK to Nigeria is debatable, however. The same issues of 
overcrowding that often determined whether mental patients within Africa were returned 
to Nigeria remained true for repatriation cases from outside Africa, and both the 
government of Nigeria and the government of the United Kingdom were amply aware of 
this fact. Furthermore, mentally-ill Nigerians in the UK benefited from mental 
institutions and medical care that they simply could not receive in Nigeria, where 
asylums were almost wholly custodial and resources were scarce. Occasionally, the 
government of Nigeria argued against repatriation on these grounds, but only successfully 
avoided repatriation in one case. Interestingly, in this case, government of Nigeria 
officials were able to argue that, in fact, the surroundings for the individual patient, who 
had been in a British mental institution for over twenty years, were actually more familiar 
to the patient and, therefore, more conducive to recovery, than they would be in Nigeria. 
In most cases, however, the patients were repatriated from the UK and either 
handed over to the custody of relatives to live at home, or, in chronic or severe cases, 
were placed in overcrowded, underfunded asylums. What happened to these patients after 
they were evaluated on arrival in Nigeria is mostly untraceable. Some probably did see an 
improvement in their quality of life as a result of repatriation. Those who returned to their 
families probably found their circumstances somewhat improved over what they had 
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been in the UK, so long as they did not require any further psychiatric treatment in the 
future. Some patients that psychiatric evaluators believed would need further institutional 
care once back in Nigeria were deemed well enough to return to their families once they 
reached Nigeria. It is unclear whether this was a result of actual improvement in these 
patients’ conditions or of the triage tactics that Nigerian asylum staff were forced to 
practice. Others, however, almost certainly did not see their situations improve as a result 
of repatriation. Those who were sent to asylums in Nigeria almost certainly faced worse 
conditions than if they had not been repatriated. Some died before their repatriations 
could be completed, and, in one case, the death was a direct result of the repatriation 
process.  
The cases of Nigerian mental patients repatriated from the UK therefore illustrate 
the importance of colonial psychiatric interpretations of the “African mind” in two ways. 
First, despite the different types of mental illness and the different approaches to treating 
these illnesses in UK asylums, these patients were all expected to be better off in Nigeria, 
whether they agreed to repatriation or not, whether they were expected to live normally in 
Nigeria or to be placed in an asylum on arrival. The way that these cases were lumped 
together and argued in the same way suggests that psychiatrists in Britain had 
internalized much of the theory of the “African mind” that colonial psychiatrists had 
developed. In “modern” Britain, the “African mind” was in danger; in “primitive” Africa 
it could recover regardless of the different environments these patients would face once 
back in Nigeria. Second, the cases of repatriation from the UK stand in stark contrast to 
those that originated in Africa, where arguments about the patient’s best interests were 
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never made. The extrapolation made here is that it was far more important to remove the 
“African mind” from the foreign surroundings of “modern” Britain than it was to remove 
them from other African surroundings, which, while still foreign to the Nigerian, were 
not dangerously so since they still reflected the “primitive” lifestyle of Africa. In this 
way, the definition of the “African mind” developed by colonial psychiatrists influenced 
assumptions about Africans not only in the colonial setting but beyond, creating an 
international and intercontinental system of thought in which Africans were defined and 
controlled as mental inferiors.  
THE ROLE OF THE “AFRICAN MIND” IN REPATRIATION 
Underlying the decisions to repatriate Nigerian mental patients from the UK was an 
implicit understanding that it would be in the patient’s best interests to be back in 
Nigeria. However, the assumption that Nigerian mental patients would be better off in 
Nigeria is by no means intuitive, and was debatable even at the time that the repatriations 
discussed in this chapter occurred, which was mostly the 1940s and 1950s.1 At the time, 
political and medical authorities in both Nigeria and the UK knew that institutional care 
and treatment options for the mentally ill were far less sophisticated and available in 
Nigeria than they were in the UK. Colonial government officials repeatedly lamented the 
poor conditions of their asylums and scarcity of medical personnel.2 Arguments 
concerning the overcrowding of Nigerian asylums had been sufficient to prevent the 
repatriation of many Nigerian mental patients from the Gold coast in the 1930s.3  
                                                 
1
 See Chapter 2, this volume. 
2
 See Chapter 1, this volume. 
3
 See Chapter 3, this volume. 
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Conditions of overcrowding continued throughout the 1940s and 1950s, and 
affected repatriation cases from the UK just as they did from the Gold Coast. In several 
repatriation cases from the UK, the government of Nigeria made it clear that conditions 
would likely be worse for the patient if they returned to Nigeria. For example, in 1951, 
the Director of Medical and Sanitary Services (DMSS) for Nigeria reluctantly agreed to 
the repatriation of James Omoro, who had traveled to the UK in 1946 as a stowaway. By 
1950, he had been admitted to Winwick Hospital suffering from schizophrenia. 
According to hospital records, Omoro desired to be repatriated, but was still manifesting 
symptoms of his mental illness. He was “excitable and emotionally unstable,” and was 
sometimes “abusive and aggressive.” He had “the habit of spitting on the floor or his 
bedding” and could be “resistive to attention.” Under the circumstances, the medical 
authorities at Winwick Hospital determined that there was “no immediate prospect of his 
recovery.” Omoro “would require mental hospital treatment on repatriation.”4 The DMSS 
acquiesced, stating that Omoro could be repatriated and admitted to Lantoro Mental 
Hospital on arrival. However, the DMSS made it clear that conditions would not be 
opportune for Omoro’s recovery at Lantoro, noting that “the most modern methods of 
treatment of these cases are not yet fully available in Nigeria and without having full 
details it would be impossible to say whether any effective remedial measures could be 
carried out here.” He went on to state that “as space for mental cases is at a premium in 
this country we normally only admit such cases as are likely to benefit from treatment or 
                                                 
4
 L.H. Thorpe, Board of Control, London to A.H. Jordan, Esq., Colonial Office, London, 12 March 1951, 
NAI CSO 26 03028/S.976/8. 
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who are a danger to themselves or others.”5 The implication in the DMSS’s statement is 
clear. Conditions in Nigerian asylums were poor and if UK officials were really 
interested in Omoro’s recovery, he was likely better off staying in an up-to-date hospital 
in England. Omoro was repatriated anyway in 1952, but, on arrival was deemed 
recovered enough by Nigerian standards to be released to the custody of a cousin.6 
  The DMSS for Nigeria made a similar remark concerning the repatriation of 
Adekunle John Hughes in 1954. Hughes, like Omoro, had come to the UK as a stowaway 
in 1953. After arriving he applied for repatriation, presumably as a distressed British 
subject, but was admitted to Long Grove Hospital, Epsom, before his repatriation could 
be carried out. Medical authorities at the hospital declared the intention to complete the 
repatriation “eventually”, however they desired to know if Hughes could be admitted to 
an asylum on arriving back in Nigeria. The DMSS responded much as he had in Omoro’s 
case, stating “he could be admitted to a lunatic asylum. I have however to bring to your 
attention the overcrowded condition of all the asylums in this country.” Wishing to 
illustrate again the point that asylum space in Nigeria was generally reserved for patients 
who might improve as a result of custody or who were a danger to themselves or others, 
the DMSS hoped “that when Mr. Hughes returns to this country it will be found that he 
will be able to be looked after by his relatives at home,” as had been done in Omoro’s 
case.7 The implication was that if UK authorities did not believe that Hughes was 
                                                 
5
 Director of Medical Services, Nigeria to Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos, 29 May 1951 NAI 
CSO 26 03028/S.976/11. 
6
 K. Sagoe, Medical Officer in charge of Yaba Lunatic Asylum to Senior Medical Officer, Lagos, 19 June 
1952 NAI CSO 26 03028/S.976/39. 
7
 Inspector-General of Medical Services, Nigeria to Chief Secretary of the Government, Nigeria 30 June 
1954 NAI CSO 03028/1088/16. 
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recovered enough to be handed over to his relations, perhaps they should reconsider his 
repatriation and spare him the discomfort of life in a Nigerian asylum. Hughes, like 
Omoro, was repatriated anyway. However, Hughes’ case did not end as favorably as 
Omoro’s. Hughes was apparently not recovered enough to be released to his relatives on 
returning to Nigeria. In fact, he did not survive the sea voyage home. He sailed from 
London aboard the “Apapa” on November 18, 1956. Sometime before November 26 he 
jumped overboard and was lost at sea.8 
 Such unfortunate circumstances led some officials within the government of 
Nigeria to question the value of repatriating mental patients from overseas. In 1955, after 
several Nigerian mental patients in the United States had been abruptly deported and 
placed on a chartered flight to Kano,9 one colonial officer in Nigeria posed the question 
to the Acting Secretary of Health for Nigeria: “Why do we accept them back… It would 
surely be better to leave them where they can be well treated and looked after, possibly 
even cured?”10 By 1956, the colonial officials in the government of Nigeria were not 
particularly of the opinion that it was always a good idea to repatriate mental patients 
from the UK.  
In two cases Nigerian officials strenuously argued for repatriation not to occur. In 
1956, the Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the government of Nigeria of the 
impending repatriation of Bolaji Otepola Alakija. Alakija was born in 1902 and had lived 
in the UK since the early 1930s, having come to Britain to study medicine at Manchester 
                                                 
8
 Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor-General, Nigeria, 26 November 1954 NAI CSO 
03028/S.1088/31. 
9
 See Chapter 6, this volume. 
10
 unknown to Acting Secretary Health, Nigeria 4 July 1955 NAI MH 59/S4/3. 
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University. In 1935, he had murdered someone. He had been found not guilty by reason 
of insanity and was placed in Broadmoor Institution where he lived for the next 21 years. 
Diagnosed with a case of paraphrenia (a form of paranoid schizophrenia) when admitted 
to Broadmoor, Alakija “was violent and had auditory hallucinations.” Medical authorities 
declared in 1956 that he “requires – and will continue to require – care and attention.” 
Nevertheless, Broadmoor desired to repatriate Alakija in 1956, citing that “he has 
gradually improved” and, although he continued to have hallucinations “he has not been 
violent since 1952.” 11 The doctors vaguely asserted that repatriation would be “in the 
best interests of the patient if he could be returned to his country of origin,” but to 
colonial officials in Nigeria it was unclear why this would be the case. The Governor-
General of Nigeria, acting on advice from the DMSS, responded to the Secretary of State 
that under the circumstances: 
“the medical authorities in Lagos are of the opinion that the above named person 
should not be returned to Nigeria for the following reasons –  
 (a) after over 20 years in the United Kingdom he would have no relatives 
or interests in Nigeria to assist in ameliorating his condition. 
 (b) conditions at Yaba Mental Hospital are extremely overcrowded and he 
would find this most upsetting. 
 (c) there are no facilities at Yaba for special diets, etc., and by now he 
would be completely used to English-type food. 
 
The Governor-General closed by asking “if the decision to return this man to Nigeria 
could be reconsidered.”12 After further deliberations, it was decided not to repatriate 
Alakija. A similar case occurred in 1959, when the government of Nigeria argued that a 
mental patient named Francis Zibai should not be repatriated, stating “the patient had 
                                                 
11
 Medical Report, Bolaji Otipola Alakija, 19 June 1956 MH 59/S4/C9/3. 
12
 Governor General, Nigeria to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 September 1956 NAI 
MH59/S4/C9/6. 
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better be left in the United Kingdom if he can be looked after there,” because there was at 
the time no psychiatrist in the Federal Medical Service in Nigeria.13 
 The cases of Alakija and Zibai are the only documented cases from the period 
before 1960 in which repatriation was not carried out due to objections from medical or 
administrative officials in Nigeria. Despite the apparent understanding in both Nigeria 
and in the UK that medical care and institutional facilities were in poorer shape in 
Nigeria than they were in the UK, psychiatric officials in the UK decided in the vast 
majority of cases that repatriation would be in the best interests of the patient. In many 
cases, it is unclear why the medical authorities believed that repatriation was in the best 
interests of the patient because the medical reports submitted to the government of 
Nigeria by medical authorities in the UK were often vague. When Michael Onwubya, a 
nineteen year-old Nigerian admitted to Saxondale Hospital in Nottingham with 
schizophrenia, applied for repatriation in 1950, the hospital staff supported the 
repatriation on the unexplained grounds that “the boy is unlikely to make a full recovery 
until he gets home.”14 Similarly, Godwin Njoki, a 26 year-old patient in Bristol Mental 
Hospital diagnosed with “reactive depression with gross hysterical phenomena”, applied 
for repatriation in 1952 and was supported in this decision by psychiatric authorities who 
considered repatriation “essential to complete recovery.”15 The doctor of Pedros 
Adamojo, a Nigerian “said to be suffering from serious mental disability” in 1956 
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 Chief Medical Adviser to the Federal Government to Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Health, 
Lagos, 3 March 1959, NAI MH 59/S4/C35/4. 
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 Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria 23 August 
1950 NAI CSO 03028/S.978/1. 
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 Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria 12 August 
1952 NAI CSO 03028/S.1051/1. 
 158 
declared that “in view of his mental condition, he would best be treated in his own 
country.”16 Bolaji Alakija, the criminally-insane former medical student who had been in 
Broadmoor Institution for over twenty years had been suggested for repatriation in 1956 
on the grounds that “it would be in the best interests of the patient if he could be returned 
to his country of origin.”17 The exact same wording was used to support the repatriation 
of Nwazue Udumaga, who suffered from “schizophrenia of an intense and paranoid 
type”. Despite (or perhaps because of) his “vigorous delusions of a grandiose type, such 
as that Princess Margaret was his wife and that he had invented some wonderful space-
travel apparatus,” the consultant psychiatrist at Long Grove Hospital in Surrey informed 
the Colonial Office that “the sooner he can be repatriated the better.”18 
 The cases described above have very little in common other than that medical 
reports are extremely vague on the reasoning for supporting repatriation. In several of the 
cases it is clear that the patient himself wished to be repatriated, having personally 
applied to the Secretary of State’s office for this purpose, but it is not necessarily clear 
why psychiatric authorities would see this to be in the patient’s best interests. In other 
cases, however, it is clear that the patients were ambivalent to repatriation. Alakija’s 
medical report indicates that at the time his repatriation was requested by psychaitric 
authorities in 1952 he refused even to write to his relatives in Lagos.19 The second 
similarity is that repatriation was supported by the medical authorities in all these cases 
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despite the varying diagnoses and degrees of mental illness exhibited by the patients. 
Diagnoses ranged from depression and delusions of grandeur to paranoid schizophrenia, 
and at least one of the patients had been institutionalized for over twenty years as a 
violent and potentially dangerous person. The patients required varying degrees of further 
care once they returned to Nigeria ranging from suggested further institutionalization in 
Nigerian asylums in the case of Alakija to immediate release to the custody of relatives in 
the cases of Onwubya, Adamojo, and Udumaga. The psychiatric staff at Yaba Asylum in 
Lagos decided that Njoki should be returned to his relations after his arrival in October 
1953, but were unable to trace his relations because since his arrival he had been 
“absolutely inactive, docile, mute and altogether inaccessible. He has not spoken a word 
and therefore [has been] incapable of giving any account of himself or his relations.”20    
Given the varying degrees of psychosis of the patients, their different attitudes 
towards returning to Nigeria and the various recommendations for further treatment 
proposed, how could medical and administrative officials in the UK have decided that 
repatriation was in the “best interests” of all these patients? Despite all the differences 
that are apparent in these cases, the patients all had one thing in common: they were 
Africans who had developed symptoms of mental illness in the UK. From the perspective 
of the medical authorities who handled these cases, it was clear that to some extent that 
the social order within the UK contributed at least in part to the psychic problems that 
these unfortunate Nigerians were experiencing. Although many of the patients were being 
medically treated for biologically-caused mental diseases such as schizophrenia, 
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psychiatric authorities nevertheless often saw social disorders as contributing to the poor 
mental state of these individuals. The cases described above, in which medical reports 
were vague about the reasons for supporting repatriation, do not provide much evidence 
for this interpretation. However, other cases shed light upon an implicit reliance on 
conceptions of the inferior and “African mind,” fragile and threatened by European 
cultural and social norms, which seems to have influenced psychiatric opinions on why 
repatriation was in the best interests of so many Nigerian mental patients. 
Sometimes, patients were repatriated simply because they did not respond to 
treatment in the UK. Such was the case with Peter Okpokan, who traveled to the UK as a 
sailor and, by 1953 had been admitted to Pastures Hospital in Derby suffering from 
“General Paralysis of the Insane.”21 Okpokan was treated in three different hospitals in 
the UK “without effect” and, as a result, the conclusion was reached that “it is doubtful 
whether any permanent improvement can be expected.” He was repatriated in December 
1953 and taken to Yaba Asylum. In cases where no improvement was likely, it was 
deemed best to return the patient to Nigeria regardless of the conditions the patient would 
face. Since neither medical treatment nor social circumstances were a factor in the 
eventual improvement of Okpokan, it was concluded that he might as well be placed in 
custody in his country of origin. 
However, in most cases, medical authorities in the UK weighed the positive 
benefits of modern medical treatment against the supposedly negative influence of social 
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surroundings that the patients faced in the UK. The conception of the “African mind” as 
fragile and easily disturbed by modern societies like the UK comes through in many 
places in the repatriation files of Nigerian mental patients. For example, Laban Sodeinde, 
who arrived in the UK in 1954 to study carpentry at the L.C.C. School of Building at 
Brixton, was admitted to Warlingham Park Hospital in April 1955 having developed “a 
strong persecution mania.”22 While a recognized pity considering “his fundamentally 
good intelligence and enthusiasm to complete his course of study,” the psychiatric staff at 
the hospital nevertheless suggested that he should be repatriated on account of the fact 
that after deep insulin therapy, he was “still auditorily [sic] hallucinated and this feature 
of his illness has shown no improvement with treatment.” However, this was not the only 
reason to propose repatriation. Presumably repatriation would result in no better medical 
treatment for Sodeinde’s hallucinations. However, since Sodeinde also apparently 
suffered from an “inadequate and dependent personality,” medical authorities at 
Warlighamm Park Hospital believed that “it might be unwise to encourage his continued 
stay in this country.”23 The underlying message relayed by hospital staff was that 
Sodeinde’s “personality” had been “inadequate” to the challenge of adapting to “this 
country”, i.e. the UK. Under the circumstances, hospital authorities declared Sodeinde’s 
prognosis “doubtful at best”,24 and suggested that he be returned to Nigeria, where his 
personality was presumably more suited to thrive in its surroundings. 
                                                 
22
 H.B. Shepheard, Welfare Officer for Director of Nigerian Students to Chief Secretary, Lagos, 20 January 
1956 NAI MH 59/S.4./C.6/1. 
23
 Wm. H. Shepley, Acting Medical Superintendent, Warlingham Park Hospital, Surrey, to Director of 




The social atmosphere in the UK cannot be discounted as a factor that brought 
significant emotional stress to many foreigners who tried to adapt and survive in new 
surroundings. However, even in cases where the social stresses of assimilating into new 
surroundings clearly affected the mental state of Nigerians in the UK, medical officials 
sought to explain these stresses in terms of the “African mind.” Take, for example, the 
case of Umebuala Uwuoma, known as John Brown in the UK. Uwuoma left his home in 
Bende, Nigeria, in 1954 without telling his family where he was going or what he 
intended to do. He arrived in the UK the next year but soon applied for repatriation as a 
distressed British subject. At the time, officials in the Secretary of State for the Colonies’ 
offices declared that Uwuoma’s mental health “is giving cause for concern.”25 During the 
ensuing months while officials in Nigeria attempted to verify Uwuoma’s nationality and 
trace his relations, Uwuoma fell afoul of the law and was imprisoned in Brixton for 
smashing several windows. The medical officer at Brixton prison indicated that Uwuoma 
was in a “restless, uncooperative state, and has torn his clothing.” He was not, however, 
certified as a mental patient, and repatriation proceedings continued under the condition 
that he would be escorted back to Nigeria under guard. After further examination, the 
Medical Officer of the prison determined the cause of Uwuoma’s disturbance: 
He tells me that he has fallen in love with a white girl of about twenty years old. 
He says he has never been able to talk to her, and that he does not know her name 
because he has been warned off her by men bigger than himself. 
He says that he wants no other girl but this one and yet he realises that she is 
unattainable. 
In this pent up state he has seen men of colour that he knows by sight out with 
girls similar to the one he covets. This raises such jealousy in himself that he 
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relieves his tension by smashing their windows. He says he has done this three 
times.26 
 
The medical officer concluded that “in such a man as the prisoner I do not believe that 
these are insane actions. In my opinion he cannot be certified as insane under the Lunacy 
Act, nor is he in need of medical treatment.”27 
So Uwuoma was not insane according to the Medical Officer. However, he did 
exhibit symptoms of an over-stimulated, fragile “African mind”. According to the 
Medical Officer, the reason Uwuoma’s actions could not be regarded as indications of 
mental illness was because “he is a Nigerian coloured man of low normal intelligence, of 
poor education…. He appears to me to come from a primitive culture,” and, in the 
Medical Officer’s opinion, “this should be borne in mind when assessing his peculiar 
attitude and conduct.”28 Uwuoma was not insane: he was simply out of his element, and 
had not been able to cope with the stress that had resulted from transitioning from a 
“primitive” to a “modern” society. His inability to possess a “white woman”, a symbol of 
the civilization into which he was trying to assimilate, served as a constant reminder of 
the outsider, indeed “primitive”, status that he could not overcome in the UK. Under the 
circumstances, Uwuoma himself wished to be repatriated from the UK to forget the 
heartache had had suffered and the Medical Officer agreed that this was in his best 
interests, if not because of the need to heal his broken heart then because of the benefits 
of being back in a familiar, “primitive” society.  
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  Similar implications were made in other cases. For example, Raje Idowu, a 
Nigerian who turned up as a mental patient in Highcroft Hospital in Birmingham, 
England, in 1948, was repatriated on the grounds that his doctor at the hospital, who 
happened to be a Nigerian himself, believed that his condition was “likely to improve on 
return.” The reason Idowu was likely to improve, however, was not so much that 
conditions in Nigeria would be beneficial to his recovery as that his surroundings in 
Birmingham were exacerbating his symptoms. Idowu was apparently “deriving no 
benefit from present treatment,” according to a memo from office of the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, “and this is due to his inability to adjust himself to conditions in 
the U.K.”29 Idowu’s “African mind” was not able to cope with life in the UK; therefore 
even his Nigerian doctor believed that he should be removed from the environment. The 
positive effect that returning to familiar surroundings and his family and friends might 
have was a secondary consideration to the main concern that social circumstances in the 
UK were actually causing the breakdown of his psyche. 
 In several cases, medical authorities in the UK implied that Nigerian mental 
patients were only mentally disturbed insofar as they did not possess the mental acuity to 
fend for themselves in a modern society like the UK. Such an argument was made in the 
case of O.A. Otitoju, who arrived in Winwick Hospital in Warrington sometime before 
1950 suffering from inactive pulmonary tuberculosis and an apparent mental disorder. 
According to medical reports issued at the time his repatriation was requested in 1952, 
Otitoju “remains sullen, suspicious and excitable with impulsive outbursts. He also has 
ideas of reference and persecutory beliefs. He has periods in which he appears fairly 
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rational, but at others takes no interest in his surroundings and mutters to himself. He 
remains untidy in his habits and requires care and supervision.”30 Otitoju was himself 
“very keen to be repatriated,” and the Medical Superintendent at Winwick Hospital 
believed that “the sure knowledge of this would probably be a factor in extending his 
well behaviour over a period.”31 However, Otitoju’s personal desire to return to Nigeria 
was only part of the reason that medical authorities thought repatriation was a good idea. 
The Medical Superintendent went on to state that “[b]ecause of his unreliable mental 
state… [h]e will not be able to take care of himself in this country.”32 The implication 
here is that the stresses of British society were in some way causing Otitoju’s mental 
illness or, at the very least, that Otitoju’s mental illness prevented him from functioning 
in British society. He might, however, be able to take care of himself in some other 
country. Therefore leaving Britain and returning to Nigeria was the best possible remedy 
for Otitoju. Unfortunately, before Otitoju could be repatriated he died in Winwick 
Hospital on April 4, 1953.33 
 John Muruako received a similar diagnosis from medical authorities. Muruako, 
who had been admitted to Banstead Hospital in Surrey in December 1957 suffering from 
severe paranoid schizophrenia, received a “prolonged course of physical treatment” 
including 20 bouts of electroconvulsive therapy after which the Physician Superintendent 
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at the hospital determined he was “as well as he is likely to be.”34 The Physician 
Superintendent supported Muruako’s repatriation to Nigeria on the grounds that “in the 
event of returning there, his chances of obtaining work are probably quite good,” while, 
in the opinion of the Physician Superintendent, Muruako was “not likely to become self-
supporting if he remains in the United Kingdom.”35 Again, the implication is that 
Muruako’s fragile psyche would not be able to cope with conditions in the UK enough to 
hold a job or take care of himself while, in Nigeria, a more “primitive” society, he would 
be a suitable candidate for employment despite his mental disorder. The Physician 
Superintendent did not argue that Muruako was likely to improve as a result of 
repatriation, suggesting that after the electroconvulsive therapy he was “as well as he is 
likely to be”. It is therefore clear that the implicit argument made by medical authorities 
in Muruako’s case was not that repatriation was in the patient’s best interests because his 
condition was likely to improve as a result of being back in familiar surroundings and in 
the care of friends and relatives but that his fragile “African mind” would never be able to 
function properly in the UK. 
 The importance that medical authorities in the UK placed on removing “African 
minds” from stressful, modern surroundings to more “primitive” surroundings is clear in 
the case of Musa Sunmonu, who was admitted to Freirn Hospital sometime before 1950. 
Sunmonu himself wished to return to Nigeria, but as far as the hospital authorities were 
able to ascertain, he had no next of kin who could take responsibility for him. 
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Nevertheless, the repatriation was supported as “in Mr. Sunmonu’s best interests.”36 
However, before Sunmonu could be repatriated, authorities wanted to know “whether he 
could receive suitable treatment on his return.”37 The government of Nigeria, as it had 
done in other cases, argued that, of course, Mr. Sunmonu could not receive suitable 
treatment if he returned to Nigeria. In a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
the Acting Governor of Nigeria, A.F.F.P. Newns, declared: 
It would not be possible to put Musa Sunmonu in Yaba Asylum unless he is 
certified and without medical details it is not possible to say whether he is 
certifiable or not. If he were brought here now and not put in the asylum, it 
appears he would be both destitute and helpless. 
While, therefore, on humanitarian grounds this Government would be willing to 
pay for the repatriation of Musa Sunmonu if it is likely his health would benefit 
thereby, it seems that, if he were repatriated now, he would be in a far worse 
position than at Freirn Hospital in the United Kingdom.38  
 
With no relatives to look after him, Sunmonu would be on his own unless he could be 
placed in the asylum. In either case, Sunmonu would be worse off than he currently was.  
Eventually, Sunmonu’s father was located, and the repatriation was therefore to 
move forward. By this time, however, nearly a year had passed and the government of 
Nigeria wished to know if Mr. Sunmonu would still require “the same handling and 
treatment” that hospital authorities had suggested the previous year.39 The response by 
the Physician’s Superintendent at Freirn Hospital indicated the extent to which 
perceptions of the “African mind” played into the decision to repatriate. According to the 
Physician Superintendent, “The answer to this depends on whether his home is in a large 
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town or in a small village in the country. In the first case he would be in need of hospital 
care, but it is quite possible that he might be looked after by his family in a small country 
district.”40 The implication here is clear. The benefits of familiar surroundings of home 
and family were not the primary psychiatric justifications for repatriating Sunmonu. It 
was not assumed that his family could take care of him in a bustling urban area. In order 
for Sunmonu to function in society, that society needed to be rural and “primitive”, i.e. a 
“small village”. The stresses of a “modern” urban lifestyle were too much for Sunmonu, 
who needed first, to be removed from such surroundings in the UK and, second, to be 
isolated from reminders of such surroundings once back in Nigeria.  
Interestingly, Sunmonu was not repatriated. Apparently it was decided that since 
Sunmonu’s father was in Lagos, he would have to be placed in Yaba asylum if he 
returned. Since the asylums in Nigeria were by all accounts inferior to those in the UK, 
Sunmonu remained at Freirn. Five years later, in November 1956, the Consultant 
Psychiatrist at Freirn reported that Sunmonu “has made considerable improvement in the 
last few weeks, and as he does not wish to go back himself at this juncture it is felt that he 
should be given an opportunity of further improvement and possible discharge from 
hospital.”41 However, always ready for the possibility that the improvement would not 
last in the UK, the Consultant Psychiatrist concluded that “in the event of his 
improvement proving to be transitory I will get in touch with you again concerning the 
                                                                                                                                                 
39
 Governor, Nigeria to Secretary of State for the Colonies 28 May 1951 NAI CSO 26 03028/S.988/10. 
40
 Physician Superintendent, Freirn Hospital to Secretary, Board of Control, London 9 June 1951 NAI CSO 
26 03028/S.988/12. 
41
 Secretary of State for the Colonies to Officer Administering the Government of the Federation of Nigeria 
8 January 1957 NAI CSO 26 03028/S.988/27. 
 169 
possibility of his repatriation.”42 It is not clear from the documentary record that this 
repatriation ever occurred. 
NIGERIAN RESPONSES TO REPATRIATIONS 
Sometimes Nigerian mental patients and the families and friends of Nigerian mental 
patients also ascribed to beliefs that the mental disturbances that they or their relations 
experienced had an inherently social origin, not a biological one. James Omoro, for 
example, the paranoid schizophrenic discussed earlier in this chapter, held persecutory 
beliefs, including that he was being “detained in hospital because of his colour.”43 As far 
as Omoro was concerned, his own mental illness was a construction of white medical 
personnel intent on undermining the mental capacity of blacks.  
In the case of Gregory Nduka, a young Nigerian who had traveled to England in 
the early 1950s, a local Catholic priest urged the Principal Immigration Officer for 
Nigeria to repatriate Nduka because he was unable to cope with conditions in the UK. 
Nduka had broken down “owing to excessive night work during the winter months, 
November to February,” and “to insufficient sleep and food”. 44 As a result, he was taken 
to Bow Road Hospital in “a delirious state”, after which he was urged to admit himself to 
Claybury Mental Hospital in Essex as a voluntary mental patient. According to Nduka’s 
priest, however, “The Ndukas are clearly good Catholics and Gregory has practiced his 
religion and kept straight out here. Though he was in a wing of the Mental Hospital at 
Claybury he was not mental.” His main problem had been the exhaustion he had 
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experienced at his work and, perhaps more importantly, the social pressures of life in the 
UK. “All who come in contact with Gregory,” claimed the priest, “say he ought not to be 
in London, or indeed out of his own country.” His personality was simply not fit for life 
in the big city. “He is too confiding and gets imposed upon.” These personality traits had 
led Nduka into trouble on several occasions. According to the priest, “Once or twice 
coloured men have robbed him of his wages and even set on him.”45 Nduka himself 
desired to return to Nigeria, and, though the file ends before his repatriation took place, it 
seems likely that he probably was repatriated since he had been discharged from the 
hospital and was working at a Catholic Boy’s Hospital. As such, he would not have been 
repatriated as a mental patient, but as a distressed British subject.  
It may not be surprising that many people in London would believe that a 
Nigerian like Nduka did not have the appropriate personality traits to cope with the social 
surroundings of the UK. However, in some cases, it is clear that even Nigerians 
themselves bought into the stereotypes of the “African mind” that supposedly hindered 
Nigerians from thriving in “modern” environments. Perhaps the most telling case of this 
phenomenon is that of Olajide Dairo. Dairo’s case is different from the others that have 
been discussed so far, in that he was not repatriated from the UK but was deported from 
Canada on account of what medical personnel described as “chronic” 
 paranoid schizophrenia that would “probably require prolonged, if not permanent, 
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hospital care.”46 Dairo was a student who had left Nigeria to study science at Norwich 
City College in England in 1952. After nine months in England he was accepted into a 
pre-medical program at the University of Manitoba in Canada. After one year in Canada, 
Dairo began exhibiting symptoms of mental illness and admitted to the Psychopathic 
Hospital in Winnipeg and later the Hospital for Mental Diseases in Selkirk, Manitoba. He 
was released from the hospital in March 1955 to resume his studies. However, within six 
months he had relapsed and was readmitted in September. It was during this stint in 
hospital the medical authorities determined him to be suffering from chronic paranoid 
schizophrenia and decided to have him deported as he was unlikely ever to be able to 
complete his studies in Canada. Efforts were made to contact Dairo’s father to make 
arrangements for his son’s arrival back in Nigeria. 
Though the medical authorities in Canada were quite clear that Dairo’s illness 
was, in their opinion, a biological and chronic form of schizophrenia that would require 
prolonged institutionalization, others involved in the case were not so sure. According to 
the Canadian Faculty Advisor to Overseas Students in a letter to Dairo’s father: 
the opinion of the authorities here seems to be that Jide will require institutional 
care at least for some time after reaching Nigeria. No doubt the duration of this 
would be for the Nigerian medical authorities to decide once he is there. My own 
view is that, given the proper family surroundings, and continuous contacts, such 
as unfortunately he cannot have in ordinary life here, he should be able to leave 
the institution almost immediately.47 
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As it turned out, medical authorities in Nigeria agreed with this assessment. Dairo was 
repatriated in April 1956 and was met by Dr. T.A. Lambo, the chief psychiatrist at the 
Mental Hospital in Abeokuta. Dairo was released into the custody of his father and held 
weekly meetings with Dr. Lambo thereafter. According to Dairo’s father and Dr. Lambo, 
since his arrival Dairo “has not once shown any signs of abnormality.” According to 
Dairo’s father, his son’s illness “clearly evinced that it was not an innate disease but was 
a case of brain-fag caused by stress from intensive studies. All he needed… was rest, 
which he has had since he broke off from his studies….”48 Dairo’s father claimed his son 
had completely recovered and should be returned to his overseas studies because “if 
prevented from resuming his studies it would result in frustration which would affect him 
very adversely.”49 Dairo’s father declared he would try to have his son admitted to 
university in the UK rather than in North America. Since he had been deported, he was 
not allowed back into Canada. 
 The statements made by Dairo’s father are interesting in that they illustrate the 
extent to which perceptions of the “African mind” influenced Nigerians’ own 
understandings of mental illness, or, at the very least, how to portray their own mental 
capabilities to colonial authorities to achieve a sympathetic response. Although medical 
authorities in Canada had deemed Dairo a chronic case, he had apparently completely 
recovered within months of returning to Nigeria. Whether Dairo had, in fact, recovered, 
is a matter for speculation. Indeed, he may have. It is also possible, however, that Dairo’s 
father portrayed his son’s illness as the result of “brain-fag”, an illness at the time 
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believed to be transitory and isolated in occurrence to Nigerian students,50 so as to reduce 
the embarrassment associated with having his son deported and to convince colonial 
authorities that his son was not a chronic case and was capable of resuming studies 
overseas which, if completed, would have brought prestige to the family and gainful 
employment to his son. In either case, it is clear that Dairo’s father wanted colonial 
officials to believe that his son’s illness was caused by his inability to cope with the stress 
of being an overseas student. In this case, the Nigerian father of a Nigerian mental patient 
clearly felt that it was more believable and/or more advantageous to suggest that the 
social conditions his son faced as a student in Canada were the cause of his mental 
collapse rather than a biological deficiency. Dairo’s father found it useful to fall back on 
ideas of the “African mind” socially incapable of adjusting to “modern” environments 
either for his own peace of mind or to develop comity with colonial officials who he 
believed would understand this line of thinking. 
ANALYSIS OF THE PATIENTS’ BEST INTERESTS 
The purpose of this chapter is not to argue that repatriation of mental patients was not in 
their best interests, as psychiatric authorities claimed. The issue is debatable, especially 
for those poor individuals who found themselves taken out of modern, up-to-date mental 
hospitals with highly trained and adequately numbered staff in the UK and placed in run-
down, underfunded and understaffed asylums and mental hospitals in Nigeria. In the 
majority of cases, however, it very well may have been beneficial for patients to return to 
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Nigeria, and it appears that psychiatric and administrative authorities in the UK did their 
best, in general, to act in the patients’ best interests and to comply with the wishes of the 
patients themselves. 
Repatriations of mental patients from the UK were not conducted hastily. The 
process took at least several months, and in many cases, multiple years to complete from 
request to disembarkation. Partially, repatriations took so long because of the complex 
bureaucracy of the British Empire. It took a long time for the request for repatriation to 
be made to officials in the Secretary of State for the Colonies office, then for that request 
to be transmitted to colonial officials in Nigeria who then had to go about confirming the 
patient’s nationality and tracing the patient’s relatives, who often had relocated since the 
patient had left Nigeria in the first place. Generally, this process took somewhere 
between six months and a year to complete before the patient could be repatriated. 
However, it often took longer. In the case of James Omoro, repatriation was first 
requested in May 1950, but his repatriation did not occur until May 1952.51 Nwazue 
Udumaga first applied for repatriation in 1953, but did not return to Nigeria until 1958. 
Sometimes repatriation was delayed because of a deterioration in the patient’s condition 
that made it unsafe for the patient to travel or otherwise unadvisable for the patient to 
leave the hospital in the UK. The dangers of moving patients had been illustrated in the 
case of Adekunle John Hughes, a paranoid schizophrenic who had thrown himself 
overboard on his journey back to Nigeria in 1954. Although a tragedy, Hughes’ demise as 
a result of his repatriation was extremely uncommon. Several patients had their 
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repatriations delayed over concerns that they were not fit to travel. Olanrewajo Otitoju, 
who applied first applied for repatriation in 1950, had his repatriation twice postponed 
“due to a deterioration in his condition.”52 Otitoju’s health was indeed an issue in his 
repatriation. He died in Winwick Hospital in the UK of bronchopneumonia on April 4, 
1954. 
The process of repatriation indicates that the patient’s well-being was, in fact, a 
consideration of medical and psychiatric authorities in the UK in ways that they do not 
seem to have been in cases that originated in African colonies. It is also important to 
remember that many of the patients repatriated from the UK, those who were voluntary 
patients or who were able to be discharged from the mental institution, personally applied 
for repatriation.53 Of the certified mental patients who hospital officials decided should 
be repatriated, it appears that most were agreeable to returning to Nigeria. According to 
medical authorities who requested the repatriation of Joseph Kodo, a paranoid 
schizophrenic admitted to Lancaster Moor Hospital in 1932, by 1958 Kodo had declared 
that “he would very much like to go back to Nigeria.”54 The Catholic priest of Gregory 
Nduka, the young man who had broken down after months of night work with little sleep 
or food in 1952 declared that Nduka “longs to get home and he is worrying over it.”55 
Nanakomo K. Thompson, who suffered from bouts of depression and dementia owing to 
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several cerebro-vascular accidents that had damaged his brain, wished to return to 
Nigeria in 1958 to spend his remaining time with his family. The medical authorities at 
Banstead Hopsital in Surrey recommended he be de-certified and made a voluntary 
patient to expedite his repatriation.56 In 1958, J.A. Sanwo, who resided as a mental 
patient in Springfield hospital in London, declared his desire to return to Nigeria “as he 
felt it was boring to remain longer” in hospital in the UK.57 In each of these cases the 
patient, although technically a certified mental patient and therefore not legally able to 
decide for himself whether to be repatriated, nevertheless approved of repatriation. 
In other cases, repatriations once requested were not carried out because the 
patient did not wish to return to Nigeria. For example, Musa Sunmonu, whose 
repatriation was first requested in 1950, was ultimately not repatriated by 1957 because 
he had made significant progress and had decided that he wanted to stay in the UK.58 In 
another case, Thomas Martins, a sailor who had served in the Merchant Navies during the 
Second World War, was certified insane and admitted to Cane Hill Mental Hospital in 
Surrey sometime after the war. In 1951, Martins’ mother appealed to the Colonial Office 
to have her son repatriated. She claimed that “on the 17th day of August [1951] I… was 
invited to the Office of the Immigration Officer, Nigeria and was informed that the said 
Thomas Akanni Martins is suffering from mental disease and he is becoming a nuisance 
to the British public.” Because of this, Mrs. Martins desired that the colonial government 
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“be graciously disposed to repatriate the said Thomas Akanni Martins back to Nigeria 
from the United Kingdom to the place of his birth for treatment where he can be cured of 
the reported malady and be saved from this disgraceful position in which he the said 
Thomas Akanni Martins is now unfortunately placed.”59 When Thomas Martins was 
approached about repatriation, however, he did not wish to return.60 As a result, he was 
not repatriated. 
The cases above are mentioned to illustrate that the opinion of the patient did 
matter to medical and administrative authorities in many instances. Furthermore, most of 
the patients repatriated to Nigeria from the UK were deemed well enough by Nigerian 
medical authorities to be released into the care of their families immediately upon their 
return.  Even in cases where patients were repatriated from the UK on the understanding 
that they would require further institutional care, psychiatric authorities in the UK were 
largely optimistic that they would eventually recover enough to be returned to the care of 
their relatives. Vincent Igara, for example was repatriated on the advice of medical 
authorities in the UK that he “might be liable to relapse so that his reception into a mental 
hospital on arrival is advised, though he might be well enough to leave fairly soon.”61 
 Sometimes Nigerian medical authorities found repatriated mental patients 
recovered enough to return to their families even in cases in which UK medical 
authorities believed the patient would need more institutional care, such as occurred in 
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the cases of Olajide Dairo and James Omoro. This is a possible indication that it may, in 
fact, have been to the patient’s psychological benefit to return to Nigeria as psychiatric 
authorities in the UK suggested. Such a conclusion must be taken with a grain of salt, 
however, as it is also clear that Nigerian medical authorities often had little choice but to 
release patients to relatives due to general overcrowding in Nigeria’s asylums. As L. 
Lambo, Medical Superintendent at Aro Mental Hospital in Abeokuta noted with regard to 
the repatriation of Clement Okoma, a paranoid schizophrenic with suicidal tendencies 
who was repatriated from St. Ebba’s Mental Hospital in London in 1959: 
I am sure you will appreciate the fact that facilities at Aro are limited, especially 
in relation to personnel, and the ever-increasing demand for psychiatric treatment 
in this country has put a great deal of strain on the staff here. I have, at present, on 
my active treatment list over 400 patients with 372 on waiting list…. In the 
circumstances, I am sure, you will understand not only the incredibility of the 
situation but the impossibility of coping with any more patients. 
 
Dr. Lambo went on to lament that even those patients who had been released to the care 
of relatives had been “discharged without any attempt at rehabilitation or follow-up, as 
we have no facilities for this aspect of our psychiatric treatment much as it is desirable 
and essential.” Under such circumstances, Dr. Lambo declared that he could not “see my 
way clear to accept Mr. Okoma for treatment or rehabilitation.” The best he could offer 
was “to see him for opinion and advice on his arrival in this country.”62 Dr. Lambo’s 
statements make it clear that it is quite possible that patients were released to the care of 
their relatives under duress and by no means necessarily because they were adequately 
recovered from their symptoms.  
                                                 
62
 L. Lambo, Medical Superintendent, Aro Hospital, Abeokuta to Chief Medical Adviser, Federal Medical 
Headquarters, Lagos 10 February 1959 NAI MH 59/S.4/C.33/14. 
 179 
 It is therefore difficult to assess with any degree of certainty whether the patient’s 
best interests were actually met through repatriation to Nigeria from mental institutions in 
the UK. It is, however, relatively clear that medical and administrative authorities within 
the UK did genuinely consider patient welfare and interests in their decisions about 
whether or not to push for repatriation. This stands in marked contrast to cases that 
originated within Africa, in which mental patients were primarily treated as lines on an 
expense sheet. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that the considerations about the 
patient’s best interests were very much grounded in conceptions of the “African mind” 
that pathologized Nigerian migrants in the UK as particularly likely to experience mental 
breakdowns due to the inability to cope with “modern” British society. Under such a 
construction, the “best interests” of the patient would almost always lie in extrication 
from such deleterious surroundings and a return to the “primitive” environment in which 
the “African mind” could recover. 
CONCLUSION 
Almost every repatriation request involving a Nigerian mental patient in the UK resulted 
in the repatriation of the patient either to be released to the custody of his or her relations 
or to be placed in an asylum in Nigeria. In many of these cases, medical authorities 
argued that returning to Nigeria was in the patient’s best interests. Despite that fact that 
mental institutions and medical treatment options for mental patients were less available 
and in poorer condition in Nigeria than they were in the UK, psychiatric officials argued 
that mental patients would recover better if they were back in Nigeria.  In such cases, 
analysis of the statements of medical and administrative figures in the UK indicates that 
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this argument was implicitly based on assumptions about the nature of the “African 
mind.” The issue of primary importance to UK medical authorities when deciding 
whether to repatriate mental patients to Nigeria was the need to remove mentally-
disturbed Africans from the stressful surroundings of modern British society which they 
believed to be causing or, at the very least, exacerbating the mental imbalance in the 
patients.  
This argument was made whether the patient was suffering from ailments as 
minor and socially stimulated as episodes of depression caused by lovesickness, as in the 
case of Umebuala Uwuoma, to diseases as severe and biological in nature as paranoid 
schizophrenia and dementia, as in the cases of Nwazue Udumaga, who had claimed to 
have invented a space-travel machine, or Vital Aghagbon, a criminal lunatic who 
believed he was “President of the Bank of Africa, Dean and Director of the World 
Council of African Education, a General of the French Legion of Honour, and a leading 
authority on the Vikings.”63 Despite the variety of diagnoses and the different treatment 
regimens that would be available for each patient when he or she returned to Nigeria, 
medical authorities believed repatriation to be in all their best interests. Arguments about 
the patient’s best interests were also made whether the patient desired to return to Nigeria 
or not. The differences between these individuals therefore seems to have been 
overridden by one overarching similarity: they were all Africans who manifested 
symptoms of mental illness while in the UK, and, as such, it was important for all of their 
fragile “African minds” to be removed from the stressors of British society that had 
contributed to their mental breakdowns. Although it could be argued that familiar 
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surroundings and the support of family and friends was likely to contribute to the 
recovery of many of these patients, this was not the primary argument made by the 
psychiatric authorities. Most important was removing them from Britain, where they 
could not cope, to more “primitive” surroundings, where they presumably had a better 
chance of integrating into society and finding employment. If relatives were willing to 
watch after them, so much the better, but the most important thing was to remove them 
from Britain. 
  More evidence that the idea of the African mind affected how repatriation of 
Nigerian mental patients was treated is clear when the cases from the UK are compared 
to the cases that originated within African colonies. Whereas medical and administrative 
authorities in the UK regularly argued that the repatriation of patients to more familiar 
surroundings would be in the patient’s best interest, colonial medical or administrative 
authorities within Africa never made this argument, preferring instead to argue for or 
against repatriation on the grounds of overcrowding and cost. This strong distinction 
between how repatriation cases were treated is an indication of the racism that influenced 
how both psychiatric and governmental personnel treated “African minds.” The 
assumption clearly was that Nigerians who suffered mental or emotional breakdowns in 
Britain had little chance to recover in such an inhospitable European environment that 
attacked the “primitive” psyches of these variously deranged individuals. However, if 
they were back in Africa, there was a good chance that the absence of such catalysts to 
mental illness would be limited and, therefore, the patient had a better chance at some 
sort of long-term recovery. In these cases repatriation was almost always seen as a 
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beneficial and necessary option: added to which the relatively wealthy government of the 
United Kingdom was always willing to pay the costs of repatriation, something that was 
not always the case on the shoestring budgets of African colonies. However, Nigerians 
who exhibited symptoms of mental illness in another African colony, where conditions 
were similarly “primitive” to those in Nigeria, were not repatriated on the grounds that it 
would be in their own best interests. In fact, they were rarely repatriated at all. When the 
government of the Gold Coast wanted to repatriate mental patients, it did not argue that it 
would be in these patients’ best interests to do so. Instead, medical authorities undertook 
to discharge as many patients as possible, so that they could be repatriated as normal 
destitute British subjects, not as mental patients at all. Some of the Gold Coast patients 
were clearly not recovered enough for discharge, an indication that not only was the 
patient’s best interests not considered in these cases, they were actually undermined.64 
The differences in motivations and outcomes of repatriation cases involving 
mentally-ill Nigerians depending on whether they were to be repatriated from the UK or 
from within Africa serves as a strong indication of the extent to which racist conceptions 
of the “African mind” implicitly influenced the way that decisions were made about the 
needs, interests, and futures of these individual Nigerians. At the same time, the cases 
discussed here serve to illuminate the construction of a knowledge base positing that 
Africans belonged in Africa for their own good. This definition of the “African mind,” 
created by colonial psychologists in colonial Africa, therefore contributed to how 
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Africans were defined, controlled, and treated not only within the British Empire but in 
other parts of the world as well.
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Chapter 5 
Repatriation of Mentally-Ill Pilgrims 
INTRODUCTION 
In March of 1954 a man named Daud al Hausawi was repatriated to Nigeria from Sudan. 
Daud was a “lunatic” whose origins within Nigeria were unknown, but his ethnic 
background was determined to be Hausa and he claimed to be from “near Zinder” in 
northern Nigeria. He was held in the Kano Native Authority Lunatic Asylum until such 
time as his origins could be traced. It is unclear what happened to Daud after he returned 
to Nigeria: perhaps he was retained in the asylum for a long period; perhaps his relatives 
were traced and he was released into their custody. In either case, Daud’s treatment 
would have been well within normal parameters for dealing with repatriated mental 
patients. What is unique about the repatriation of Daud al Hausawi is what kind of 
migrant he was. Daud had “presumably been engaged on the pilgrimage” to Mecca - one 
of the Five Pillars of Islam – a holy mission demanded once in the lifetime of all devout 
Muslims who have the physical and pecuniary means to undertake it.1 What is even more 
interesting is that Daud’s appears to be the only repatriation case regarding a mentally-ill 
pilgrim to have come to the attention of the central colonial administration in Lagos over 
the entire period of British rule in Nigeria.  
The paucity of documentary records regarding mentally-ill Nigerian pilgrims is 
puzzling, but this very paucity ultimately contributes substantially to the idea that 
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colonial psychiatric definitions of the “African mind” implicitly influenced how 
governments treated mentally-ill Nigerians not only in Nigeria, but wherever they 
traveled in Africa, Europe, or elsewhere, including on overland pilgrimage through the 
Sudan to Saudi Arabia. British efforts to control the overland pilgrimage during the 
colonial period conformed very closely to those that governed the repatriation of mental 
patients in motivations and processes, i.e. desire to reduce public expenditure and the 
possibility of public nuisance or embarrassment on the one hand, and the desire to do 
what was in the colonial subject’s “best interests” on the other. As a result, the 
administrative and bureaucratic machinery for repatriation of distressed or destitute 
pilgrims from Saudi Arabia to Sudan was firmly in place by the late 1920s.  
However, since the ability to repatriate destitute pilgrims existed and was 
frequently utilized, the question therefore must be addressed why Daud al Hausawi is the 
only documented case of repatriation of a mentally-ill Nigerian pilgrim in central 
government files from the colonial era. It is possible, but extremely unlikely, that there 
simply were not mentally-ill Nigerian pilgrims. It is possible, and somewhat more likely, 
that repatriation cases of mentally-ill pilgrims were not handled by the central 
government in Lagos, but by Native Authority governments in the various provinces of 
northern Nigeria, who could opt to pay for the repatriation of mentally-ill pilgrims with 
funds from Native Treasuries. It is also possible that mentally-ill Nigerian pilgrims were 
treated exactly as any other distressed or destitute pilgrim and were repatriated only as far 
as Sudan, where they were expected to incorporate themselves into existing communities 
of Nigerian migrant pilgrims and find work in the cotton fields to pay their way home.  
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Given the lack of documentary record, none of these hypotheses can be proven 
beyond a shadow of a doubt, but all of them do lead to the same conclusion vis a vis the 
implicit importance of colonial psychiatric definitions of the “African mind” on the 
control of Nigerian immigration. As in cases from other African colonies, it seems that 
the “best interests” of mentally-ill Nigerian pilgrims was not the primary consideration 
when deciding repatriation procedure. Of far more importance when repatriating Nigerian 
pilgrims was the desire on the part of the Government of Nigeria to maintain good 
relations with the Saudi government by preventing large numbers of destitute Nigerians 
from clogging the streets of Mecca and Medina. Secondarily, the Government of Nigeria 
was interested in keeping expenditure on pilgrim repatriations low; as a result, 
repatriation of pilgrims only covered their travel from the port of Jeddah, in Saudi Arabia, 
across the Red Sea to Suakin, from where pilgrims were expected to make their own way 
home. It is likely that in some cases, destitute pilgrims appealed to their own Native 
Authority government in Nigeria to repatriate them from Native Treasury accounts, but 
the Native Authority certainly had the right to refuse, and it is unlikely that someone 
suffering from mental illness would have the presence of mind to apply for such aid.  
Despite the lack of documentary record, it therefore seems reasonable to conclude 
that mentally-ill Nigerian pilgrims were treated much the same as any other distressed or 
destitute pilgrim. As in the cases of mentally-ill Nigerians in other British African 
colonies, there was no sense of political or medical urgency on the part of the 
Government of Nigeria to repatriate mentally-ill pilgrims. Whereas governments of other 
African colonies were eager to relieve themselves of the liability of maintaining 
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mentally-ill Nigerians, the Government of Sudan had few such compunctions, since there 
were outlets for the social and economic incorporation of Nigerians, mentally-ill or 
otherwise, in Sudan. Medically, treatment options and social surroundings for mentally-
ill pilgrims would have been largely the same in Sudan as in Nigeria from the colonial 
government’s point of view – and, indeed, both were British-governed colonies -  
therefore the “best interests” of the patient were not an issue in the same way that they 
were with repatriations from the UK. Conditions were similarly “primitive” in both 
colonies, and therefore there would be little to gain medically by repatriating mentally-ill 
pilgrims beyond Sudan. As a result the central government in Lagos does not appear to 
have had any interest in the repatriation of mentally-ill pilgrims, certainly less than it had 
in the repatriation of mentally-ill Nigerians resident in the UK. From a psychiatric 
perspective, therefore, it appears, although it cannot be proved, that the same kind of 
implicit understanding of the “African mind” that affected how mentally-ill Nigerians in 
other British-governed African colonies were treated justified the way that mentally-ill 
pilgrims were treated as well. 
PILGRIMAGE CONTROL: MOTIVES AND METHODS 
Muslims from the area of what is now northern Nigeria have been making the pilgrimage 
to Mecca since roughly the twelfth century, AD.2 Until the twentieth century, the number 
of pilgrims was small, the voyage unregulated. The journey was primarily undertaken 
only by nobility or the exceedingly wealthy, the only people who could afford to embark 
on such a long and dangerous journey. For the most part, only the ruling classes in the 
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savanna region of northern Nigeria had converted to Islam prior to the jihad of Usman 
dan Fodio that established the historic Sokoto Caliphate in the first decade of the 
nineteenth century, and even afterward the average Hausa, Fulani, or Bornuan would not 
have had the means to undertake the pilgrimage. Although historically pilgrims from 
northern Nigeria had been few, their numbers increased dramatically with the onset of 
British colonial rule in the region in the first decade of the twentieth century. Bawa 
Yamba has given multiple reasons for the surge in pilgrims from northern Nigeria at this 
time. Many Muslims in the area viewed the British conquest of the theocratic Sokoto 
Caliphate as an apocalyptic omen marking the onset of a new and decidedly evil regime. 
Large numbers of Muslims fled the region after the collapse of the Caliphate, many 
embarking on pilgrimage to Mecca and some heading east to Sudan to aid in the Mahdist 
uprising against British colonial interests there.3 While the establishment of British 
colonial rule in northern Nigeria influenced many people’s decision to leave the area, 
Bawa Yamba argues that over time the colonial infrastructure also facilitated many 
Muslims’ journey to Mecca, “making travel comparatively easy” and offering pilgrims 
“opportunities for working en route” to Mecca.4  
The number of pilgrims from northern Nigeria undertaking the pilgrimage 
annually is difficult to determine before the 1950s. Efforts were not made to count 
pilgrims from the region until the 1920s, and even after the institution of pilgrimage 
controls and censuses the numbers were widely skewed due to the fact that large numbers 
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of pilgrims did not submit themselves to the routinized process of the pilgrimage, 
preferring instead to avoid the fees, inoculations, and other hassles associated with the 
formal pilgrimage process. Even so, colonial officials did make some estimations of the 
number of Nigerian pilgrims engaged in the pilgrimage. As early as 1912, H.R. Palmer, 
the District Officer of Bornu, in northeastern Nigeria, submitted a report along with the 
Emir of Katsina, one of the largest city-states in northern Nigeria, indicating that roughly 
30,000 West African pilgrims resided in the Sudan at that time. Seven years later, Palmer 
submitted another report estimating that this number had risen to between 50,000 and 
60,000.5 In 1929, a total number of 2,338 West African pilgrims left Sudan at Suakin to 
travel to Jeddah, and the vast majority of these were probably Hausas from northern 
Nigeria. By 1938 this number had risen to 6,046, and again to 9,881 in 1947.6 
 The rapid increase in the number of Nigerians going on pilgrimage was evident to 
British colonial administrators by the years after World War I, and from the early 1920s, 
measures were undertaken to control the movement of pilgrims in the perceived best 
interests of both the British colonial government and the pilgrims themselves. Prior the 
1950s, when air travel became the fastest and easiest way to make the journey from 
Nigeria to Arabia, most Nigerian pilgrims traveled to Mecca overland across the 
savannas of northern Nigeria and Chad to the Sudan, making their way to the Red Sea, 
where they crossed into Arabia at Suakin. The journey was long, nearly two thousand 
miles, and treacherous. Hunger, thirst, disease, exposure to the elements, as well as the 
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threat of robbery and violence at the hands of others faced pilgrims along their journey. 
Many died along the way. Still others, made destitute and vulnerable by their journey, fell 
victim to slave raiders in Arabia. As indicated in a confidential memorandum from the 
Secretary of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria to the Chief Secretariat in Lagos in 1922: 
Slavery is rife in the Hejaz and there is no doubt there is a considerable traffic in 
women and children from Nigeria and the Sudan. The Emir was asked if he had 
brought no children for sale, and I met a string of some forty to fifty Hausa and 
Fulani girls carrying water who, I learnt had recently been bought by various 
Notables, sold, I gather, by relations or friends whom they had accompanied on 
the pilgrimage. The purchase of slaves is, of course, not illegal and even Arab 
girls are dealt in. A think [sic] that greatly shocked the Emir. 
Many adults also drift into practical slavery. Either they have spent all 
their money or have been robbed and cannot pay their passages back to Suakin, 
and they endeavour to earn money by acting as porters or “servants” to Arab 
notables. In the former case they may preserve their independence, in the latter 
they probably find that when they wish to leave, there is some technical difficulty 
and they are forced to enter on another contract of service, while their children are 
simply “domestic slaves”.7 
  
Even when no such catastrophe befell pilgrims, many still found it impossible to 
complete the trek in one continuous journey, finding it necessary to stop along the way 
and work for the money that would allow them to continue their voyage. It took the 
average pilgrim anywhere from several months to several years to travel from Nigeria to 
Mecca. Many did not finish at all, settling in the Sudan as “permanent pilgrims”, always 
declaring their intention to continue towards Mecca but never able to do so. Those who 
succeeded in reaching Mecca faced the same hardships on their return to Nigeria; most 
were significantly poorer than they had been when they had left home.  
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The first efforts on the part of British colonial administrators in Nigeria to 
regulate the process of the pilgrimage were based largely on the humanitarian interests of 
the pilgrims themselves. As early as 1919, H.R. Palmer had suggested that colonial 
officials undertake some form of pilgrimage control “not only in the interests of Nigeria 
as a country, but in the interest of the people themselves… so as to ensure as little human 
waste as possible.”8 He suggested that pilgrims should be issues special pilgrim’s 
passports indicating their name and place of origin. Pilgrims should be required to 
provide proof that those traveling with them were family members and not unknown 
persons that could easily be sold into slavery on along the way. Perhaps most 
importantly, Palmer suggested that pilgrims should be required to make a deposit large 
enough to cover the cost of the pilgrimage, including transportation to and from the 
Hejaz, inoculation and quarantine fees in Suakin, and a small stipend for subsistence, 
before leaving Nigeria. This would ensure that pilgrims would not become destitute along 
the way and would be able to complete their journeys with relatively little hardship. 
Palmer’s proposals were not immediately instituted, however. It would take more 
pressing economic and political considerations to instigate a plan of pilgrimage control. 
In 1921 alone, the colonial government had paid over •317 on the repatriation of destitute 
pilgrims and decided that the existing system whereby the central government paid the 
charges was economically burdensome and a new system would have to be developed.9 
In 1922, colonial officials founded the Nigerian Repatriation Fund to offset the cost to the 
central government of paying for the repatriation of destitute pilgrims from Arabia. The 
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fund was fed from contributions by each of the Native Administrations in northern 
Nigeria as a percentage of their overall revenue. The Repatriation Fund authorized  the 
British Agent at Jeddah to advance sufficient funds to a legitimately destitute pilgrim to 
purchase a steamer ticket across the Red Sea to Suakin. Once in Sudan, the pilgrim was 
expected to find work and pay his own way back to Nigeria.10 The Repatriation Fund 
therefore filled a humanitarian purpose in that it aided distressed Nigerians in leaving the 
Hejaz, where they were most vulnerable to violence, possible enslavement, and the threat 
of hunger and thirst, to the Sudan where opportunities for employment and self-
sufficiency were greater. However, the motivation for establishing the Repatriation Fund 
was also economic insofar as it defrayed the cost of repatriating distressed pilgrims from 
the central government in Lagos to the Native Administrations which had the most 
immediate jurisdiction over pilgrims, the vast majority of which hailed from the 
provinces of northern Nigeria.   
Political concerns precipitated a much more aggressive pilgrimage control scheme 
after 1925. In 1925, Ibn Saud conquered the Hejaz, the region of Arabia that contained 
the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, incorporating them into the new Wahhabist state of 
Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud immediately embarked on a campaign to “purify” the pilgrimage, 
which included bringing much more organization to pilgrim traffic and greater control 
over the duration of pilgrims’ stay in Saudi Arabia. These measures had major 
implications on the Nigerian pilgrimage, which up to 1925 had placed very limited 
controls on the pilgrimage. The Saudi regime was quite distressed by the lack of control 
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that the colonial government of Nigeria exercised over its pilgrimage. According to 
Abdullah Damluji, the Director of Foreign Affairs for Saudi Arabia in 1926: 
they [Nigerian pilgrims] come to the Hejaz running away and holding no 
passports or any official documents such as are usually issued to pilgrims by their 
Governments when they leave, and… their presence now in this country is 
worrying the inhabitants because they bother people by always begging for food 
in a disturbing manner….11 
 
In 1922, it had been estimated that there were as many as 4,000 Nigerian pilgrims 
residing semi-permanently in Jeddah alone, not to mention those tarrying around the holy 
cities of Mecca and Medina.12 
 The Saudis also complained that pilgrims from British-controlled territories of 
Nigeria and Sudan regularly crossed the Red Sea at random points on the Sudanese coast 
and entered the Hejaz illegally at some point other than Jeddah, which was the only 
authorized port of entry for maritime pilgrimage vessels.13 The Saudis therefore requested 
that the British  
secure a good method of their [pilgrims] coming in a regular legal manner, 
providing them with passports when they wish to leave and giving strict warnings 
to such people to limit their visit to this country as much as possible and that it 
should only be for visiting the “Beit Muazzam” Kaaba (the great house) during 
the season months, to lighten the pressure of their presence in the country and to 
decrease their harms.14 
 
 The British colonial governments in Nigerian and Sudan had little choice but to 
consent to the Saudi request. The Saudis made it clear that if stricter pilgrimage controls 
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were not enacted, then Saudi authorities reserved the right to “take the necessary steps to 
prevent them from landing at such ports and places on the coast in order to protect their 
lives and rights.”15 Therefore, to refuse at this point to enact stricter pilgrimage controls 
would have aggravated Saudi opinion of the British colonial governments of Nigeria and 
Sudan as well as that of the Muslim populations of Nigeria and Sudan, who now faced 
the prospect of trekking two thousand miles on pilgrimage only to have their entry into 
Arabia blocked by Saudi authorities.  
 A second political consideration influencing the decision of British colonial 
governments in Nigerian and Sudan to institute pilgrimage control was the enactment of 
the International Sanitary Convention of 1926. The convention, to which Britain was 
signatory, required that all pilgrims undergo quarantine for cholera, smallpox, and yellow 
fever and charged port authorities to prevent the embarkation of any pilgrim showing 
symptoms of any of these illnesses. The convention also required that governments 
maintain a sanitary service in their port areas capable of carrying out such prophylactic 
measures.16 Under the convention pilgrims were required to purchase round-trip steamer 
tickets and were obliged to cross the Red Sea only in “mechanically propelled ships.”17 
The British colonial governments in Sudan and Nigeria were compelled to act in 
accordance with the stipulations of the convention. The colonial government of Sudan 
went above and beyond the obligations of the convention, instituting mandatory cholera 
and smallpox vaccinations for all pilgrims crossing the Red Sea from Suakin to the 




 “International Sanitary Convention of 1926,” Paris, 21 June 1926, articles 13 and 14. This document can 
be found in the treaty records of each individual signatory country. In the case of the United States, the 
document is contained in Treaty Series (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1928), no. 762. 
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Hejaz. In order to comply with the will of the Saudi regime and the international 
community represented by the International Sanitary Convention, the Government of 
Nigeria embarked in 1926 on a large-scale pilgrimage control program known as the 
Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme. 
The Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme followed many of the recommendations that had 
been made by Palmer in 1919, regulating the movement, money and identification of 
pilgrims on their journey from Nigeria to Mecca. Although the Scheme suffered from 
many impediments to perfect implementation, the ideal procedure taken by pilgrims 
under the scheme went as follows. Pilgrims applied to their own local Native 
Administration for a passport and paid a deposit of five pounds sterling to cover the 
multitudinous costs incurred during the pilgrimage: passport dues, vaccination, 
inoculation and quarantine fees, round trip steamer ticket from Suakin to Jeddah, Hejaz 
entrance fees, and fees to be paid to local chiefs in the Hejaz for their services in 
orienting newly-arrived pilgrims. After leaving this deposit with their local Native 
Administration, pilgrims traveled to Maiduguri, near the northeastern border of Nigeria, 
where they received their passport and a metal disc bearing the passport number in case 
of loss of the original passport. Pilgrims then proceeded to the Sudan by whatever route 
and form of transportation they chose. Once pilgrims arrived in Suakin, they were met by 
the local African Sheikh of Pilgrims and taken for vaccination and inoculation. 
Afterwards, they were remitted a portion of their deposit sufficient to purchase a round-
trip steamer ticket to Jeddah. Pilgrims then went on to Jeddah to complete the pilgrimage. 
On return, pilgrims presented to the British Legation in Jeddah, where they were given 
                                                                                                                                                 
17
 Ibid., articles 93 and 94. 
 196 
their return steamer ticket and the balance of their deposit, to be used for subsistence on 
the return journey. Once back in the Sudan, pilgrims were expected to fend for 
themselves on the return journey to Nigeria.  
Although conceived in 1926, the Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme was not first 
enacted until the pilgrimage season of 1933-34, at which point it was instituted strictly on 
a voluntary basis. According to government of Nigeria officials, the idea was that the 
Scheme had to be instituted slowly so as not to invite the dissent of Muslim subjects by 
radically altering established pilgrimage procedure. The goal, as expressed by the 
Governor of Nigeria in 1928, was to promote the Scheme among the “better class” of 
Nigerian Muslims, i.e., those wealthy enough to pay a large deposit on short notice. Once 
wealthy pilgrims had successfully endured the Scheme, it was hoped that they would 
spread the word about the scheme to the point that it would “get the benefits of the new 
system so appreciated by the better class pilgrim as to become sought after by a 
majority”.  Once most pilgrims were already convinced that the Scheme was in their best 
interests, colonial officials believed it could be made compulsory.18 
Two issues prevented the Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme from working effectively 
in its early years. First, the voluntary basis of the Scheme meant that the vast majority of 
pilgrims continued to perform the pilgrimage without sufficient funds and without taking 
the proper route across the Red Sea from Suakin to Jeddah. Second, many prospective 
pilgrims balked at the provisions of the Scheme, most notably the vaccination, 
inoculation and quarantine procedures. These were invasive and rather expensive 
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procedures, and most pilgrims sought to avoid them if they could. After 1926, it was 
impossible for pilgrims to embark from Suakin to Jeddah without undergoing these 
procedures. As a result, thousands of pilgrims, many of them Nigerian, chose to 
circumvent Suakin, moving beyond Sudan to the port of Massawa in the neighboring 
Italian colony of Eritrea where they crossed the Red Sea illegally via sambuk. Until the 
mid-1930s, Italian authorities made very little effort to impose vaccination and quarantine 
controls, which meant that pilgrims who passed through Massawa arrived not only at an 
unauthorized point of entry in Arabia, but also that they did not have the required 
certificates of health to make their presence in the Hejaz legal. 
Although the British Agent at Jeddah announced that the Pilgrimage Scheme in its 
first season “must be accounted a success,” there were strong indications that the 
voluntary nature of the Scheme was hindering its overall effectiveness. The British Agent 
himself recognized that  
nearly all those benefiting by the scheme belonged to a relatively speaking well-
to-do class, who in the past would have made their way unostentatiously in and 
out of the Hejaz without bringing themselves to the notice of the Legation in any 
way, and that the poorer Nigerian, who has been the chief nuisance to the 
Legation in the past, has not been brought under the scheme.19 
 
The Governor-General of the Sudan corroborated this statement in 1929, noting that poor 
pilgrims had no real incentive to avail themselves of the Scheme, stating: 
Indeed it is, I think, self-evident that the Nigerian Government cannot reach even 
an approximate achievement of the aims set out while the scheme outlined 
remains on a voluntary basis, for it is not to be anticipated that any but the strictly 
limited class of well-to-do pilgrims, of the type which carries money rather than 
earns it upon the route, will voluntarily pay a deposit of approximately •6 and 
commit themselves irrevocably to make a through journey, which has been 
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especially “speeded up” in both directions, by a specified route. The poor pilgrim 
– and such will always constitute the vast majority – has no incentive for so 
restricting his freedom, but has on the other hand, good economic reasons and a 
natural inherent predilection for preserving his liberty to halt en route where and 
for whatever time he pleases.20 
 
Indeed, the voluntary nature of the Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme failed to regulate 
the majority of the pilgrim traffic from Nigeria. This ultimately caused great 
embarrassment and economic waste for the colonial government of Nigeria when Saudi 
authorities began expelling destitute West Africans from the Hejaz in the late 1920s. In 
1927, approximately one thousand destitute West African pilgrims were transported 
across the Red Sea to Suakin. Upon arrival it became clear to British officials that the 
vast majority of these pilgrims held no return steamer tickets and had avoided vaccination 
and quarantine by crossing the Red Sea illegally at Massawa.21 Another five hundred 
pilgrims were repatriated from Jeddah in 1931, and, again, most had crossed into the 
Hejaz illegally through Massawa.22 A further 1,491 destitute West African pilgrims were 
repatriated in 1934-35,23 1,368 of whom had crossed into the Hejaz via Massawa.24 Such 
incidents strained relations between Saudi authorities and the colonial British 
governments in Sudan and Nigeria and also put pressure on the Repatriation Fund, which 
had to be supplied with enough money to pay the transport of these destitute pilgrims to 
Suakin and their quarantine dues on arrival. As a result of these relatively frequent mass 
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repatriations, the government of Nigeria decided to abandon the voluntary basis for the 
Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme, making it obligatory for all pilgrims as of the 1938-39 
pilgrimage season. 
WHERE ARE THE MENTALLY-ILL PILGRIMS? 
The establishment of the Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme was motivated by many of the 
same factors that motivated the Governments of Nigeria, the UK and other British-
governed African colonies to repatriate mentally-ill Nigerians. As discussed in Chapters 3 
and 4, arguments for or against the repatriation of mental patients were couched in 
political, economic, and humanitarian rhetoric. When mental patients were to be 
repatriated from other British-controlled colonies in Africa, governmental negotiations on 
whether to repatriate were based on the political need to redistribute West African mental 
patients so as to relieve the public embarrassment of overcrowded asylums and the 
possibility that a mentally-ill Nigerian might become a public nuisance in a host country, 
the economic need to reduce public expenditure by removing non-indigenous mental 
patients from colonial asylums, and the humanitarian discussion of whether conditions 
would be improved for the patient by repatriating, which, in most cases, they would not. 
Repatriation of mental patients between British-governed colonies was quite rare because 
it could not be argued that conditions in overcrowded Nigerian asylums were any better 
for the patient than they were in other British-governed colonies and because the country 
doing the repatriating most often bore the burden of paying the costs of the repatriation.  
On the other hand, when mental patients were repatriated to Nigeria from the UK, 
occasional mention of the desire to prevent the possibility of patients becoming a public 
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charge in the UK was made, but by and large, arguments for or against the repatriation of 
the patient were based on what was in the patient’s “best interests,” with best interests 
being defined within the psychiatric constructs of the fragile, “primitive” “African mind” 
incapable of assimilating effectively into “modern” British society. As a result, medical 
and governmental authorities overwhelmingly believed that most Nigerian patients’ best 
interests were better served by repatriating them from the UK to more familiar 
surroundings despite the superior medical treatment that they could receive in the UK. 
When Nigerian mental patients turned up in non-British countries or colonies, political 
considerations guaranteed a speedy repatriation so as to avoid minor international 
incidents. 
The same kinds of political, economic, and humanitarian goals informed the 
Government of Nigeria’s establishment of pilgrimage control policies in the form of the 
Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme. Politically, the provision of pilgrims’ passports and the 
requirement of vaccination, inoculation and quarantine brought the governments of 
Nigeria and Sudan into line with prevailing international opinions on the proper 
regulation of pilgrimage traffic that had been developed since the mid-nineteenth century 
and which had been most recently updated in the International Sanitary Convention of 
1926.25 These elements of the Scheme also showed Nigerian efforts to comply with the 
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desires of the Saudi authorities, thereby maintaining an important relationship with the 
government that administered the holy sites of the world’s, and Nigeria’s, Muslim 
population. These measures further guaranteed that Nigerian pilgrims could be accounted 
for and that they would not become public nuisances in their host countries either as 
destitutes or health risks. The creation of the Repatriation Fund also contributed to these 
political goals by providing a system through which Nigerian pilgrims who became 
public nuisances in the Hejaz could be removed quickly and with minimal bureaucratic 
hassle. The need to avoid the possibility of public embarrassment by controlling the 
migration of Nigerian subjects therefore broadly influenced both decisions regarding the 
repatriation of mental patients from abroad and the establishment of pilgrimage controls. 
Economic considerations also affected both the enactment of pilgrimage controls 
and the repatriation process for mentally-ill Nigerians. The deposit system set up under 
the Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme was meant to reduce the burden on the Native 
Administrations supplying the Repatriation Fund by ensuring that pilgrims would have 
enough money to complete the pilgrimage and therefore would not have to call on the 
Repatriation Fund to relieve them in a time of penury, a system that correlated generally 
with the efforts of the Government of Nigeria to persuade relatives of mentally-ill 
Nigerians abroad to pay for the repatriation of their loved ones. . 
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The humanitarian motivations behind the establishment of the Nigerian 
Pilgrimage Scheme also mirrored the humanitarian concerns elaborated in repatriation 
cases involving mentally-ill Nigerians. The Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme was considered 
an improvement on the prevailing unregulated system of pilgrim traffic in that it helped 
to ensure that all pilgrims were accounted for and that they had the necessary means to 
complete their voyage, thereby limiting pilgrims’ likelihood of facing such hardships as 
starvation, thirst, illness, or enslavement. Government officials widely believed that 
Nigerian pilgrims had little chance of working their way out of destitution while in the 
Hejaz. Therefore, the establishment of the Repatriation Fund and the deposit system were 
meant to remove pilgrims from surrounding social conditions in a foreign country that 
were seen to be contributing to their miserable states, just as medical and administrative 
authorities believed that social conditions contributed to the instability of mentally-ill 
Nigerians in a culturally foreign country like the UK in particular. 
If the motivations for establishing Nigerian pilgrimage controls were much the 
same as the motivations governing the treatment of repatriation cases involving mentally-
ill Nigerians and the administrative machinery existed for the repatriation of distressed 
pilgrims in the form of the Repatriation Fund, which was used to repatriate thousands of 
Nigerians from Jeddah to Suakin between the 1920s and 1950s, the question which must 
be asked is why there are not documented cases of mentally-ill Nigerian pilgrims on the 
same scale that there are cases of mentally-ill Nigerians in other parts of the world. There 
are several possible answers to this question. The first and, perhaps, most obvious theory 
is that there simply were no mentally-ill Nigerian pilgrims. This suggestion seems highly 
 203 
implausible for several reasons. First, the physical and emotional stressors associated 
with the overland pilgrimage were severe, certainly as severe as those faced by migrants 
to other parts of Africa or the UK. Pilgrims left their familiar homes on a long journey 
that exposed them to many new places, peoples, and societies, just as did migrants to 
other regions. Pilgrims faced real physical danger in the form of starvation, thirst, 
destitution, exposure to the elements, armed robbery, and possible enslavement. They 
faced the possibility of illness and death, and the possibility that loved ones traveling 
with them would fall ill or die as well. Certainly the process of pilgrimage was 
psychologically taxing enough to cause a mental breakdown in an otherwise healthy 
individual. Certainly European colonial powers believed that Muslims were capable of 
succumbing to mental illness, hajj-induced or otherwise. Often cloaked in the discourse 
of the “Arab mind”, Muslims were pathologized as inferior to Europeans in much the 
same way that non-Christian, non-Muslim black Africans were. European colonial 
psychiatrists saw mental illness and criminality as endemic to Muslim communities in 
Africa, particularly in Francophone colonies.26 
Second, we have some scant evidence that individuals did succumb to the 
pressures of traveling east. The case of Daud al Hausawi, mentioned at the outset of this 
chapter is one specific case of a pilgrim suffering from mental illness Although Daud’s is 
the only case in which a mentally-ill person repatriated from east of Nigeria on account 
of mental illness was specifically identified as a pilgrim, there are two cases of 
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individuals whose repatriation to Nigeria from Cairo was requested in the 1920s due to 
mental breakdown. In 1924, a Nigerian named Sam Bassi requested repatriation from 
Cairo and authorities there encouraged the repatriation on the grounds that “this person is, 
or shortly will be, interned in a lunatic asylum.”27 However, governmental authorities in 
Nigeria declared that “there is nothing… to suggest that Sam Bassi was making a 
pilgrimage to Mecca”, and, since the Repatriation Fund was not to be used at Cairo in any 
case, the government declined to pay for his repatriation.28 The other case of a mentally-
ill migrant in Cairo came later in 1924. A man named Ismail Ayinda Shitta was placed in 
hospital in Cairo “suffering from nervous complaint”, and the doctor at the British 
Consulate recommended his removal from Egypt.29 The Government of Nigeria was able 
to secure a deposit of •100 from Shitta’s parents for his repatriation.30 Again, there was 
no indication, however, that Shitta was a pilgrim and the Repatriation Fund was not used 
to repatriate him from Cairo. Although Bassi and Shitta were probably not pilgrims, their 
cases do serve as evidence of the capacity for mental breakdown of Nigerians traveling 
east as well as to other parts of Africa and the UK. 
Other arguments for the lack of mentally-ill Nigerian pilgrims can be conceived, 
but are equally unlikely. It could be argued that Nigerian pilgrims, in fact, did not 
undergo the same kind of social stress as other Nigerian migrants because there were 
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communities of Nigerians all along the route between Nigeria and Mecca which allowed 
for some form of social continuity for itinerant pilgrims. However, the same could be 
argued for Nigerian migrants elsewhere in the world. Ethnically-based communities of 
peoples indigenous to Nigeria dotted the West African landscape as well, and a large 
West African community, many of whom were Nigerian in origin, existed in London and 
other British cities, offering a familiar social outlet for newly-arrived Nigerian migrants. 
The existence of such communities did not prevent some Nigerians in these places from 
developing symptoms of mental illness. It therefore seems unlikely that their existence 
along the pilgrimage route would prevent this phenomenon amongst Nigerian pilgrims.  
It could also be suggested that the institution of the Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme 
might have prevented those who suffered from chronic forms of mental illness from 
undertaking the pilgrimage in the first place, since they would be unlikely to be able to 
pay a •5 deposit before leaving and the forced contact with the local Native 
Administration offered an opportunity for the local government to recognize signs of 
mental illness in prospective pilgrims and to get them into custody or, at the very least, 
disallow them from embarking on the pilgrimage. This argument is reasonable, but highly 
unlikely to have curbed the numbers of mentally-ill pilgrims for two reasons. First, the 
same kind of barriers to exiting the country existed for most persons who left Nigeria for 
the UK. Only stowaways could conceivably have traveled alone to the UK with any 
significant, pre-existing mental illness. Students had to show the capacity of mind to pass 
exams and get accepted into British schools. Seamen had to have the wherewithal to get 
hired by a shipping firm and to perform their duties while in transit to the UK. Despite 
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these seeming migratory barriers, Nigerians from many different backgrounds - sailors, 
students, soldiers, etc. - suffered symptoms of mental illness while in Britain and were 
repatriated to Nigeria.  It therefore seems unlikely that creating migratory controls for 
pilgrims would have been very effective at preventing persons from suffering symptoms 
of mental illness while on pilgrimage. Added to the difficulty of controlling the 
movement of mentally-ill pilgrims, the Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme remained voluntary 
for several years and, even after it was made compulsory, pilgrims still had little 
difficulty crossing the porous colonial borders between Nigeria and the Red Sea. 
Prospective pilgrims suffering from mental illness would have had little difficulty leaving 
Nigeria to travel east if they so chose. 
There is, therefore, a high likelihood that mentally-ill pilgrims existed in 
comparable percentages to other kinds of migrants. Why, then, does the documentary 
record in archives of the central colonial government of Nigeria not reflect this? It is 
possible that such records may have been destroyed over time, but, given the prevalence 
of similar files discussing mentally-ill migrants from other regions, this seems highly 
unlikely. The more likely explanation is that such cases did not come to the attention of 
the central government in Lagos and, as such, the central government has no files relating 
to the repatriation of mentally-ill pilgrims as it does for migrants from other African 
colonies or countries outside of Africa.  If a mentally-ill Nigerian pilgrim turned up in the 
Hejaz somewhere, most likely the pilgrim was transported to Suakin and the cost simply 
debited from the Repatriation Fund, which was supplied annually with funds from the 
Native Administrations of Nigeria. In such cases, any correspondence would have been 
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strictly between the British Agent at Jeddah and the Government of Sudan, which had to 
be prepared to accept the pilgrim for quarantine and then send him on his way.  
Once in Sudan, presumably the pilgrim could apply through his own local Native 
Administration for repatriation all the way to Nigeria. Native Administrations would then 
seek out the relatives of the pilgrim, ask if they could contribute to the cost of their loved 
one’s repatriation, and then make a decision on whether or not to support the repatriation 
of the mentally-ill pilgrim. In most cases, the pilgrim’s family was probably nearly as 
poor as the destitute pilgrim himself, and would not be able to contribute to the costs of 
repatriating their relative. Native Administrations in northern Nigeria were also 
underfunded owing to the poor economy of the region. It is therefore unlikely that the 
Native Administration would have been very excited about the prospect of paying for the 
repatriation of mentally-ill pilgrims without some guarantee that they would be refunded 
by the pilgrim’s family. Indeed, Native Administrations already contributed to the 
Repatriation Fund to aid such destitute pilgrims on their voyage home. As such, it seems 
unlikely that many mentally-ill pilgrims would have been repatriated beyond Sudan, 
where they would have been in the position of having to fend for themselves like all other 
pilgrims. At no point, apparently, did the central government get involved with 
repatriation cases involving pilgrims, mentally-ill or not, after the establishment of the 
Repatriation Fund, or there would presumably be some record of the cases that came to 
the central government’s attention. Daud al Hausawi’s case in 1954 is the only instance 
of the central government in Lagos having anything to do with a repatriated pilgrim after 
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1922, and even in this case Daud was already in Nigeria by the time the central 
government was contacted. 
PILGRIMAGE AND THE “AFRICAN MIND” 
What can we conclude about the relationship between ethnopsychiatric definitions of 
mental illness in the “African mind” as it relates to the repatriation of Nigerian pilgrims? 
Without documentary records, it is difficult to determine exactly what was in the minds 
of medical or administrative personnel who may have come in contact with mentally-ill 
pilgrims. However, the fact that such cases did not come to the attention of the central 
government in ways that cases from other regions did does tell us some things about the 
relative unimportance of the issue of mental illness among pilgrims to officials in the 
Government of Nigeria. The lack of documentary evidence leads to the conclusion that 
mentally ill pilgrims were not treated any differently than any other pilgrim, and the most 
help that other pilgrims could receive towards repatriation was the payment through the 
Repatriation fund of transport costs from Jeddah to Suakin. Once back in Sudan, pilgrims 
were unlikely to be repatriated any further at government expense.  
Therefore, when comparing the repatriation of mentally-ill pilgrims to other 
mentally ill migrants, it appears that mentally-ill pilgrims were repatriated on much the 
same terms as mentally-ill Nigerians in other British-governed African colonies. In cases 
where mentally-ill patients were to be transferred between African colonies within the 
British Empire, repatriation was only proposed or undertaken if one government thought 
it could significantly reduce its public expenditure or its potential for public nuisance and 
embarrassment by relieving itself of Nigerian mental patients. Very few repatriations 
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were ever conducted on these grounds, primarily because the government of Nigeria did 
not believe that conditions would be better for the patient upon returning to Nigeria. This 
situation largely matches that which was faced by mentally-ill pilgrims, who were 
repatriated from Saudi Arabia to Sudan to avoid the public embarrassment of having 
mentally-ill or otherwise distressed and destitute Nigerians burdening a foreign state, but 
who likely were not repatriated any further for economic reasons. The argument could 
easily be made that conditions for mentally-ill Nigerians in the Sudan were largely the 
same as they would be back in Nigeria, where asylums were overcrowded, medical 
treatment could not be obtained, and where relatives may or may not be financially 
capable of caring for them.  
The situation faced by mentally-ill Nigerian pilgrims differs significantly from the 
cases where mentally-ill Nigerians were repatriated from the UK. In these cases, 
repatriation was often seen as in the “best interests” of the patient. Medical authorities 
thought it important to remove “primitive” African minds from the stressors of a 
“modern” society like Britain. Dozens of repatriations were made on these grounds. 
Distressed pilgrims, including those who suffered from mental illness, were repatriated 
from Saudi Arabia, removing them from a foreign society in which they could not hope 
to thrive, but not to the familiar surroundings of their homes in Nigeria. Rather, pilgrims 
were repatriated only as far as Sudan, where they had to fend for themselves unless they 
were so lucky as to have a family member pay for their repatriation to Nigeria.  
 In repatriation cases from both other British-controlled African colonies and from 
the UK the most important factors contributing to the decision to propose repatriation or 
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not, therefore, appears to have been, first, whether the government doing the repatriating 
could avoid public expenditure or public nuisance through repatriating mental patients to 
Nigeria and, second, the distinction between “primitive” and “modern” social 
surroundings. In cases where the patient was repatriated from the UK, conditions for the 
patient were considered to be better in the familiar surroundings of “primitive” Africa. In 
cases where repatriation to Nigeria from another British colony in Africa was proposed, 
the mental patient was already in “primitive” Africa, so it could not be argued that 
conditions would be better for the patient in Nigeria than in the place they went mad. 
Therefore, as long as the mental patient resided somewhere in British-governed Africa, 
there was usually little psychiatric motivation to move the patient. Such an attitude was 
an implicit adherence to colonial psychiatric definitions of the nature of the “African 
mind” and how it was best treated. Although conjectural, what evidence we have of the 
treatment of mentally-ill Nigerians appears to fit this scenario. Pilgrims, including 
mentally-ill ones, were repatriated from a foreign society back to Africa by the most 
economical means possible, thereby avoiding the possibility of public embarrassment and 
international incident, while at the same time returning “primitive” African minds back to 
their natural environment in Africa where they were considered to be much more likely to 
recover and become self-sufficient.
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Chapter 6 
Deportations from the United States 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 27, 1955 a charter plane carrying “about 57 mental patients and deportees” 
landed in Kano, in northern Nigeria.1 The plane had embarked from the United States of 
America with six Nigerian deportees on board. Five of these Nigerian deportees were 
diagnosed as suffering from a mental illness in the United States. In one way or another, 
the diagnosis of mental illness had led directly to the deportation of these five Nigerians 
to the extent that it either altered their status from legal to illegal immigrant or brought 
their pre-existing illegal status to the attention of the relevant authorities. While at a basic 
level the deportation of these Nigerian migrants can be explained in simple legal terms, a 
deeper analysis must question the intellectual and social impulses that allowed for the 
legislation under which these people were deported. Just as racialized psychological 
theories developed in colonial Africa had influenced how mentally ill Nigerian migrants 
were treated throughout the British Empire in the first half of the twentieth century, a 
similar set of psychological theories developed in the United States and affected how 
mentally ill Nigerian migrants were treated there.  
The development of racialized psychiatry in the United States therefore provides a 
good comparison to the development of colonial psychiatry discussed in previous 
chapters. Such a comparison provides a clear indication of the extent to which 
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assumptions of innate racial difference, built around biological, environmental, and 
historical factors, influenced psychiatric perceptions of the causes of mental illness in 
blacks on a global scale. As in the colonial and imperial context, migration was seen as a 
major factor impinging upon the mental health of blacks in America. Unlike in the UK or 
other parts of the British Empire where the influence of psychiatric knowledge was 
largely indirect, in the United States such psychiatric knowledge directly influenced the 
development of immigration legislation. Therefore, through the nexus of mental illness 
and migration, yet another link between psychiatric knowledge production and the 
exercise of state power becomes evident. 
The development of psychiatric attitudes towards blacks was in many ways 
similar between the United States and European colonial powers. Both the colonial 
psychiatry utilized in the British Empire and the racialized psychiatry of the United States 
were based on the basic assumption that Africans and people of African descent were in 
some ways inferior in mental processes to people of European stock, although debates 
raged as to whether this inferiority was biological or environmental in origin. Likewise, 
both American and European colonial psychiatrists believed that blacks were inherently 
less susceptible to mental illness than whites because of their “primitive” lifestyle and 
worldview, but that greater assimilation into advanced “white” civilization led to a 
greater incidence of mental illness among blacks. However, whereas European colonial 
psychiatrists were concerned with the relatively recent contact between Europeans and 
Africans as a result of the expansion of European empires dating from the late nineteenth 
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century, American psychiatrists were preoccupied with long-standing contacts between 
whites and African-Americans dating back hundreds of years to the beginning of the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade and the development of plantation slavery in the Americas.  
The differences in the type of historical contact between whites and blacks in the 
American and colonial environments led to slightly different conceptions of the way that 
“white” civilization affected the mental health of blacks. European colonial psychiatrists 
argued that Africans had been in a relatively “pure” state of “primitiveness” prior to 
European encroachment and that their “primitive” minds and cultures simply could not 
adjust to the shock of sudden contact with the superior “civilization” of Europeans. 
American psychiatrists, on the other hand, had to recognize that blacks had been exposed 
to white “civilization” in North America for a long time, and had even incorporated 
aspects of white civilization into their own cultures, belief systems, and even bloodlines 
over time. As a result, simple contact with white civilization was not adequate to explain 
rates of mental illness in American blacks as of the twentieth century. For American 
psychiatrists, the factor exacerbating mental disorder among blacks in the US was 
freedom. American psychiatrists argued, and had dubious statistics to prove, that mental 
illness rates among African-Americans had been very low on the plantations, but had 
increased enormously since the emancipation of black slaves following the US Civil War. 
The ostensible cause of such an increase was that African-Americans, so well 
conditioned for subordination and servitude, could not cope with the stresses brought on 
by having to take individual responsibility for their own welfare.  
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With freedom came mobility. As in the case of European colonial psychiatry, 
American psychiatrists saw black migration as a threat to mental health. American 
psychiatrists in the early twentieth century developed a preoccupation with freed blacks 
who moved north as part of the “Great Migration”. While institutionalization of mentally-
ill African Americans was increasing rapidly all over the country at this time, it was seen 
to be increasing more quickly in the urban areas of the north. Some argued that this was 
the case because African-Americans in the north had to live as “marginal men”, perfectly 
capable of fully integrating into “white” civilization but not allowed completely to do so 
because of their own cultural heritage and because of lingering racism in the north. 
However, one hotly-debated theory had it that, for various reasons, migrants from the 
south were responsible for this accelerated rate in the north. Some argued that migrants 
were likely the least stable members of their original communities, the most prone to 
mental illness from the start. Others argued that migrants were simply overstressed by the 
pressure to assimilate into new, urban and non-agricultural environments in the north. 
Some argued that migration played no part at all and, that, in fact, those who stayed in the 
south were at greater risk for developing mental disorder because of the trauma they 
experienced remaining in a violent, race-prejudiced environment. These debates, none of 
which were ever proven conclusively, painted a picture in which the black person in the 
United States was highly susceptible to mental illness by virtue of the fact that he or she 
was a black person living in the United States. This view agrees with Gilman, who 
claimed that “[t]he stereotype of the black… associates blackness not merely with 
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pathology, but with one very specific category of disease, psychopathology.”2 There was 
nowhere that the black mind was safe, and nothing that one could do to make it safer. 
The concerns over black mobility and assimilability in the United States were not 
an isolated phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century. This was the same 
period that saw the greatest restrictions on immigration in American history as well. Not 
only were rates of mental illness amongst African-Americans perceived as extraordinarily 
high at this time, rates for most immigrant groups, white and non-white, were also 
worrisome to many American psychiatrists and legislators. As with blacks, the 
connections between mental illness and migration were based on debates over whether it 
was simply the most unstable element of the population that decides to immigrate or 
whether the difficulties associated with relocation and assimilation into a new society 
breed mental disorder. In any case, the supposed fact that immigrants tended to end up in 
American mental institutions at higher rates than native-born white citizens was one of 
the chief justifications for the restrictive immigration policies put in place as early as the 
1880s. The association of immigrant status with insanity was at this time as conspicuous 
as that between blackness and madness. The five Nigerians deported in 1955 were 
therefore doubly pathologized by their status as both black and immigrant. The overall 
psychological construction of the “African mind” in the United States was therefore very 
similar to what obtained in the colonial and imperial contexts discussed in previous 
chapters, with the sole added burden that in the United States this pathologization had a 
legal as well as social impact.  
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THE NIGERIANS 
At a very basic level, the reason for the deportation of the five Nigerian immigrants in 
1955 was a simple legal requirement: their presence in the United States in their current 
condition was a clear violation of existing immigration law. For two of the deportees the 
onset of mental illness was the basis for their deportation. Juliana Onwu, a twenty-five 
year old midwifery student, and Adebayo J. Ojebuovboh, a twenty-seven year old student 
of unspecified specialization, had entered the country legally.3 Under United States 
immigration legislation dating to 1929, however, any immigrant exhibiting a mental 
illness within five years of arrival could be deported to their country of origin for this 
reason alone.  
The other three deportees had either entered the United States illegally or had 
overstayed their welcome. David Bey, a sixty-year old widower with “little or no 
education” had come to the US as a shipworker in the winter of 1925. He abandoned his 
post and moved to New York City, where he lived for the next thirty years until a case of 
“alcoholic psychosis” put him in a mental hospital in 1954.4 Joseph Oladipupo Robinson 
had also entered the US illegally in 1928. He supported himself for ten years doing “odd 
jobs”, but had been hospitalized since 1938, suffering from what was diagnosed as 
“paranoid schizophrenia.”5 Okon Antigha Edet, on the other hand, had originally come to 
the United States legally in 1939, having won a scholarship to study journalism at 
Lincoln College, the esteemed African-American college in Pennsylvania. After only a 
semester, however, Edet withdrew from the school over financial issues, but remained in 
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the US, eventually taking electrical engineering classes that contributed greatly to an 
obsession with circles and circuits that became a frequent theme in the “chronic 
schizophrenia” with which he was diagnosed in 1942.6 His failure to complete the course 
of study for which he was initially admitted to the United States, however, made him an 
illegal immigrant long before his mental breakdown brought him to the attention of 
government authorities.  
From the dates listed for these migrants’ entry into the United States, it is clear 
that although they were illegal immigrants, at least a couple of them had lived large 
portions of their lives in the United States without incident, and had assimilated into 
American society to a considerable degree. David Bey, for instance, had lived in the 
United States for thirty years at the time of his deportation, most of his adult life. He had 
married an American woman, Wilhelmina Green, from Savannah, Georgia in 1932. He 
had been active in a “Moorish society” in New York from roughly the same time. 
Although he had been out of work for long stretches, he was well-regarded in his 
community and was known to authorities as a person of “good moral character.” At times 
he had even qualified for and received government relief, had worked under a WPA 
program during the Depression, and was registered under the Aliens Registration Act of 
1940 and in the Selective Service. In 1948, Bey had been arrested for a minor offense and 
deportation proceedings had been initiated. When asked if he had any reason why he 
should not be deported as a result of his arrest, Bey declared, “I love this country and 
want to stay here. I never had any trouble with anybody and am no trouble to the 




government.”7 Although deportation proceedings were begun at this time, they were 
apparently never completed. Bey remained in the United States until he became a trouble 
to the government by entering the state hospital with “alcoholic psychosis” in 1954. 
Joseph Oladipupo Robinson had been in the United States almost as long as Bey. 
Although no corresponding specifics of Robinson’s life in the US are available, he clearly 
spent the better part of his life illegally in the United States as well and probably was 
more accustomed to life there than in the home country that he had left twenty-seven 
years earlier. 
 Unlike cases of repatriation from the United Kingdom, but similarly to cases 
originating in African colonies, authorities in the United States did not seem particularly 
concerned with the patient’s well being when making the decision to send them back to 
Nigeria. Bey’s and Robinson’s long tenure in the country would have been a strong 
indication that their “best interests” were probably to stay in the United States. The 
students Onwu and Ojebuovboh would probably have been best served in the long run to 
attempt recovery in the United States and possibly continue their studies. However, 
whether or not it was in these patients’ best interests to return to Nigeria was less 
important than the fact that they had no legal right to be in the United States in the first 
place, and certainly no right to draw on public funds for their maintenance. None of the 
five patients appear to have had any relations that could support them in or out of a 
mental institution. Under the circumstances, deportation was probably the most expedient 
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means of resolving the situation. The circumstances, however, are important. The social 
and political atmosphere that Nigerian immigrants like these five navigated in mid-
twentieth century America was one that tended to view blacks and immigrants as more 
susceptible to mental illness than white, native born Americans and to diagnose blacks 
and immigrants with mental illness at greater rates relative to their total populations than 
the white, native born majority. American psychiatric knowledge and theory about black 
and immigrant mentality was both influential to and influenced by this larger social 
construction of mental illness in American society. 
BLACKNESS AND MADNESS 
Americans’ perception of essential African-American psychology was no more flattering 
than Europeans’ perception of Africans’. In general, examiners of African-American 
mentality in the United States in the first half of the twentieth century found African-
Americans to exhibit, as a group, the following characteristics summarized by Ferguson 
in his extensive 1916 work “The Psychology of the Negro”: 
It is the common opinion that the negro differs more from the white in such traits 
than intellect proper [in which Ferguson found African-Americans to have 
roughly three quarters the capacity of whites]. His emotions are generally 
believed to be strong and volatile in their manifestations…. Instability of 
character is ascribed to the negro, involving a lack of foresight, an improvidence, 
a lack of persistence, small power of serious initiative, a tendency to be content 
with immediate satisfactions, deficient ambition…. Along with high emotionality 
and instability of character, defective morality is held to be a negro 
characteristic…. It may be that the total circumstances of his life are such as 
would lead to immorality even were the negro possessed of the psychic nature of 
the white man.8  
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Various other white American psychiatrists noted the fanatical religiosity of African-
Americans,9 as well as their superstition which caused one author to note matter of factly 
that “all Negroes have a fear of darkness”.10 Such a characterization of African-American 
character traits conforms nearly exactly to that supplied by Carothers in discussing 
African character.11 In essence, the essential psychological boundaries separating 
Europeans from Africans and white Americans from African-Americans were 
remarkably similar, forging a construction in which whites possessed mostly positive 
innate traits and blacks mostly negative. 
Similarly to the European experience with Africans, white American 
psychologists were preoccupied with determining whether African-Americans exhibited 
such negative character traits because of a biological inferiority or because of a cultural 
environment that tended to retard intellectual development in otherwise capable black 
minds. Part of determining whether African-Americans could ever effectively assimilate 
into a free and democratic white civilization relied on whether or not African-Americans 
were intellectually capable of making such an adjustment. Similarly to European colonial 
psychiatrists, American psychiatrists were obsessed with determining the comparative 
intelligence capacities of whites and blacks. As in the case of colonial psychiatry, 
conclusive results were never obtained. Debates raged as to the value of existing 
intelligence tests, the cultural bias inherent in such tests, and the extent to which 
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differences in results were the result of biological or environmental factors.12 Data 
abounded supporting any side of the argument one preferred. Ferguson, in 1914, claimed 
to have proved that even when controlling for environmental factors, African-Americans, 
as a whole, had roughly 75% of the intellectual capacity of whites.13 Other studies 
corroborated this finding, although with slightly different statistical results.14 Even those 
who believed such dubious statistical evidence, however, recognized that individually, 
African-Americans could excel on intelligence tests far above average white scores. 
Witty and Jenkins wrote a study of a Chicago girl named “B.”, who was discovered in 
1935 to have a Stanford-Binet score of 200, the average aggregate score being 100.15 
Other studies clearly indicated that geography mattered in intelligence test results, noting 
repeatedly that northern, urban African-American intelligence test scores tended to more 
closely equal, and sometimes, exceed those of their white peers, while tests conducted in 
southern and rural areas tended to reaffirm the superiority of white intellect.16 
All American psychiatrists were willing to admit, however, that individual 
African Americans could perform very well on intelligence tests. The question of great 
import was whether these individual differences were best explained in terms of 
                                                 
12
 For background on these issues, see Otto Klineberg, ed., Characteristics of the American Negro (New 
York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1944); and Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The 
Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, twentieth anniversary edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
chapters 6 and 44. 
13
 Ferguson, “Psychology of the Negro,” 125. 
14
 See, for example, P.A. Witty and H.C. Lehman, “Racial Differences: the Dogma of Superiority,” 
Journal of Social Psychology 1 (1930): 394-419. For a historiographical overview of race and intelligence 
testing in the United States, see Alexander Thomas and Samuel Sillen, Racism and Psychiatry (New York: 
Brunner/Mazel, 1972), 30-44. 
15
 Paul A. Witty and Martin D. Jenkins, “The Case of ‘B’ – A Gifted Negro Girl,” Journal of Social 
Psychology 6 (1935): 117-24. 
16
 For a rundown of several studies isolating geography as a factor in intelligence test results, see Otto 
Klineberg, “Problems of Interpretation,” in Characteristics of the American Negro, 38-58.  For a specific 
 222 
biological or environmental differences amongst African-Americans. Those who argued 
for biological explanations of differentials within the African American population 
tended to focus on the “purity” of the African American specimen. As far as Ferguson 
was concerned, the explanation for intellectual differences was obviously biological, 
because he found that the intellectual capacity of African-Americans was directly 
proportional to the amount of white blood in their family line, noting that “it is probably 
correct to say that pure negroes, negroes three-fourths pure, mulattoes and quadroons 
have, roughly, 60, 70, 80 and 90 per cent., respectively, of white intellectual 
efficiency.”17 Later studies, of course, heavily disputed the importance of race-mixing in 
determining intelligence levels.18 
Those who wanted to believe in the biological superiority of white intelligence 
also had an explanation for the differences in African American intelligence test scores 
between northern and southern locales. Known as the process of “selective migration”, it 
was supposed that, overall, the biologically most intelligent and capable African 
Americans migrated from the south to the north and from rural to urban areas in the 
decades after emancipation. These highly intelligent African Americans in the north in 
turn bred more intelligent children than their southern counterparts, whose overall 
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intelligence levels had declined as a result of the northern migration of the best of the 
African-American stock.19 
Those who rejected the biological interpretation of intra-racial difference tended 
to argue for the primacy of environmental factors in determining intelligence test 
performance. Upholders of the environmental theory claimed that greater exposure to 
white culture and education systems better prepared African Americans for survival in 
white “civilization” and made them more familiar with the types of questions and 
evaluation methods employed in the most commonly used intelligence tests. Those with 
lighter pigment tended to be more accepted and assimilated into white society, although 
they still faced hardships, than darker-skinned African-Americans. Those African-
Americans who lived in cities and in the north were more likely to have a higher-quality 
education comparable to that which most white children received. Klineberg, for 
example, conducted a long-term study of migrants to New York City and determined that 
intelligence test scores tended to improve the longer they had been in the city, a clear 
indication that environment played a role in individuals’ performance capacity on 
intelligence tests. This evidence was used as a strong argument debunking the selective 
migration hypothesis.20  
The question of African-American intelligence as it was debated by white 
American psychiatrists therefore paralleled the debate on African intelligence undertaken 
by European colonial psychiatrists. The tests were recognized as flawed in both contexts, 
but were continually used as the best tools available, although results were consistently at 
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variance and inconclusive. It would be nice to say that the recognition of type and extent 
of education, environmental reference points, and a growing sense of cultural relativism 
would have obliterated the biological determinism so prevalent in the early twentieth 
century, but this was not the case. As late as 1969, some research scientists were still 
advancing the idea that blacks were inherently, biologically inferior to whites in 
intellectual capacity.21 
Just as a large number of American psychiatrists believed that prolonged exposure 
to and concerted efforts to assimilate with white “civilization” could affect the 
intellectual capacity of African-American minds, it also affected their psychological 
makeup. Where European colonial psychiatrists argued that mental illnesses in Africans 
increased through “detribalization”, as inferior African minds struggled to cope with 
exposure to more sophisticated European civilization, white American psychiatrists 
argued that emancipation had served the same function for African Americans, exposing 
previously well-balanced, unburdened black minds to the horrors of freedom for which 
they were unprepared and with which they were incapable of coping.  
In the opinion of most white psychiatrists, the mental history of African-
Americans had undergone three phases. First was the condition of complete savagery 
exhibited by Africans in their continental homeland. The high point for African-
Americans came when they were captured in their homelands and brought across the 
Atlantic as slaves for southern plantation. Slavery, according to most white American 
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psychiatrists, had been an ideal position for the black mind. The condition of servitude 
exposed African-Americans to an advanced white civilization that they would not have 
known otherwise, and slowly allowed for the incorporation of elements of white 
civilization into African-American worldviews over the long term. At the same time, 
however, slavery protected these inferior black minds from the rigors and stresses of full 
integration into white civilization. Slaves had no worries, were not concerned with how 
to feed and house themselves; they did not know the tortuous anxiety of protecting 
personal property. Emancipation, white American psychiatrists argued, rent African-
Americans from an idyllic existence, forcing them to make their way in a civilized, white 
world for which they were not adequately prepared and in which they might be inherently 
incapable of surviving on their own. 
It was a tragic tale, told thusly by Bevis in his essay on the psychological traits of 
African-Americans from 1921: 
Less than three hundred years ago the alien ancestors of most of the families of 
this race were savages or cannibals in the jungles of Central Africa. From this 
very primitive level they were unwillingly brought to these shores and into an 
environment of higher civilization for which the biological development of the 
race had not made adequate preparation. In later years, citizenship with its novel 
privileges (possibly a greater transition than the first) was thrust upon the race 
finding it poorly prepared, intellectually, for adjustment to this new social order. 
Instinctively the negro turned to the ways of the white man, under whose tutelage 
he had been, and made an effort to compensate for psychic inferiority by imitating 
the superior race. Thus we see in this people a talent for mimicry that is 
remarkable. Efforts to imitate his white neighbors in speech, dress and social 
customs are often overwrought and ludicrous, but sometimes sufficiently exact to 
delude the uninitiated into the belief that the mental level of the negro is only 
slightly inferior to that of the Caucasian.22 
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African Americans had little chance of earning any respect from whites in such a 
construction. Even when African-Americans appeared to have adjusted effectively to 
white “civilization”, Bevis asserts that this is mere “mimicry”, not evidence of black 
equality. 
 O’Malley had spun nearly the same yarn in 1914: 
Only 300 years ago the negro ancestors of this race were naked dwellers on the 
west coast of Africa, whither they had been driven by the superior negro tribes 
who occupied the eastern coast as well as the interior. Here these outcasts, unfit 
even to compete with these other uncivilized races were found by the slave traders 
in the depths of savagery and suddenly transplanted to an environment of the 
highest civilization, and 250 years later had all the responsibilities of this higher 
race thrust upon them, so that to preserve their existence in this environment of 
civilization they were forced to make the products of their mental and manual 
efforts equal to those of their competitors, who had the advantage of thousands of 
years of civilization.23 
 
As had Evarts in a 1914 study on schizophrenia in African-Americans: 
  
Under conditions of great stress, they [Africans] were torn from their own land, 
and sent into a new one, of different climatic conditions, with an entire change of 
food, with a language so utterly unlike their own that even yet their descendents 
speak it imperfectly. Of them, who in their whole race history had not known 
what it was to follow a definite, long continued task, was demanded that they 
work as did their Caucasian masters: of them, who had as yet no moral standards, 
was demanded that they measure up to the lofty ideals of life and conduct those 
Caucasian masters had slowly formed for themselves from the forgotten chaos of 
their own barbarism: of them, whose only conception of religion was the malign 
power of witchcraft, and whose creed affected only their attitude toward their 
gods, not toward their fellow man, was demanded that they kiss the cross of 
Christ, and assume forthwith all the Christian virtues…. Hard as this was in its 
beginning, this bondage in reality was a wonderful aid to the colored man. The 
necessity for mental initiative was never his, and his racial characteristic of 
imitation carried him far on the road. But after he became a free man, the 
conditions under which he must continue his upward progress became infinitely 
harder. He must now think for himself, and exercise forethought if he and his 
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family are to live at all; two things which had so far not been demanded, and for 
which there was no racial preparation.24 
 
Three examples have been provided to illustrate how relatively mainstream the belief was 
that slavery was good for the African-American psyche and that freedom actually 
threatened it because the race was not prepared to accept this boon.  
The inability of African-Americans to adapt to the responsibilities of freedom was 
evident to many American psychiatrists in the statistical increase in rates of mental illness 
among African-Americans since the Civil War. Although no reliable statistical evidence 
was available, conventional wisdom had it that mental illness was quite rare amongst 
black slaves in the United States. For example, Babcock declared in 1895 that “according 
to the testimony of travelers and natives, mental disease is almost unkown among the 
savage tribes of Africa. Among the slaves of the Southern states, also, insanity appears to 
have been conspicuously rare in the experience of individual observers.”25 The forms of 
mental illnesses amongst African-Americans recognized by whites during the slavery era 
were contextually linked to their condition of slavery. Drapetomania, one of the most 
common forms of mental illness amongst slaves, was characterized by an uncontrollable 
urge to run away. Such a construction implied that slaves absconded from plantations 
because of a mental disorder on the slave’s part, not out of any rational desire to rid 
themselves of a life of hardship and indignity. Another oft-cited form of mental malady 
amongst slaves was dysaethesia Aethiopica, often dubbed simply “rascality”. Both of 
these conditions were seen as unnatural behavior for slaves. Since blacks were defined by 
whites as naturally conditioned for servitude not least because of their “happy-go-lucky” 
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attitude towards life in general, those who did not exhibit these characteristics were 
considered mentally ill in the context of a slave society.26 
Many American psychiatrists believed that the majority of African-Americans 
were not threatened by mental illness until their external environment no longer 
symbiotically matched their natural abilities. The result, according to these psychiatrists, 
was a rapid increase in the rates of mental illness among African-Americans in the 
decades after emancipation. As Babcock noted: 
Since emancipation, however, brain diseases have become more common in the 
negro as compared with the whites, having increased, according to the census, 
from one-fifth as common in 1850 and 1860 to one-third as common in 1870 and 
to one-half as common in 1880 and 1890.27 
 
Indeed hospitalization rates of African-Americans suffering from mental disorder 
increased rapidly in the decades after emancipation, and nearly every study conducted in 
the first half of the twentieth century made note of this fact. For example, Malzberg’s 
influential study of admissions to New York state hospitals indicated that first admission 
rates for African-Americans was 150.6 per 100,000 as compared to 73.7 for whites.28 As 
Wilson and Lantz noted for hospitals in Virginia, the admission rate for whites with 
mental disorders had increased from 75 per 100,000 of the population over the five year 
period from 1914-1919 to 96.7 per 100,000 in 1954. African-American admission rates 
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during that period were 84.1 in 1914-1919 and 147.3 in 1954.29 While rates of increase in 
admissions for African-Americans regularly outstripped whites, it was not until the 
census of 1933, however, that African-Americans first represented a larger percentage of 
all mentally patients in state hospitals than whites.30  
 There were many possible explanations for the increase in the hospitalization 
rates of African-Americans for mental disorders during this period, and the causes of 
such an increase were heavily debated by American psychiatrists. Some argued that 
mental illness rates were not actually increasing after the Civil War; it was simply that 
the demands and lifestyle of slavery effectively masked many mental illnesses amongst 
African-Americans. As long as someone could continue to perform their highly rote, 
physical labor, there was no reason to suspect mental illness or to do anything about it 
even if it was recognized.31 Others argued that the statistics were misleading. African-
American institutionalization rates increased after the Civil War relative to whites 
because African-Americans by and large had access to such hospitals for the first time. 
Also, whites were more likely to receive home care or private institutionalization than 
African-Americans, who usually ended up in state hospitals out of poverty or because 
they were arrested for a crime and later placed in the hospital. Those whites who did not 
become a public responsibility did not appear in government-issued data and therefore 
skewed analysis of mental illness rates unrepresentatively towards African-Americans.32 
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Some, of course, argued that African-Americans simply could not handle the 
stress of freedom. “We are beginning to think of insanity,” declared Evarts in 1914: 
 as a failure on the part of the individual to adjust to the demands of his 
environment. In the upward spring of any race it is inevitable that many 
individuals will fall because of their inability to change with changing conditions. 
With this in mind, we can understand why insanity should be on the increase in 
the colored race, for of it is being demanded an adjustment much harder to make, 
when we consider the factors to be used in the problem, than any other race has 
yet been called upon to attempt.33 
 
In the case of African-Americans, the adjustment from slavery to freedom was a grim 
process as far as many psychiatrists were concerned. As Heyman put it: 
We allow ourselves to believe that the Negro still lives in a movie-land of banjo-
playing, cake-walking, and magnolias, care-free and light-hearted. But no one 
who has worked with Negro families can forget the grim struggle to meet the rent, 
the bitter wringing out of a few pennies for burial insurance, the borrowing of 
three lumps of coal on a biting cold day from a more fortunate neighbor, or the 
sense of utter frustration at the absolute inelasticity of money.34 
 
These were all experiences that presumably blacks had not contended with under slavery 
and which they were ill-prepared to handle. 
American psychiatrists were not clear on whether the largely negative character 
traits used to define African-Americans were the result of nature or nurture, but they did 
often link the causes of mental illness in African-Americans to the supposed deficiencies 
in African-American character that were no longer held in check since emancipation. 
“The cause of insanity and other diseases with them [blacks] now,” declared Babcock, “is 
the removal of all healthy restraints that formerly surrounded them.”35 For example, 
African-Americans were typically characterized as immoral, sexually promiscuous, and 
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lacking inhibitions. It was therefore not surprising that African-Americans appeared to 
develop psychoses related to syphilis at a much higher rate than whites.36 In a 
characteristic explanation for this fact, Green declared that “the prevalence is due partly 
to the immorality of the negro which tends to spread the disease, partly to the fact that 
through ignorance or carelessness he takes no precaution against its being communicated 
to others.”37 By the same rationale, it might be expected that psychoses associated with 
alcoholism would occur at a higher rate amongst African-Americans. In most cases, 
however, it did not.38 The explanation, however, was not far to find. Though “[v]ery few 
negroes do not take alcohol when it can be had”, declares Green, “the cost is prohibitive 
as few members of this race earn more than enough to furnish them with basic 
necessities….”39 Green had “no doubt that but that chronic alcoholism would be 
frequently met with in the negro were his financial condition better….”40 Even where 
African-Americans did not exhibit higher mental illness rates than whites, excuses were 
developed to present the African-American as dangerously unstable. 
In general, African-Americans were characterized as overly-emotional and easily 
excitable, but also affable and firmly rooted in the present, incapable of worrying about 
the future or planning for it. As Bevis defined the African-American: 
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Naturally, the Negro lacks initiative; takes no thought for the immediate future, 
living only in the present, without recalling with any degree of concern the 
experiences of the past and profiting by the same; does not worry poverty or 
failure…; is jolly, careless, and easily amused, but sadness and depression have 
little part of his psychic make-up.41 
 
Because of their nature, American psychiatrists argued, African-Americans were less 
likely to develop manic-depressive disorders, which were typically associated with 
periods of high ambition and productivity followed by chasms of obsessive worry and 
unhappiness with current conditions. Where they did occur, manic-depressive states were 
believed to be much more heavily weighted toward the manic in African-Americans due 
to their excitable nature. One of the truisms frequently used to prove that African-
Americans did not suffer from depression was the relatively low suicide rates found 
amongst Afrian-Americans.42 As Prudhomme declared, it was unlikely to see an African-
American commit suicide “over the loss of money or a job. They always seem happiest 
when they are broke and out of a job.”43 Higher rates of schizophrenia, often 
characterized by paranoia and paralysis, among African-Americans were regularly linked 
to the “atmosphere of superstition in which they move” which predisposed them to such 
persecutorial conditions.44 However, schizophrenia was typically among the most 
common diagnosis of mental illness in both blacks and whites.45 
As with intelligence data, mental illness data amongst African-Americans did not 
apply universally across space. Rates of mental illness and their purported causes tended 
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to fluctuate between south and north and between rural and urban. Again, migration was 
seen as a key factor determining these results. Rates of mental illness, at least insofar as 
could be obtained from data emanating from state-run mental hospitals, were generally 
found to be higher in the North than in the South, and higher in urban areas than rural 
areas. Some analysts made the argument that this must naturally be the case because 
more treatment centers were available in urban areas and access to those centers was 
therefore easier for urban populations. Similarly, the widely held belief was that life in 
urban areas was more strenuous than in rural areas for both whites and blacks.46 For 
example, Malzberg’s highly influential study of mental illness rates among African-
Americans in New York State between 1929 and 1931 found that mental illness rates, 
calculated to account for age, indicated that African-Americans were being admitted to 
mental hospitals at a rate of 225 per 100,000 of their population as opposed to 97 per 
100,000 for whites.47 Rates for African-Americans, argued Malzberg were driven by 
admissions in New York City, which accounted for nearly 75% of the African-American 
population of the state.  
Even more alarming, however, African-Americans who had migrated from other 
states accounted for over 90% of all admissions for mental illness in New York state 
hospitals. Whereas the admission rate for both black and white native New Yorkers was 
roughly the same at 40 and 45 per 100,000, the rate for non-native African-Americans 
was 186.2 per 100,000, a clear indication that migration from the South was the key 
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factor leading to high rates of African-American mental illness in the North. As with 
intelligence testing, debates raged as to whether the difference was due to biological 
circumstances linked to the process of selective migration or to the environmental factors 
faced by migrants. As Myrdal put it, “Conditions of life in the South, from which most 
Negroes in the North have come, are the most important reason for the higher mental 
disease rates of Negroes… [I]t is disorganizing to have to change one’s home, job, 
friends, manner of living, especially if that change is as great as that from the rural South 
to the urban North. Too, the people who make these moves are generally the least 
satisfied and least secure; otherwise they would not be making the change.”48 For these 
reasons, migration was widely believed to be a contributing factor to the development 
mental illness in African-Americans. 
It had to be recognized, however, that African-Americans migrated from the 
South because conditions for them were poor there. Even in the South, rates of mental 
illness amongst African-Americans had apparently risen since emancipation. In addition 
to the typical argument that African-Americans were not prepared to cope with the rigors 
of freedom, some psychiatrists argued that the virulent racism that African-Americans 
dealt with in the South and the more tepid social alienation African-Americans 
experienced in the North themselves contributed to mental disorder in African-
Americans. Prudhomme argued that “the emotional supercharge associated with lowered 
threshold and heightened tension unable to discharge itself on the offending agent – the 
white majority, remains as floating hatred ready to be released in a greatly exaggerated 
form at the first suitable object – hence the frequency of physical expressions from 
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simple assaults to homicide.”49 Such cathartic releases were contributory to the low 
suicide rate amongst African-Americans, however, argued Prudhomme. Wilson and 
Lantz argued that increased mental illness rates in Virginia over the first half of the 
twentieth century was at least partially affected by the fact that African-Americans were 
advancing economically and educationally and were “moving rapidly toward a middle 
class white culture” while all the while being reminded of their continued inferior status 
in the form of Jim Crow segregation.50 Such a condition mirrored that of mixed-race 
persons, perpetually seen as more prone to mental-illness than “pure” blacks because of 
their marginal status between cultures and their ultimate inability to identify or assimilate 
completely into either.51 The race problem in America itself was therefore often cited as a 
precipitating factor leading to mental disorder in African-Americans. 
However one viewed the cause of increased admission rates amongst African-
Americans, it was clear that after emancipation, blacks “[had been] raised in the same 
civilization as the white members of a community, read the same advertisements, stare 
into the same shop windows, and have the same ambitions for themselves and their 
children for education, economic security, and happiness in general.”52 It was therefore 
no surprise to many psychiatrists that as African-Americans increasingly assimilated into 
white “civilization” that mental illness rates amongst African-Americans would rise to 
meet those of the white population. There was little to no concern expressed by 
psychiatrists during this period over possible bias in diagnostic processes; it was widely 
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believed that the nature and manifestations of mental illnesses were largely similar 
between white and black Americans. As Evarts had noted in his study on dementia 
precox (schizophrenia) in African Americans: “Dementia precox is dementia precox still, 
though present in an already primitive race. ‘There is no disease, only the diseased.’”53 
What differed between the races as far as American psychiatrists were concerned was the 
incidence of specific mental disorders, each race being more predisposed to certain 
mental illnesses because of their innate racial characteristics. Not until after the political 
groundswell of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s was a concerted effort 
made by an emerging cohort of African-American psychiatrists to develop a distinct form 
of “black psychology” that viewed African-Americans as a distinct cultural unit requiring 
a re-thinking of diagnostic and treatment processes for mentally ill members of the 
group.54 Perhaps not surprisingly, the black psychology movement emerged at roughly 
the same time that African psychiatrists like T.A. Lambo were developing culturally-
sensitive models of psychiatry in Africa. 
IMMIGRATION AND INSANITY 
In the United States, concerns over the link between migration and mental illness were 
not isolated to African-Americans traveling from South to North in the second half of the 
nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. Foreign immigrants, both white and 
non-white, were also pathologized as potential threats to the mental health of the country. 
From the founding of the country until the 1880s, immigration into the United States had 
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been controlled by each individual state, not the federal government, although only the 
federal government had the power to set immigration policy. As a result, immigration 
was relatively unhindered, but the burden of cost, procedure, and socio-cultural impact 
was borne by the states.  By the 1880s, however, clamoring had reached a crescendo for 
the federal government to take control and institute some enforced restrictions on 
immigration in the United States. This clamor was primarily in response to ballooning 
numbers of new immigrants to the United States, mostly from southern and eastern 
Europe and Asia.  Previously, few immigrants from these places had come to the United 
States and, although never accepted, they at least did not pose a recognizable threat to the 
demographic makeup and Protestant culture of Anglo-Saxon America.  As a result, 
increasingly restrictive immigration policies were developed in the United States between 
the 1882 and 1929 that drastically reduced the number of people who could legally enter 
the country. These policies were overtly racist and this racism was linked directly to 
beliefs that certain types of people were more prone to developing mental illnesses than 
others. 
 The immigration restrictions enacted between 1882 and 1929 were intrinsically 
bound to the idea that immigrants tended to develop mental illnesses in the United States 
at much higher rates than native-born whites. As with African American studies, analysts 
tended to determine that, as a whole, the new immigrants from southern and eastern 
Europe were of lower intelligence than native white Americans, who had historically 
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been of northern and western European background.55 The new immigrants also 
supposedly had greater difficulty assimilating to American culture, and were more likely 
to be mentally defective at the time of emigration or to develop a mental illness while in 
the United States. Crude statistical data appeared to corroborate such beliefs. Analysis of 
census statistics from the nineteenth century indicated that as of 1850, the foreign-born 
accounted for one tenth of the population of the US, but one seventh of the insane. By 
1870, the foreign born had risen to one seventh of the population, accounting for one 
third of the insane.56 The consensus by the 1880s was that immigrants, primarily from 
southern and eastern Europe, were clogging the mental hospitals of the US, becoming 
public charges in a country that did not yet owe them anything. Several factors were seen 
to contribute to the problem of foreign insane. First, there was the possibility that “the 
intense life of our native population”57 in the United States was too much for immigrants 
to handle. Second, there was a conspiracy theory that “European municipalities, burdened 
by defective and criminal classes, seeing in our hospitality to emigrants a chance of 
relieving themselves from a heavy tax, began, in a quiet unobserved way, to encourage 
and aid, and, at times, almost to compel, their defective population to come to us.”58 And 
finally, the ultimate fear for white Anglo-Saxon nativists, there was the certainty that 
“insanity is increased, among our native whites, by intermarriage with this tainted foreign 
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element.”59 Therefore, even where mental illness rates rose among native whites, the 
problem could still be blamed on immigrants. 
 Analysts found many problems with the census data, and chipped away at the 
foundations of the belief that insanity was significantly more prevalent amongst 
immigrants than native born populations. By 1903, the importance of age differentials 
had been recognized. It was recognized that mental illness rarely presented itself in 
children. Children made up a significant percentage of the total population of native born 
Americans, but a much smaller percentage of the immigrant population. By instituting 
age controls the results of data collection were altered significantly.60 Others argued that 
the proportion of foreign-born insane, while perhaps high in the late nineteenth century, 
was actually falling over time. According to Waldman, foreign-born adults constituted 
46.2 percent of the population of mental hospitals in New York in 1904; 42.9% in 1909; 
and 41.9% in 1912, a steady decrease even as their proportion of the total population 
grew from 26% to 29.9% over roughly the same period.61 Still others argued that 
migration was a major problem affecting mental illness rates, but that the most dangerous 
type of migration was not that of the foreign-born to the United States but that of the 
native-born within the United States. Malzberg, in a study of first admissions rates in 
New York State hospitals between 1939 and 1941, concluded that “rates for the foreign 
born were in general intermediate between those persons born in New York State and for 
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interstate migrants, and were usually closer to the former.”62 As already noted, Malzberg 
was well aware that a large percentage of those interstate migrants had been African-
Americans moving from the South and had already implicated them as a major 
contributing factor to mental illness rates among African-Americans in New York. 
Whether in the form of arguments for or against a connection between 
immigration and mental illness, the link between immigration and mental illness became 
part of public discourse in the United States. Whether the allegations were true or not, 
many Americans felt that it was the duty of the federal government to protect the states 
from the social and economic threat posed by large numbers of potentially insane 
immigrants. Congress responded by taking up the reins of immigration control.  In 1882, 
Congress enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act, which forbid all immigration of Chinese, 
except for small quotas of teachers, students and merchants.63  This overtly racist 
restriction was complemented later the same year by restrictions denying the immigration 
of “any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of himself or herself 
without becoming a public charge.”64 Amendments to these categories occurred over the 
years, restricting immigration based on moral grounds as well as physical and mental 
handicaps.   
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Growing numbers of unfamiliar immigrants caused increasing fears that non-
Anglo immigrants were more likely to affect the makeup of American society negatively 
through higher rates of disease, mental illness and general inability to support themselves 
in the industrial society of the United States.  These conjectures were put to the test with 
the establishment by Congress of the Dillingham Commission in 1907 to compile reliable 
data about immigrants and their assimilability into US society.  This commission’s 
findings, publicized in 1911,  perpetuated beliefs that the new immigrants of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century were qualitatively different than immigrants from 
northern and western Europe who had preceded them, and indicated that the new “races” 
immigrating at such high rates during this period were more likely to suffer from 
criminality, disease, mental illness, poor physical stock, and lower mental aptitude than 
the non-immigrant population and were less likely to assimilate culturally into Anglo 
industrial society in the first generation.65 The commission recommended both the 
development of a literacy test for admission to the US, as well as the creation of a quota 
system for immigration of five percent of a specific nation’s representation in the US 
census of 1910.  The literacy test was adopted by Congress in 1917. The quota system 
was first enacted in 1921, with amendments in 1924 and 1929 that reduced immigration 
to 2 percent of a nation’s representation in the 1890 census, and finally to a total 
immigration number of 150,000 annually, to be divided up among nations based on their 
proportional representation in the 1920 census.   These parameters of these restrictions 
were meticulously designed to keep out immigrants from undesirable racial and ethnic 
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backgrounds, the same immigrants that were supposedly responsible for the explosion in 
the mentally-ill population of the United States.  
The 1929 Immigration Act restricted immigration to its tightest levels and 
remained the basis of immigration policy until the demolition of the quota system in 1965 
and its replacement with higher generalized quotas with emphasis on family 
reunification, skilled labor, and refugee aid.  Immigration restrictions had been relaxed 
during World War II in order to allow laborers in to aid the war effort, and afterwards a 
1952 act had eliminated racial and ethnic bars to immigration and naturalization, even as 
it tightened the reins on radicals, subversives and Communists.  Nevertheless, by 1965, 
race had ceased to be a legally justifiable basis of exclusion, paving the way for large 
increases of immigration, particularly from Asia, Africa and Latin America, from the 
1970s to the present. 
 The racialized conceptions of mental health evident in both conceptions of 
African-American and immigrant mental health affected each other to forge a definition 
of a “sane” America as a “white”, predominantly Anglo-Saxon, America. While 
immigration policies were geared towards keeping out undesirable race types, the 
increasingly race-based immigration policy had effects on an undesirable race type 
already extant within the United States. American legislators’ ability to construct 
immigration policy, and thereby define the US cultural tradition as one of Anglo-
Saxonism, had adverse effects on the African-American population. Restrictive 
immigration policies in the United States ensured that African Americans, who were 
already viewed as inassimilable, were not a recognized aspect of America’s cultural 
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tradition and, as a result of immigration legislation, would never be an included group in 
a pluralized American society.66 
Where did Africans fit into this picture? Levels of immigration from Africa had 
never been high, and there was little need to make specific regulations limiting black 
immigration. The quota system set legal immigration levels of Africans at nearly zero, 
and those Africans who came to the US, legally or illegally, were subjected to the same 
oppressive Jim Crow legislation in the South and social segregation in the North that 
marginalized the African-American population. As Fairchild has noted, blacks did not 
appear prominently in discussion of immigration restriction because, “with an effective 
set of laws in place limiting the rights of all people of African descent – whether they 
were former slaves or new immigrants – there was little imperative to develop a strong 
rationale or mechanism for controlling immigrants from African nations at the borders.”67  
That black immigrants from Africa and the Caribbean experienced a culture shock when 
arriving in the United States because of racist policies and practices has been well 
documented.68 
While the significance of black immigration may pale in comparison to that of 
Asians or Southern and Eastern Europeans in terms of policy motivations, black 
immigrants did, in fact, come to the United States between the 1880s and 1960s, and 
special circumstances caused this black migration to be a legislative problem in certain 
instances. A 1790 naturalization law denied naturalization rights to blacks and indentured 
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servants. The Fourteenth amendment (1868) gave citizenship to African-Americans, but 
left “those who had been born in Africa or the West Indies ineligible to citizenship.”69 
This changed in1870, however, when Charles Sumner pushed a bill through Congress 
that “extended naturalization to ‘aliens of African nativity and to persons of African 
descent’.”70 So by 1870, Africans and black Caribbeans had naturalization rights in the 
United States.  Immigration rights, however, were another matter. 
The vast majority of black immigrants to the United States before the 1970s came 
from the Caribbean.  Over 150,000 blacks migrated to the United States between 1900 
and 1930, mostly from the Caribbean.  Even after the institution of the quota system 
beginning in 1921, many of these black immigrants did not count under quotas because 
Western Hemisphere immigration had no quotas.  Further adding to the legal muddle was 
the fact that many Caribbean nations were under the imperial political thumb of Great 
Britain or France, making these immigrants eligible for immigrant visas under French or 
British quotas, which were among the highest quotas in the system,71 a situation that 
clearly applied to the Nigerian immigrants around whom the present discussion is based. 
Unsurprisingly, American legislators were not particularly keen on the legal immigration 
of blacks, Caribbean or otherwise, into the United States at this time. In 1936, for 
example, the categorization of “African (Black)” in the national quota registry was 
changed simply to “Negro”, encompassing those from the Western hemisphere as well, in 
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order to reduce the number of blacks entering the country.72 It has also been noted that 
Immigration Service officials deported Africans and Asians at higher than average rates, 




In the American psychiatric construction of the causes and frequency of mental illness, 
African-Americans were pathologized as more susceptible to mental illness than whites 
in all places and at all times. Those who lived in urban areas and in the North were more 
likely to develop a mental illness because of the stresses associated with adapting to 
“white” civilization. Those who lived in the South were endangered by the frustrations of 
living in a racist and segregationist society. Those who chose to change their situation by 
migrating to a more amenable environment were the most stigmatized of all, seen to be at 
the ultimate disadvantage of having to adapt to new surroundings more quickly and with 
a greater culture shock than those who had always been there.  
At the same time, however, it must be noted that American psychiatrists always 
believed that African-Americans had attained a higher level of “civilization” than their 
African race-mates, who had not had the historical benefit of envelopment in white 
civilization. American psychiatrists and European colonial psychiatrists do not appear to 
have had much direct influence on each other – only scant mentions of each other appear 
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in their respective works.74 Overall, however, the thrust of their respective theories were 
similar: both Africans and African-Americans as a racial group were seen to be 
intellectually inferior to whites, for reasons related both to biology and environment. In 
both cases, rates of mental illness in blacks were seen to have been naturally very low but 
to have been exacerbated by the encroachment of white civilization on poorly-equipped 
black minds. In the context of European colonialism in Africa, the influence of white 
civilization was relatively recent and isolated to urban areas; in the United States it was 
everywhere and could not be escaped. In both contexts, migrant blacks put themselves at 
even greater risk because of the drastic changes to their surroundings that they 
encountered.  
In the United States, the pathologization of blackness was accompanied by a 
general pathologization of immigrants, who were deemed more likely to suffer from 
mental illness than native-born Americans, particularly native-born white Americans. 
This link between immigration and mental illness contributed to the establishment of 
highly restrictive immigration policies over the course of the period from 1882 to 1929 
that made it nearly very difficult for blacks to enter the United States legally and nearly 
impossible for blacks to remain in the country if they were diagnosed with a mental 
illness.   
                                                 
74
 American psychiatrists regularly made mention of the “primitive” state of African civilizations, but 
usually in a historical context, making little mention of contemporary conditions in the twentieth century. 
J.C. Carothers in his monograph The African Mind in Health and Disease: A Study in Ethnopsychiatry 
(Geneva: World Health Organization, 1953) has two chapters dedicated to the psychology of the 
“American Negro” but they are very short and do not reference most of the works cited in this chapter 
despite the fact that they were available at the time the book was written. 
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The mentally-ill Nigerian immigrants deported in 1955 were therefore doubly 
pathologized as blacks and immigrants. Under the social and legal designations that 
resulted from the cooperation of psychiatric knowledge and state power, Juliana Onwu, 
Adebayo J. Ojebuovboh, David Bey,  Joseph Oladipupo Robinson and Okon Antigha 
Edet had to be deported to Nigeria not necessarily because it was in their own best 
interests but because it was in the best interests of an America that defined its own mental 
health in terms of its “whiteness”. The links between race, migration and mental illness is 
perhaps even clearer here than in the Euro-African context, indicating the extent to which 
these relationships transcended political and cultural boundaries and contributed to the 
development of a global system of migration control based on the idea that blacks and 




Although racialized perceptions of mental health were never explicitly stated in official 
documents, the analysis provided in the previous chapters indicates that such perceptions 
played a role in how repatriation cases were negotiated and how they were resolved. 
Repatriation cases that originated within British African colonies did not require 
resolution, since conditions were seen as much the same everywhere and there was 
thought to be very little chance that repatriation would improve the mental health of a 
patient. These cases, most of which came from West Africa, largely revolved the short-
term political and economic interests of the governments negotiating the repatriation, 
usually regarding who would pay for the repatriation and endemic and embarrassing 
overcrowding in mental institutions across West Africa. In cases of pilgrimage, in which 
Muslim Nigerians traveled from British-controlled Sudan into the sovereign state of 
Saudi Arabia, repatriation of mental patients appears to have been based on the same 
political considerations as other distressed or destitute pilgrims. In order to avoid 
international embarrassment that came from the congregation of homeless British 
subjects in the holy places of Islam, destitute Nigerian pilgrims were repatriated as far as 
Sudan, but not all the way to Nigeria. There is no indication that mentally-ill pilgrims 
were treated any differently. So long as they were returned to African territory, 
specifically British-controlled African territory, there was little incentive for the colonial 
government of Nigeria to take any further action whether it would have been in the 
mentally-ill migrants’ best interests or not. 
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Conversely, in cases that originated in the United Kingdom or the United States, 
the cause of mental illness was often seen as a direct result of the foreign conditions of 
chaos and modernity that the patient encountered – therefore repatriation, even if it was 
to a place with poorer medical and mental health facilities, was considered useful. It 
could very well be argued that the primary motivations for repatriations from these 
“modern” and “white” countries were also essentially political and economic, i.e. the 
desire to be rid of someone likely to become a public charge or public nuisance. 
However, the rationalization for these motivations was very much based in racialized 
conceptions of the “African mind” and what caused it to sink into madness.  In simple 
terms, the “African mind” belonged in Africa. As long as the African mental patient was 
in Africa, he was in his element and little could be done to improve his mental health by 
repatriating him. However, if the African was outside of Africa, the best thing for him 
was to return him to Africa, where his “primitive” mind could be readjusted to familiar, 
“primitive” surroundings. However, the benefits to be gained by returning Nigerians to 
familiar surroundings seem to have been of secondary concern to the benefits associated 
with removing them from the dangerous environments that were supposed to be 
exacerbating their conditions.  
There is one important distinction to be made here between how the United 
Kingdom and the United States viewed mentally-ill Nigerian migrants. Whereas those 
mentally-ill Nigerians in the UK had every legal right to be there, those in the US did not. 
As a result, the construction of the justification for removal of Nigerian mental patients 
was slightly different. In the UK, the argument was typically that the individual patient 
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would ultimately be better off by returning to Nigeria, even if they would not have access 
to adequate mental health treatment and facilities. In the US, the long-term social 
constructions linking race, immigration and mental illness led to a legal system that 
ultimately deported mentally-ill Nigerians because it was seen to be in the best interests 
of the United States to disavow responsibility for the foreign insane in its borders.   
Despite these differences in how mentally-ill Nigerians were treated across space, 
there is a clear global system in operation here. African minds were not only defined and 
colonized in the African setting: racialized understandings of the “African mind” affected 
not only how mentally-ill Nigerians were treated by their own colonial government, but 
also the way that mentally-ill Nigerians were treated by other governments throughout 
the world. In this way, the construction of the “African mind” undertaken by colonial 
psychiatrists was more than a colonial endeavor, it had global consequences in that the 
knowledge created in the colonial environment spread throughout the world and affected 
colonial subjects beyond the colonial domain. The implicit link established by white 
psychiatrists between race, mentality, and the causes, manifestations and treatments of 
mental illness was instrumental in influencing and justifying the ways that governments 
both in Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States thought about black migration 
and, consequently, how that migration should be controlled. 
It is in the connection between knowledge produced in Africa about Africans and 
the global dissemination and application of this knowledge that this dissertation makes its 
greatest contribution to existing scholarship. The construction of psychiatric knowledge 
about the “African mind” has been dealt with by other historians of psychiatry in colonial 
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Africa. Likewise, the implications of the link between state power, social control, and 
psychiatric definitions of “normality” have been standard fare in the historiographies of 
psychiatry both in Africa and the West. However, the practical effects of processes have 
overwhelmingly been discussed only in local or regional settings. In the case of colonial 
Africa, the colonial mental asylum until very recently had been the sole site in which the 
implications of colonial psychiatry have been examined. In such examinations, it has 
largely been found that psychiatric knowledge, while important within the asylum 
environment, was largely uninteresting to colonial governments, which had already 
defined all Africans as inferior because of their status as colonial subjects. Therefore, 
such scholarship argues, colonial psychiatric knowledge had little use to these 
governments.  
This dissertation argues quite the contrary. By expanding the geographical scope 
and following the flows of migrants out from the colonial setting, the discussion about 
the relationship between psychiatric knowledge and state power is no longer one between 
government and psychiatrist, but between government and government. In this 
relationship, psychiatric knowledge became an underlying factor influencing the 
conditions under which colonial subjects could travel across political boundaries, or, 
more exactly, be carried back across political boundaries once crossed. By looking at 
colonial Africa in a more global context, new perspectives on old problems reveal 
themselves and avenues for future debates are opened. It is hoped that this project may 
provoke comparisons or contrasts with other regions or governments; or with other global 
knowledge systems in the sciences or social sciences. 
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 This has been a story about the constraints on mobility imposed upon Nigerians 
during a time when racism and imperialism dominated European attitudes towards Africa 
and its people. On one level, then, this has been a story about what happened to Africans 
in a global context. On another level, however, it is crucial to see the ways that Africans 
resisted and responded to the things that were happening to them. At no point were 
Africans complicit in the psychiatric constructions that defined them as inferior to 
Europeans. Over the long term, this resistance contributed to the transformation of 
psychiatry from a discipline that explicitly promoted the segregation of people on racial 
lines as beneficial to the mental health of everyone into a discipline that no longer treats 
Africans as a monolithic psychological group and no longer sees mental illness in blacks 
as the residue of the death throes of “primitivism”. The independence of African states 
from colonial domination and the rise of African psychiatrists capable of navigating 
between western psychiatric methods and indigenous African cultural modes contributed 
to the dissemination of new psychiatric knowledge on a global scale to replace the racist 
psychiatry that had preceded it. 
 This is not to say that modern psychiatry does not still grapple with issues of race, 
ethnicity, and other fissures of identity formation.  These issues continue to affect the 
theory and practice of psychiatry today if for no other reason that that they are still major 
aspects of human social interaction that affect the worldview of each and every one of us 
in one way or another. However, thanks to the reforms undertaken by psychiatrists like 
T.A. Lambo and others, psychiatry no longer sees these social constructs as universal 
boundaries, and is more self-aware about the need to treat the mentally-ill on a culturally- 
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and individually sensitive level, if still imperfectly. Whereas the psychiatry of the 
colonial era contributed to a globalization that divided the world along racial lines, the 
cross-cultural psychiatry of today contributes to a globalization that divides the world far 
more finely, providing a globally-disseminated knowledge base that recognizes the 
diversity and uniqueness of individuals and cultures, revealing our world to be far more 
fractured than preceding generations ever imagined. This seeming paradox in which the 
processes of globalization have themselves increasingly illuminated the seemingly-
infinitely varied experiences of human beings is fertile ground for the continued growth 
of global history as a discipline and for the continued incorporation of Africa and 
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